Corruption in Customs
This paper presents a new methodology to detect corruption in customs and applies it to Madagascar’s main port. Manipulation of assignment of import declarations to inspectors is identified by measuring deviations from random assignment prescribed...
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| Format: | Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2021
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/undefined/726921634045778647/Corruption-in-Customs http://hdl.handle.net/10986/36388 |
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okr-10986-363882022-08-01T19:26:15Z Corruption in Customs Chalendard, Cyril Fernandes, Ana M. Raballand, Gael Rijkers, Bob CUSTOMS TARIFF EVASION TAX ENFORCEMENT CORRUPTION TRADE POLICY This paper presents a new methodology to detect corruption in customs and applies it to Madagascar’s main port. Manipulation of assignment of import declarations to inspectors is identified by measuring deviations from random assignment prescribed by official rules. Deviant declarations are more at risk of tax evasion, yet less likely to be deemed fraudulent by inspectors, who also clear them faster. An intervention in which inspector assignment was delegated to a third party validates the approach, but also triggered a novel manifestation of manipulation that rejuvenated systemic corruption. Tax revenue losses associated with the corruption scheme are approximately 3 percent of total taxes collected and highly concentrated among a select few inspectors and brokers. 2021-10-14T14:01:58Z 2021-10-14T14:01:58Z 2021-10 Working Paper http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/undefined/726921634045778647/Corruption-in-Customs http://hdl.handle.net/10986/36388 English Policy Research Working Paper;No. 9802 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English |
| topic |
CUSTOMS TARIFF EVASION TAX ENFORCEMENT CORRUPTION TRADE POLICY |
| spellingShingle |
CUSTOMS TARIFF EVASION TAX ENFORCEMENT CORRUPTION TRADE POLICY Chalendard, Cyril Fernandes, Ana M. Raballand, Gael Rijkers, Bob Corruption in Customs |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No. 9802 |
| description |
This paper presents a new methodology
to detect corruption in customs and applies it to
Madagascar’s main port. Manipulation of assignment of import
declarations to inspectors is identified by measuring
deviations from random assignment prescribed by official
rules. Deviant declarations are more at risk of tax evasion,
yet less likely to be deemed fraudulent by inspectors, who
also clear them faster. An intervention in which inspector
assignment was delegated to a third party validates the
approach, but also triggered a novel manifestation of
manipulation that rejuvenated systemic corruption. Tax
revenue losses associated with the corruption scheme are
approximately 3 percent of total taxes collected and highly
concentrated among a select few inspectors and brokers. |
| format |
Working Paper |
| author |
Chalendard, Cyril Fernandes, Ana M. Raballand, Gael Rijkers, Bob |
| author_facet |
Chalendard, Cyril Fernandes, Ana M. Raballand, Gael Rijkers, Bob |
| author_sort |
Chalendard, Cyril |
| title |
Corruption in Customs |
| title_short |
Corruption in Customs |
| title_full |
Corruption in Customs |
| title_fullStr |
Corruption in Customs |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Corruption in Customs |
| title_sort |
corruption in customs |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2021 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/undefined/726921634045778647/Corruption-in-Customs http://hdl.handle.net/10986/36388 |
| _version_ |
1764485140872953856 |