Managing Financial Integration and Capital Mobility -- Policy Lessons from the Past Two Decades
The accumulated experience of emerging markets over the past two decades has laid bare the tenuous links between external financial integration and faster growth, on the one hand, and the proclivity of such integration to fuel costly crises on the...
Main Authors: | , |
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Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Published: |
2012
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20110831145953 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/3549 |
Summary: | The accumulated experience of emerging
markets over the past two decades has laid bare the tenuous
links between external financial integration and faster
growth, on the one hand, and the proclivity of such
integration to fuel costly crises on the other. These crises
have not gone without learning. During the 1990s and 2000s,
emerging markets converged to the middle ground of the
policy space defined by the macroeconomic trilemma, with
growing financial integration, controlled exchange rate
flexibility, and proactive monetary policy. The OECD
countries moved much faster toward financial integration,
embracing financial liberalization, opting for a common
currency in Europe, and for flexible exchange rates in other
OECD countries. Following their crises of 1997-2001,
emerging markets added financial stability as a goal,
self-insured by building up international reserves, and
adopted a public finance approach to financial integration.
The global crisis of 2008-2009, which originated in the
financial sector of advanced economies, meant that the OECD
"overshot" the optimal degree of financial
deregulation while the remarkable resilience of the emerging
markets validated their public finance approach to financial
integration. The story is not over: with capital flowing in
droves to emerging markets once again, history could repeat
itself without dynamic measures to manage capital mobility
as part of a comprehensive prudential regulation effort. |
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