Why Central Bank Independence Matters

Deep economic crises - the global financial crisis and the Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic - have put some strains on and rekindled an older debate about the costs and benefits of central bank Independence. Central banks have been acco...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Bandaogo, Mahama Samir
Format: Brief
Language:English
Published: World Bank, Malaysia 2021
Subjects:
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/undefined/284641638334557462/Why-Central-Bank-Independence-Matters
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/36672
id okr-10986-36672
recordtype oai_dc
spelling okr-10986-366722021-12-08T05:10:40Z Why Central Bank Independence Matters Bandaogo, Mahama Samir CENTRAL BANK GOVERNANCE PUBLIC DEBT FISCAL DEFICIT CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE OVERSIGHT Deep economic crises - the global financial crisis and the Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic - have put some strains on and rekindled an older debate about the costs and benefits of central bank Independence. Central banks have been accorded more independence since the 1970s, which has helped bring down and keep inflation low and reduced the risk of fiscal crises. However, as their interventions in the economy with unconventional policies expand further beyond their original mandate, especially those pertaining to financial stability, critics have called for more oversight of their activities. That is because some of the central banks’ newfound responsibilities such as financial stability does not have a precise and unambiguous target or measure, making accountability difficult. The evidence in support of central bank independence remains strong, as highlighted in this brief. However, in light of the expansion of central banks’ power, reforms should aim to institute oversight of the newfound powers. 2021-12-07T22:36:46Z 2021-12-07T22:36:46Z 2021-11-30 Brief http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/undefined/284641638334557462/Why-Central-Bank-Independence-Matters http://hdl.handle.net/10986/36672 English Research and Policy Brief;No. 53 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo World Bank World Bank, Malaysia Publications & Research Publications & Research :: Brief East Asia and Pacific Malaysia
repository_type Digital Repository
institution_category Foreign Institution
institution Digital Repositories
building World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection World Bank
language English
topic CENTRAL BANK GOVERNANCE
PUBLIC DEBT
FISCAL DEFICIT
CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE
OVERSIGHT
spellingShingle CENTRAL BANK GOVERNANCE
PUBLIC DEBT
FISCAL DEFICIT
CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE
OVERSIGHT
Bandaogo, Mahama Samir
Why Central Bank Independence Matters
geographic_facet East Asia and Pacific
Malaysia
relation Research and Policy Brief;No. 53
description Deep economic crises - the global financial crisis and the Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic - have put some strains on and rekindled an older debate about the costs and benefits of central bank Independence. Central banks have been accorded more independence since the 1970s, which has helped bring down and keep inflation low and reduced the risk of fiscal crises. However, as their interventions in the economy with unconventional policies expand further beyond their original mandate, especially those pertaining to financial stability, critics have called for more oversight of their activities. That is because some of the central banks’ newfound responsibilities such as financial stability does not have a precise and unambiguous target or measure, making accountability difficult. The evidence in support of central bank independence remains strong, as highlighted in this brief. However, in light of the expansion of central banks’ power, reforms should aim to institute oversight of the newfound powers.
format Brief
author Bandaogo, Mahama Samir
author_facet Bandaogo, Mahama Samir
author_sort Bandaogo, Mahama Samir
title Why Central Bank Independence Matters
title_short Why Central Bank Independence Matters
title_full Why Central Bank Independence Matters
title_fullStr Why Central Bank Independence Matters
title_full_unstemmed Why Central Bank Independence Matters
title_sort why central bank independence matters
publisher World Bank, Malaysia
publishDate 2021
url http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/undefined/284641638334557462/Why-Central-Bank-Independence-Matters
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/36672
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