Fixing Markets, Not Prices : Policy Options to Tackle Economic Cartels in Latin America and the Caribbean
Collusive agreements among firms slow productivity growth, undermine economic efficiency, and hinder poverty reduction. When competitors agree to limit competition by forming economic cartels, poor households may pay up to 50 percent more for essential goods. Despite their numerous adverse consequen...
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2021
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Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/148021625810668365/Fixing-Markets-Not-Prices-Policy-Options-to-Tackle-Economic-Cartels-in-Latin-America-and-the-Caribbean http://hdl.handle.net/10986/35985 |
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okr-10986-359852022-02-08T05:11:01Z Fixing Markets, Not Prices : Policy Options to Tackle Economic Cartels in Latin America and the Caribbean World Bank ECONOMIC CARTELS MARKET COMPETITION CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ANTITRUST LAW COMPETITION POLICY Collusive agreements among firms slow productivity growth, undermine economic efficiency, and hinder poverty reduction. When competitors agree to limit competition by forming economic cartels, poor households may pay up to 50 percent more for essential goods. Despite their numerous adverse consequences, cartels remain common across many markets. In many LAC countries, policies to foster competition and eliminate cartels are weakly enforced or nonexistent. However, recent successes in cartel detection offer new insight into how to police and prevent collusive agreements. As they implement aggressive and far-reaching post-pandemic recovery efforts, LAC countries have an opportunity to establish a foundation for competitive markets that incentivize efficiency and deliver broad-based gains in employment and income. This report provides novel evidence on the prevalence of cartels in LAC and offers concrete policy options for identifying and breaking up cartels that reflect the country context and market realities. This report draws on a new, comprehensive dataset of cartel agreements uncovered in LAC over the last four decades and presents a sequence of policy options for dismantling cartels and preventing cartel formation. The report also offers tools to guide policymakers in deciding which policy options are most appropriate to the local context, including a taxonomy of factors that facilitate cartelization and an index to gauge the institutional independence of competition authorities. 2021-07-21T13:58:01Z 2021-07-21T13:58:01Z 2021-06-30 Report http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/148021625810668365/Fixing-Markets-Not-Prices-Policy-Options-to-Tackle-Economic-Cartels-in-Latin-America-and-the-Caribbean http://hdl.handle.net/10986/35985 English CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Economic & Sector Work Economic & Sector Work :: Corporate Governance Assessment Latin America & Caribbean Caribbean Latin America |
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Digital Repository |
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Foreign Institution |
institution |
Digital Repositories |
building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
collection |
World Bank |
language |
English |
topic |
ECONOMIC CARTELS MARKET COMPETITION CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ANTITRUST LAW COMPETITION POLICY |
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ECONOMIC CARTELS MARKET COMPETITION CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ANTITRUST LAW COMPETITION POLICY World Bank Fixing Markets, Not Prices : Policy Options to Tackle Economic Cartels in Latin America and the Caribbean |
geographic_facet |
Latin America & Caribbean Caribbean Latin America |
description |
Collusive agreements among firms slow productivity growth, undermine economic efficiency, and hinder poverty reduction. When competitors agree to limit competition by forming economic cartels, poor households may pay up to 50 percent more for essential goods. Despite their numerous adverse consequences, cartels remain common across many markets. In many LAC countries, policies to foster competition and eliminate cartels are weakly enforced or nonexistent. However, recent successes in cartel detection offer new insight into how to police and prevent collusive agreements. As they implement aggressive and far-reaching post-pandemic recovery efforts, LAC countries have an opportunity to establish a foundation for competitive markets that incentivize efficiency and deliver broad-based gains in employment and income. This report provides novel evidence on the prevalence of cartels in LAC and offers concrete policy options for identifying and breaking up cartels that reflect the country context and market realities. This report draws on a new, comprehensive dataset of cartel agreements uncovered in LAC over the last four decades and presents a sequence of policy options for dismantling cartels and preventing cartel formation. The report also offers tools to guide policymakers in deciding which policy options are most appropriate to the local context, including a taxonomy of factors that facilitate cartelization and an index to gauge the institutional independence of competition authorities. |
format |
Report |
author |
World Bank |
author_facet |
World Bank |
author_sort |
World Bank |
title |
Fixing Markets, Not Prices : Policy Options to Tackle Economic Cartels in Latin America and the Caribbean |
title_short |
Fixing Markets, Not Prices : Policy Options to Tackle Economic Cartels in Latin America and the Caribbean |
title_full |
Fixing Markets, Not Prices : Policy Options to Tackle Economic Cartels in Latin America and the Caribbean |
title_fullStr |
Fixing Markets, Not Prices : Policy Options to Tackle Economic Cartels in Latin America and the Caribbean |
title_full_unstemmed |
Fixing Markets, Not Prices : Policy Options to Tackle Economic Cartels in Latin America and the Caribbean |
title_sort |
fixing markets, not prices : policy options to tackle economic cartels in latin america and the caribbean |
publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
publishDate |
2021 |
url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/148021625810668365/Fixing-Markets-Not-Prices-Policy-Options-to-Tackle-Economic-Cartels-in-Latin-America-and-the-Caribbean http://hdl.handle.net/10986/35985 |
_version_ |
1764484200717615104 |