A Trio of Perspectives on Corruption : Bias, Speed Money and “Grand Theft Infrastructure”

A number of recent survey articles express hope that new data from enterprise surveys would shed new light on corruption complementing the corruption perception index by Transparency International. The paper explores this using the World Bank'...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Kenny, Charles, Klein, Michael, Sztajerowska, Monika
Format: Policy Research Working Paper
Language:English
Published: 2012
Subjects:
CAP
CPI
WEB
Online Access:http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20111128083654
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/3657
id okr-10986-3657
recordtype oai_dc
repository_type Digital Repository
institution_category Foreign Institution
institution Digital Repositories
building World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection World Bank
language English
topic ABUSES
ADVANCED ECONOMIES
ANTICORRUPTION
ANTICORRUPTION AGENDA
ANTICORRUPTION MEASURES
AUCTION
BIASES
BIDDING
BRIBE
BRIBE PAYER
BRIBE PAYERS
BRIBERY
BRIBES
BRIBING
BUSINESS CLIMATE
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT
BUSINESS MODEL
BUSINESS REGISTRATION
CAP
CASH FLOW
COMPETITIVENESS
COMPLAINT
CONFIDENCE
CONSUMER DEMAND
CORRUPT
CORRUPT OFFICIALS
CORRUPT REGIMES
CORRUPTION
CORRUPTION PERCEPTION
CORRUPTION PERCEPTION INDEX
CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS
CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX
CPI
CPI RANKINGS
CRIME
CULTURAL BIAS
DEBT
DEVELOPMENT CENTER
DONOR FUNDING
DRIVER LICENSES
ECONOMIC GROWTH
EDUCATION LEVEL
ELECTRICITY
ENTERPRISE SURVEY
ENTERPRISE SURVEYS
EQUIPMENT
EQUITY FUNDING
EXPENDITURE
EXPENDITURES
EXPERT OPINION
FACILITATION
FACILITATION PAYMENTS
FINANCIAL FLOWS
FISCAL RESOURCES
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
GOOD GOVERNANCE
GOVERNMENT CONTRACT
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS
GRAND CORRUPTION
HOUSEHOLD SURVEYS
HOUSEHOLDS
INCOME
INCOME GROUPS
INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS
INFRASTRUCTURE PROVIDERS
INTERNATIONAL BANK
INVESTMENT DECISIONS
KICKBACKS
LAWYERS
LICENSE
LICENSES
LITERACY RATE
MARKET SHARE
MEASUREMENT OF CORRUPTION
MISREPORTING
MOBILE TELEPHONY
MONOPOLIES
MONOPOLY
OPEN ACCESS
PANEL DATA SETS
PEOPLES
PETTY CORRUPTION
POLITICIANS
PRIVATE SECTOR
PRIVATE SECTOR PARTICIPATION
PRIVATIZATION
PRIVATIZATIONS
PROCUREMENT
PROCUREMENT PROCESS
PRODUCTIVITY
PROGRAMS
PROSECUTION
PUBLIC INVESTMENT
PUBLIC UTILITIES
RED TAPE
RESULT
RESULTS
SCANDAL
SCANDALS
SEARCH
SERVICE PROVIDERS
SMALL BUSINESSES
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
TARGETS
TELECOM
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
TELEPHONY
THEFT
TRANSACTION
TRANSPARENCY
USER
USER FEES
USERS
VICTIMS
VILLAGE
VILLAGES
WEB
spellingShingle ABUSES
ADVANCED ECONOMIES
ANTICORRUPTION
ANTICORRUPTION AGENDA
ANTICORRUPTION MEASURES
AUCTION
BIASES
BIDDING
BRIBE
BRIBE PAYER
BRIBE PAYERS
BRIBERY
BRIBES
BRIBING
BUSINESS CLIMATE
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT
BUSINESS MODEL
BUSINESS REGISTRATION
CAP
CASH FLOW
COMPETITIVENESS
COMPLAINT
CONFIDENCE
CONSUMER DEMAND
CORRUPT
CORRUPT OFFICIALS
CORRUPT REGIMES
CORRUPTION
CORRUPTION PERCEPTION
CORRUPTION PERCEPTION INDEX
CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS
CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX
CPI
CPI RANKINGS
CRIME
CULTURAL BIAS
DEBT
DEVELOPMENT CENTER
DONOR FUNDING
DRIVER LICENSES
ECONOMIC GROWTH
EDUCATION LEVEL
ELECTRICITY
ENTERPRISE SURVEY
ENTERPRISE SURVEYS
EQUIPMENT
EQUITY FUNDING
EXPENDITURE
EXPENDITURES
EXPERT OPINION
FACILITATION
FACILITATION PAYMENTS
FINANCIAL FLOWS
FISCAL RESOURCES
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
GOOD GOVERNANCE
GOVERNMENT CONTRACT
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS
GRAND CORRUPTION
HOUSEHOLD SURVEYS
HOUSEHOLDS
INCOME
INCOME GROUPS
INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS
INFRASTRUCTURE PROVIDERS
INTERNATIONAL BANK
INVESTMENT DECISIONS
KICKBACKS
LAWYERS
LICENSE
LICENSES
LITERACY RATE
MARKET SHARE
MEASUREMENT OF CORRUPTION
MISREPORTING
MOBILE TELEPHONY
MONOPOLIES
MONOPOLY
OPEN ACCESS
PANEL DATA SETS
PEOPLES
PETTY CORRUPTION
POLITICIANS
PRIVATE SECTOR
PRIVATE SECTOR PARTICIPATION
PRIVATIZATION
PRIVATIZATIONS
PROCUREMENT
PROCUREMENT PROCESS
PRODUCTIVITY
PROGRAMS
PROSECUTION
PUBLIC INVESTMENT
PUBLIC UTILITIES
RED TAPE
RESULT
RESULTS
SCANDAL
SCANDALS
SEARCH
SERVICE PROVIDERS
SMALL BUSINESSES
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
TARGETS
TELECOM
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
TELEPHONY
THEFT
TRANSACTION
TRANSPARENCY
USER
USER FEES
USERS
VICTIMS
VILLAGE
VILLAGES
WEB
Kenny, Charles
Klein, Michael
Sztajerowska, Monika
A Trio of Perspectives on Corruption : Bias, Speed Money and “Grand Theft Infrastructure”
geographic_facet The World Region
The World Region
relation Policy Research working paper ; no. WPS 5889
description A number of recent survey articles express hope that new data from enterprise surveys would shed new light on corruption complementing the corruption perception index by Transparency International. The paper explores this using the World Bank's Enterprise Survey data globally and not just the data on Eastern Europe and Central Asia that have been used before. The authors find that in general the Enterprise Survey data provide aggregate views on corruption that are similar to the corruption perception index. However, massive differences exist for key countries, such as China and India. This suggests that idiosyncratic, country-specific biases are at work in one or both data sources. The authors use the Enterprise Survey data and relate them to measures of bureaucratic complexity from the World Bank's Doing Business data, finding that more red tape is associated with higher corruption. The data are also consistent with the view that bribe payments reduce the burden of red tape. Finally, the paper looks at corruption in infrastructure. It has been suggested that the natural monopoly characteristics of infrastructure provide the lever to extract bribes. However, based on data on price-cost gaps, the authors find that infrastructure ventures in power and water typically charge prices below cost in developing economies, not anywhere near monopoly prices. Furthermore, the Enterprise Surveys do not suggest that infrastructure-related bribe payments are more significant than those, for example, related to tax payments or various forms of licensing. Existing sources on bribery surrounding specific projects suggest that the value of bribe payments may not be the biggest problem but the choice of uneconomic and inefficient projects. If infrastructure ventures were entirely dependent on revenue from user fees, they could not afford to pursue inefficient projects, thus reducing the cost of corrupt activity to society. Monopoly pricing would be better than the typical current pricing policy.
format Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
author Kenny, Charles
Klein, Michael
Sztajerowska, Monika
author_facet Kenny, Charles
Klein, Michael
Sztajerowska, Monika
author_sort Kenny, Charles
title A Trio of Perspectives on Corruption : Bias, Speed Money and “Grand Theft Infrastructure”
title_short A Trio of Perspectives on Corruption : Bias, Speed Money and “Grand Theft Infrastructure”
title_full A Trio of Perspectives on Corruption : Bias, Speed Money and “Grand Theft Infrastructure”
title_fullStr A Trio of Perspectives on Corruption : Bias, Speed Money and “Grand Theft Infrastructure”
title_full_unstemmed A Trio of Perspectives on Corruption : Bias, Speed Money and “Grand Theft Infrastructure”
title_sort trio of perspectives on corruption : bias, speed money and “grand theft infrastructure”
publishDate 2012
url http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20111128083654
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/3657
_version_ 1764387661389234176
spelling okr-10986-36572021-04-23T14:02:11Z A Trio of Perspectives on Corruption : Bias, Speed Money and “Grand Theft Infrastructure” Kenny, Charles Klein, Michael Sztajerowska, Monika ABUSES ADVANCED ECONOMIES ANTICORRUPTION ANTICORRUPTION AGENDA ANTICORRUPTION MEASURES AUCTION BIASES BIDDING BRIBE BRIBE PAYER BRIBE PAYERS BRIBERY BRIBES BRIBING BUSINESS CLIMATE BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT BUSINESS MODEL BUSINESS REGISTRATION CAP CASH FLOW COMPETITIVENESS COMPLAINT CONFIDENCE CONSUMER DEMAND CORRUPT CORRUPT OFFICIALS CORRUPT REGIMES CORRUPTION CORRUPTION PERCEPTION CORRUPTION PERCEPTION INDEX CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX CPI CPI RANKINGS CRIME CULTURAL BIAS DEBT DEVELOPMENT CENTER DONOR FUNDING DRIVER LICENSES ECONOMIC GROWTH EDUCATION LEVEL ELECTRICITY ENTERPRISE SURVEY ENTERPRISE SURVEYS EQUIPMENT EQUITY FUNDING EXPENDITURE EXPENDITURES EXPERT OPINION FACILITATION FACILITATION PAYMENTS FINANCIAL FLOWS FISCAL RESOURCES FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT GOOD GOVERNANCE GOVERNMENT CONTRACT GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS GRAND CORRUPTION HOUSEHOLD SURVEYS HOUSEHOLDS INCOME INCOME GROUPS INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS INFRASTRUCTURE PROVIDERS INTERNATIONAL BANK INVESTMENT DECISIONS KICKBACKS LAWYERS LICENSE LICENSES LITERACY RATE MARKET SHARE MEASUREMENT OF CORRUPTION MISREPORTING MOBILE TELEPHONY MONOPOLIES MONOPOLY OPEN ACCESS PANEL DATA SETS PEOPLES PETTY CORRUPTION POLITICIANS PRIVATE SECTOR PRIVATE SECTOR PARTICIPATION PRIVATIZATION PRIVATIZATIONS PROCUREMENT PROCUREMENT PROCESS PRODUCTIVITY PROGRAMS PROSECUTION PUBLIC INVESTMENT PUBLIC UTILITIES RED TAPE RESULT RESULTS SCANDAL SCANDALS SEARCH SERVICE PROVIDERS SMALL BUSINESSES SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT TARGETS TELECOM TELECOMMUNICATIONS TELEPHONY THEFT TRANSACTION TRANSPARENCY USER USER FEES USERS VICTIMS VILLAGE VILLAGES WEB A number of recent survey articles express hope that new data from enterprise surveys would shed new light on corruption complementing the corruption perception index by Transparency International. The paper explores this using the World Bank's Enterprise Survey data globally and not just the data on Eastern Europe and Central Asia that have been used before. The authors find that in general the Enterprise Survey data provide aggregate views on corruption that are similar to the corruption perception index. However, massive differences exist for key countries, such as China and India. This suggests that idiosyncratic, country-specific biases are at work in one or both data sources. The authors use the Enterprise Survey data and relate them to measures of bureaucratic complexity from the World Bank's Doing Business data, finding that more red tape is associated with higher corruption. The data are also consistent with the view that bribe payments reduce the burden of red tape. Finally, the paper looks at corruption in infrastructure. It has been suggested that the natural monopoly characteristics of infrastructure provide the lever to extract bribes. However, based on data on price-cost gaps, the authors find that infrastructure ventures in power and water typically charge prices below cost in developing economies, not anywhere near monopoly prices. Furthermore, the Enterprise Surveys do not suggest that infrastructure-related bribe payments are more significant than those, for example, related to tax payments or various forms of licensing. Existing sources on bribery surrounding specific projects suggest that the value of bribe payments may not be the biggest problem but the choice of uneconomic and inefficient projects. If infrastructure ventures were entirely dependent on revenue from user fees, they could not afford to pursue inefficient projects, thus reducing the cost of corrupt activity to society. Monopoly pricing would be better than the typical current pricing policy. 2012-03-19T18:06:20Z 2012-03-19T18:06:20Z 2011-11-01 http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20111128083654 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/3657 English Policy Research working paper ; no. WPS 5889 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper The World Region The World Region