The Political Economy of Healthcare Litigation : Model and Empirical Application to Uruguay
The political economy of health care is complex, as stakeholders have conflicting preferences over efficiency and equity. This paper formally models the preferences of consumer and producer groups involved in priority setting and judicialization in...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
2012
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20110929102908 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/3585 |
| Summary: | The political economy of health care is
complex, as stakeholders have conflicting preferences over
efficiency and equity. This paper formally models the
preferences of consumer and producer groups involved in
priority setting and judicialization in public health care.
It uses a unique dataset of stakeholder perceptions, from
Uruguay, to test whether these hypotheses are consistent
with empirical evidence. The results suggest that the
expectations of the political economy literature are
supported: 1) regulators of public healthcare are less
concerned with efficiency considerations than consumers; and
2) less organized groups are more concerned about equity
than more organized interest groups. With respect to the
consequences of health litigation, the findings are only
partially consistent with the health care governance
literature. Consumers perceive litigation as more beneficial
than health care providers and regulators do.
Counter-intuitively, powerful interest groups seem less
willing to use litigation to shape policy outcomes. |
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