A Trio of Perspectives on Corruption : Bias, Speed Money and “Grand Theft Infrastructure”
A number of recent survey articles express hope that new data from enterprise surveys would shed new light on corruption complementing the corruption perception index by Transparency International. The paper explores this using the World Bank'...
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Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
Language: | English |
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2012
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Online Access: | http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20111128083654 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/3657 |
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okr-10986-3657 |
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recordtype |
oai_dc |
repository_type |
Digital Repository |
institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
institution |
Digital Repositories |
building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
collection |
World Bank |
language |
English |
topic |
ABUSES ADVANCED ECONOMIES ANTICORRUPTION ANTICORRUPTION AGENDA ANTICORRUPTION MEASURES AUCTION BIASES BIDDING BRIBE BRIBE PAYER BRIBE PAYERS BRIBERY BRIBES BRIBING BUSINESS CLIMATE BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT BUSINESS MODEL BUSINESS REGISTRATION CAP CASH FLOW COMPETITIVENESS COMPLAINT CONFIDENCE CONSUMER DEMAND CORRUPT CORRUPT OFFICIALS CORRUPT REGIMES CORRUPTION CORRUPTION PERCEPTION CORRUPTION PERCEPTION INDEX CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX CPI CPI RANKINGS CRIME CULTURAL BIAS DEBT DEVELOPMENT CENTER DONOR FUNDING DRIVER LICENSES ECONOMIC GROWTH EDUCATION LEVEL ELECTRICITY ENTERPRISE SURVEY ENTERPRISE SURVEYS EQUIPMENT EQUITY FUNDING EXPENDITURE EXPENDITURES EXPERT OPINION FACILITATION FACILITATION PAYMENTS FINANCIAL FLOWS FISCAL RESOURCES FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT GOOD GOVERNANCE GOVERNMENT CONTRACT GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS GRAND CORRUPTION HOUSEHOLD SURVEYS HOUSEHOLDS INCOME INCOME GROUPS INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS INFRASTRUCTURE PROVIDERS INTERNATIONAL BANK INVESTMENT DECISIONS KICKBACKS LAWYERS LICENSE LICENSES LITERACY RATE MARKET SHARE MEASUREMENT OF CORRUPTION MISREPORTING MOBILE TELEPHONY MONOPOLIES MONOPOLY OPEN ACCESS PANEL DATA SETS PEOPLES PETTY CORRUPTION POLITICIANS PRIVATE SECTOR PRIVATE SECTOR PARTICIPATION PRIVATIZATION PRIVATIZATIONS PROCUREMENT PROCUREMENT PROCESS PRODUCTIVITY PROGRAMS PROSECUTION PUBLIC INVESTMENT PUBLIC UTILITIES RED TAPE RESULT RESULTS SCANDAL SCANDALS SEARCH SERVICE PROVIDERS SMALL BUSINESSES SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT TARGETS TELECOM TELECOMMUNICATIONS TELEPHONY THEFT TRANSACTION TRANSPARENCY USER USER FEES USERS VICTIMS VILLAGE VILLAGES WEB |
spellingShingle |
ABUSES ADVANCED ECONOMIES ANTICORRUPTION ANTICORRUPTION AGENDA ANTICORRUPTION MEASURES AUCTION BIASES BIDDING BRIBE BRIBE PAYER BRIBE PAYERS BRIBERY BRIBES BRIBING BUSINESS CLIMATE BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT BUSINESS MODEL BUSINESS REGISTRATION CAP CASH FLOW COMPETITIVENESS COMPLAINT CONFIDENCE CONSUMER DEMAND CORRUPT CORRUPT OFFICIALS CORRUPT REGIMES CORRUPTION CORRUPTION PERCEPTION CORRUPTION PERCEPTION INDEX CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX CPI CPI RANKINGS CRIME CULTURAL BIAS DEBT DEVELOPMENT CENTER DONOR FUNDING DRIVER LICENSES ECONOMIC GROWTH EDUCATION LEVEL ELECTRICITY ENTERPRISE SURVEY ENTERPRISE SURVEYS EQUIPMENT EQUITY FUNDING EXPENDITURE EXPENDITURES EXPERT OPINION FACILITATION FACILITATION PAYMENTS FINANCIAL FLOWS FISCAL RESOURCES FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT GOOD GOVERNANCE GOVERNMENT CONTRACT GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS GRAND CORRUPTION HOUSEHOLD SURVEYS HOUSEHOLDS INCOME INCOME GROUPS INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS INFRASTRUCTURE PROVIDERS INTERNATIONAL BANK INVESTMENT DECISIONS KICKBACKS LAWYERS LICENSE LICENSES LITERACY RATE MARKET SHARE MEASUREMENT OF CORRUPTION MISREPORTING MOBILE TELEPHONY MONOPOLIES MONOPOLY OPEN ACCESS PANEL DATA SETS PEOPLES PETTY CORRUPTION POLITICIANS PRIVATE SECTOR PRIVATE SECTOR PARTICIPATION PRIVATIZATION PRIVATIZATIONS PROCUREMENT PROCUREMENT PROCESS PRODUCTIVITY PROGRAMS PROSECUTION PUBLIC INVESTMENT PUBLIC UTILITIES RED TAPE RESULT RESULTS SCANDAL SCANDALS SEARCH SERVICE PROVIDERS SMALL BUSINESSES SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT TARGETS TELECOM TELECOMMUNICATIONS TELEPHONY THEFT TRANSACTION TRANSPARENCY USER USER FEES USERS VICTIMS VILLAGE VILLAGES WEB Kenny, Charles Klein, Michael Sztajerowska, Monika A Trio of Perspectives on Corruption : Bias, Speed Money and “Grand Theft Infrastructure” |
geographic_facet |
The World Region The World Region |
relation |
Policy Research working paper ; no. WPS 5889 |
description |
A number of recent survey articles
express hope that new data from enterprise surveys would
shed new light on corruption complementing the corruption
perception index by Transparency International. The paper
explores this using the World Bank's Enterprise Survey
data globally and not just the data on Eastern Europe and
Central Asia that have been used before. The authors find
that in general the Enterprise Survey data provide aggregate
views on corruption that are similar to the corruption
perception index. However, massive differences exist for key
countries, such as China and India. This suggests that
idiosyncratic, country-specific biases are at work in one or
both data sources. The authors use the Enterprise Survey
data and relate them to measures of bureaucratic complexity
from the World Bank's Doing Business data, finding that
more red tape is associated with higher corruption. The data
are also consistent with the view that bribe payments reduce
the burden of red tape. Finally, the paper looks at
corruption in infrastructure. It has been suggested that the
natural monopoly characteristics of infrastructure provide
the lever to extract bribes. However, based on data on
price-cost gaps, the authors find that infrastructure
ventures in power and water typically charge prices below
cost in developing economies, not anywhere near monopoly
prices. Furthermore, the Enterprise Surveys do not suggest
that infrastructure-related bribe payments are more
significant than those, for example, related to tax payments
or various forms of licensing. Existing sources on bribery
surrounding specific projects suggest that the value of
bribe payments may not be the biggest problem but the choice
of uneconomic and inefficient projects. If infrastructure
ventures were entirely dependent on revenue from user fees,
they could not afford to pursue inefficient projects, thus
reducing the cost of corrupt activity to society. Monopoly
pricing would be better than the typical current pricing policy. |
format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
author |
Kenny, Charles Klein, Michael Sztajerowska, Monika |
author_facet |
Kenny, Charles Klein, Michael Sztajerowska, Monika |
author_sort |
Kenny, Charles |
title |
A Trio of Perspectives on Corruption : Bias, Speed Money and “Grand Theft Infrastructure” |
title_short |
A Trio of Perspectives on Corruption : Bias, Speed Money and “Grand Theft Infrastructure” |
title_full |
A Trio of Perspectives on Corruption : Bias, Speed Money and “Grand Theft Infrastructure” |
title_fullStr |
A Trio of Perspectives on Corruption : Bias, Speed Money and “Grand Theft Infrastructure” |
title_full_unstemmed |
A Trio of Perspectives on Corruption : Bias, Speed Money and “Grand Theft Infrastructure” |
title_sort |
trio of perspectives on corruption : bias, speed money and “grand theft infrastructure” |
publishDate |
2012 |
url |
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20111128083654 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/3657 |
_version_ |
1764387661389234176 |
spelling |
okr-10986-36572021-04-23T14:02:11Z A Trio of Perspectives on Corruption : Bias, Speed Money and “Grand Theft Infrastructure” Kenny, Charles Klein, Michael Sztajerowska, Monika ABUSES ADVANCED ECONOMIES ANTICORRUPTION ANTICORRUPTION AGENDA ANTICORRUPTION MEASURES AUCTION BIASES BIDDING BRIBE BRIBE PAYER BRIBE PAYERS BRIBERY BRIBES BRIBING BUSINESS CLIMATE BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT BUSINESS MODEL BUSINESS REGISTRATION CAP CASH FLOW COMPETITIVENESS COMPLAINT CONFIDENCE CONSUMER DEMAND CORRUPT CORRUPT OFFICIALS CORRUPT REGIMES CORRUPTION CORRUPTION PERCEPTION CORRUPTION PERCEPTION INDEX CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX CPI CPI RANKINGS CRIME CULTURAL BIAS DEBT DEVELOPMENT CENTER DONOR FUNDING DRIVER LICENSES ECONOMIC GROWTH EDUCATION LEVEL ELECTRICITY ENTERPRISE SURVEY ENTERPRISE SURVEYS EQUIPMENT EQUITY FUNDING EXPENDITURE EXPENDITURES EXPERT OPINION FACILITATION FACILITATION PAYMENTS FINANCIAL FLOWS FISCAL RESOURCES FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT GOOD GOVERNANCE GOVERNMENT CONTRACT GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS GRAND CORRUPTION HOUSEHOLD SURVEYS HOUSEHOLDS INCOME INCOME GROUPS INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS INFRASTRUCTURE PROVIDERS INTERNATIONAL BANK INVESTMENT DECISIONS KICKBACKS LAWYERS LICENSE LICENSES LITERACY RATE MARKET SHARE MEASUREMENT OF CORRUPTION MISREPORTING MOBILE TELEPHONY MONOPOLIES MONOPOLY OPEN ACCESS PANEL DATA SETS PEOPLES PETTY CORRUPTION POLITICIANS PRIVATE SECTOR PRIVATE SECTOR PARTICIPATION PRIVATIZATION PRIVATIZATIONS PROCUREMENT PROCUREMENT PROCESS PRODUCTIVITY PROGRAMS PROSECUTION PUBLIC INVESTMENT PUBLIC UTILITIES RED TAPE RESULT RESULTS SCANDAL SCANDALS SEARCH SERVICE PROVIDERS SMALL BUSINESSES SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT TARGETS TELECOM TELECOMMUNICATIONS TELEPHONY THEFT TRANSACTION TRANSPARENCY USER USER FEES USERS VICTIMS VILLAGE VILLAGES WEB A number of recent survey articles express hope that new data from enterprise surveys would shed new light on corruption complementing the corruption perception index by Transparency International. The paper explores this using the World Bank's Enterprise Survey data globally and not just the data on Eastern Europe and Central Asia that have been used before. The authors find that in general the Enterprise Survey data provide aggregate views on corruption that are similar to the corruption perception index. However, massive differences exist for key countries, such as China and India. This suggests that idiosyncratic, country-specific biases are at work in one or both data sources. The authors use the Enterprise Survey data and relate them to measures of bureaucratic complexity from the World Bank's Doing Business data, finding that more red tape is associated with higher corruption. The data are also consistent with the view that bribe payments reduce the burden of red tape. Finally, the paper looks at corruption in infrastructure. It has been suggested that the natural monopoly characteristics of infrastructure provide the lever to extract bribes. However, based on data on price-cost gaps, the authors find that infrastructure ventures in power and water typically charge prices below cost in developing economies, not anywhere near monopoly prices. Furthermore, the Enterprise Surveys do not suggest that infrastructure-related bribe payments are more significant than those, for example, related to tax payments or various forms of licensing. Existing sources on bribery surrounding specific projects suggest that the value of bribe payments may not be the biggest problem but the choice of uneconomic and inefficient projects. If infrastructure ventures were entirely dependent on revenue from user fees, they could not afford to pursue inefficient projects, thus reducing the cost of corrupt activity to society. Monopoly pricing would be better than the typical current pricing policy. 2012-03-19T18:06:20Z 2012-03-19T18:06:20Z 2011-11-01 http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20111128083654 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/3657 English Policy Research working paper ; no. WPS 5889 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper The World Region The World Region |