Productivity Effects of Land Rental Markets in Ethiopia : Evidence from a Matched Tenant-Landlord Sample
As countries increasingly strive to transform their economies from agriculture-based into a diversified one, land rental will become of greater importance. It will thus be critical to complement research on the efficiency of specific land rental ar...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
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2012
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| Online Access: | http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20110718144352 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/3491 |
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okr-10986-34912021-04-23T14:02:10Z Productivity Effects of Land Rental Markets in Ethiopia : Evidence from a Matched Tenant-Landlord Sample Deininger, Klaus Ali, Daniel Ayalew Alemu, Tekie ACCOUNTING AGENTS AGRICULTURE ASSETS AVERAGE PRODUCTIVITY BARRIERS TO ENTRY COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE CONSTANT RETURNS TO SCALE CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DEVELOPMENT POLICY DRIVERS ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS ECONOMETRIC MODELS ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMICS EFFICIENT OUTCOMES EMPLOYMENT FACTOR MARKETS FAMILY LABOR FUTURE RESEARCH GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM GINI COEFFICIENT HOUSEHOLDS INCENTIVE EFFECTS INCOME INEFFICIENCY INSURANCE LABOR MARKETS LABOR MOVEMENT LABOR PRODUCTIVITY LAND TENURE LAND USE LANDLORDS LEASING MONITORING COSTS MORAL HAZARD OUTPUTS PERFECT INFORMATION POINTS POLITICAL ECONOMY PRODUCTION FUNCTION PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS PRODUCTIVITY RESIDUAL RISK RISK AVERSION RISK NEUTRAL SCALE EFFECT SOCIAL CAPITAL STRUCTURAL CHANGE TENANTS VARIABLE INPUTS WEALTH As countries increasingly strive to transform their economies from agriculture-based into a diversified one, land rental will become of greater importance. It will thus be critical to complement research on the efficiency of specific land rental arrangements -- such as sharecropping -- with an inquiry into the broader productivity impacts of the land rental market. Plot-level data for a matched landlord-tenant sample in an environment where sharecropping dominates allows this paper to explore both issues. The authors find that pure output sharing leads to significantly lower levels of efficiency that can be attenuated by monitoring while the inefficiency disappears if inputs are shared as well. Rentals transfer land to more productive producers but realization of this productivity advantage is prevented by the inefficiency of contractual arrangements, suggesting changes that would prompt adoption of different contractual arrangements could have significant benefits. 2012-03-19T18:03:23Z 2012-03-19T18:03:23Z 2011-07-01 http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20110718144352 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/3491 English Policy Research working paper ; no. WPS 5727 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Africa Africa Sub-Saharan Africa East Africa Ethiopia |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English |
| topic |
ACCOUNTING AGENTS AGRICULTURE ASSETS AVERAGE PRODUCTIVITY BARRIERS TO ENTRY COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE CONSTANT RETURNS TO SCALE CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DEVELOPMENT POLICY DRIVERS ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS ECONOMETRIC MODELS ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMICS EFFICIENT OUTCOMES EMPLOYMENT FACTOR MARKETS FAMILY LABOR FUTURE RESEARCH GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM GINI COEFFICIENT HOUSEHOLDS INCENTIVE EFFECTS INCOME INEFFICIENCY INSURANCE LABOR MARKETS LABOR MOVEMENT LABOR PRODUCTIVITY LAND TENURE LAND USE LANDLORDS LEASING MONITORING COSTS MORAL HAZARD OUTPUTS PERFECT INFORMATION POINTS POLITICAL ECONOMY PRODUCTION FUNCTION PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS PRODUCTIVITY RESIDUAL RISK RISK AVERSION RISK NEUTRAL SCALE EFFECT SOCIAL CAPITAL STRUCTURAL CHANGE TENANTS VARIABLE INPUTS WEALTH |
| spellingShingle |
ACCOUNTING AGENTS AGRICULTURE ASSETS AVERAGE PRODUCTIVITY BARRIERS TO ENTRY COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE CONSTANT RETURNS TO SCALE CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DEVELOPMENT POLICY DRIVERS ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS ECONOMETRIC MODELS ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMICS EFFICIENT OUTCOMES EMPLOYMENT FACTOR MARKETS FAMILY LABOR FUTURE RESEARCH GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM GINI COEFFICIENT HOUSEHOLDS INCENTIVE EFFECTS INCOME INEFFICIENCY INSURANCE LABOR MARKETS LABOR MOVEMENT LABOR PRODUCTIVITY LAND TENURE LAND USE LANDLORDS LEASING MONITORING COSTS MORAL HAZARD OUTPUTS PERFECT INFORMATION POINTS POLITICAL ECONOMY PRODUCTION FUNCTION PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS PRODUCTIVITY RESIDUAL RISK RISK AVERSION RISK NEUTRAL SCALE EFFECT SOCIAL CAPITAL STRUCTURAL CHANGE TENANTS VARIABLE INPUTS WEALTH Deininger, Klaus Ali, Daniel Ayalew Alemu, Tekie Productivity Effects of Land Rental Markets in Ethiopia : Evidence from a Matched Tenant-Landlord Sample |
| geographic_facet |
Africa Africa Sub-Saharan Africa East Africa Ethiopia |
| relation |
Policy Research working paper ; no. WPS 5727 |
| description |
As countries increasingly strive to
transform their economies from agriculture-based into a
diversified one, land rental will become of greater
importance. It will thus be critical to complement research
on the efficiency of specific land rental arrangements --
such as sharecropping -- with an inquiry into the broader
productivity impacts of the land rental market. Plot-level
data for a matched landlord-tenant sample in an environment
where sharecropping dominates allows this paper to explore
both issues. The authors find that pure output sharing leads
to significantly lower levels of efficiency that can be
attenuated by monitoring while the inefficiency disappears
if inputs are shared as well. Rentals transfer land to more
productive producers but realization of this productivity
advantage is prevented by the inefficiency of contractual
arrangements, suggesting changes that would prompt adoption
of different contractual arrangements could have significant benefits. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Deininger, Klaus Ali, Daniel Ayalew Alemu, Tekie |
| author_facet |
Deininger, Klaus Ali, Daniel Ayalew Alemu, Tekie |
| author_sort |
Deininger, Klaus |
| title |
Productivity Effects of Land Rental Markets in Ethiopia : Evidence from a Matched Tenant-Landlord Sample |
| title_short |
Productivity Effects of Land Rental Markets in Ethiopia : Evidence from a Matched Tenant-Landlord Sample |
| title_full |
Productivity Effects of Land Rental Markets in Ethiopia : Evidence from a Matched Tenant-Landlord Sample |
| title_fullStr |
Productivity Effects of Land Rental Markets in Ethiopia : Evidence from a Matched Tenant-Landlord Sample |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Productivity Effects of Land Rental Markets in Ethiopia : Evidence from a Matched Tenant-Landlord Sample |
| title_sort |
productivity effects of land rental markets in ethiopia : evidence from a matched tenant-landlord sample |
| publishDate |
2012 |
| url |
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20110718144352 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/3491 |
| _version_ |
1764387085622444032 |