Bureaucrats, Tournament Competition, and Performance Manipulation : Evidence from Chinese Cities
Tournament competition is viewed as motivating bureaucrats in promoting growth. This paper examines how this incentive leads to economic performance manipulation. Using data from Chinese cities, the analysis shows that performance exaggeration increase...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
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Washington, DC: World Bank
2022
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/430701644941429406/Bureaucrats-Tournament-Competition-and-Performance-Manipulation-Evidence-from-Chinese-Cities http://hdl.handle.net/10986/37014 |
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okr-10986-37014 |
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oai_dc |
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Digital Repository |
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Foreign Institution |
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Digital Repositories |
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World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
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World Bank |
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English |
| topic |
DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH GROUP; TIME-VARYING VARIABLE; POLITICAL CYCLE; LINEAR TIME TREND; BUREAU OF STATISTIC; PUBLIC SECTOR JOB; PRIOR WORK EXPERIENCE; QUALITY OF BUREAUCRACY; LOCAL ECONOMIC GROWTH; OPEN DOOR; REAL ECONOMIC ACTIVITY; LOCAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET; HIGH POPULATION DENSITY; LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT; LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL; AMOUNT OF POWER; REGIONAL ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE; ECONOMIC GROWTH RATE; REAL GDP; CAREER COMPENSATION; VALUE ADDED; BUREAUCRATIC PERFORMANCE; BUREAUCRATIC SYSTEM; FISCAL REVENUE; SOCIOECONOMIC VARIABLES; ECONOMIC REGION; CAREER TRACK; SUMMARY STATISTIC; DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTIC; LIGHT INTENSITY; TERTIARY SECTOR; INDUSTRIAL VALUE; CAREER ADVANCEMENT; POLITICAL CONNECTIONS; RATCHET EFFECT; FIRST YEAR; POLITICAL COMPETITION; ECONOMETRIC MODEL; ECONOMIC STATISTIC; STRATEGIC COMPETITION; TARGET SETTING; DATA MANIPULATION; SAMPLE SURVEY; WEIGHTED AVERAGE; POLITICAL INCENTIVE; CATERING SECTOR; INDUSTRIAL SECTOR; CITY GOVERNMENT; LOCAL DEVELOPMENT; PARTY COMMITTEE; NEGATIVE VALUE; SMALL AREA; LOW DENSITY; LOCAL CONDITION; AGGREGATE OUTCOME; INSURANCE SECTOR; COMPLEMENTARY FACTOR; GOVERNMENT BEHAVIOR; COAL MINE; TOTAL OUTPUT; ADMINISTRATIVE BOUNDARY; COMMUNIST PARTY; GENERAL LITERATURE; ADMINISTRATIVE RANKS; POLITICAL MECHANISM; CONSTRUCTION ENTERPRISE; PROFESSIONAL LIFE; DATA PROCESSING; PERFORMANCE METRICS; RAW DATA; CRIMINAL PENALTY; REGRESSION RESULTS; REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION; STANDARD DEVIATION; NEGATIVE SIGN; SOLID LINE; ROBUSTNESS CHECK; FREIGHT VOLUME; BASELINE REGRESSION; EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION; HIGH PROBABILITY; JOB LOSS; GEOGRAPHIC PROXIMITY; SUBSEQUENT YEARS; TAKE TIME; ENTRY DATE; CITY LEADERSHIP; PERSONAL NETWORK; LOWER COSTS; OTHER SECTORS; ADMINISTRATIVE LEVEL; PARSIMONIOUS MODEL; LINEAR TREND; COMMON POLITICAL; MARGINAL RETURN; PARTY DISCIPLINE; STATISTICAL AGENCY; LIMITED INFORMATION; PREFECTURE GOVERNMENTS; RECENT YEARS; AIR FORCE; CLOUD COVER; HUMAN SETTLEMENT; GOVERNMENT PLAY; CITY OFFICIAL; ETHNIC MINORITIES; AVAILABLE DATA; COLLECTED DATA; GREAT POWER; LOCAL POLITICIAN; PROMOTION RATE; GOVERNMENT CADRE; SOCIOECONOMIC CONDITIONS; STATISTICAL YEARBOOK; DESCRIPTIVE STATISTIC; SATELLITE DATA; FIXED EFFECT; FITTED VALUE; MEASUREMENT ERROR; TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION; PERFORMANCE REPORTING; COMPETITION FRAMEWORK; INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT; STATE CAPACITY; RESEARCH SUPPORT; SEVERAL REASONS; MACROECONOMIC ANALYSIS; FINANCIAL INTEREST; EMPIRICAL RESULT; CENTRALIZED STATE; INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT; DELIVERING SERVICES; PUBLIC SERVICES; PRIVATE BENEFIT; RENT SEEKER; PUBLIC CHOICE; BUREAUCRATIC QUALITY; ACROSS PROVINCE; LOCAL ECONOMY; PROMOTING GROWTH; PERFORMANCE INCENTIVE; GOOD PERFORMANCE; ADMINISTRATIVE HIERARCHY; DATA QUALITY; INFORMATION ASYMMETRY; OPEN ACCESS; RELATIVE PERFORMANCE; DEVELOPMENT POLICY |
| spellingShingle |
DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH GROUP; TIME-VARYING VARIABLE; POLITICAL CYCLE; LINEAR TIME TREND; BUREAU OF STATISTIC; PUBLIC SECTOR JOB; PRIOR WORK EXPERIENCE; QUALITY OF BUREAUCRACY; LOCAL ECONOMIC GROWTH; OPEN DOOR; REAL ECONOMIC ACTIVITY; LOCAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET; HIGH POPULATION DENSITY; LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT; LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL; AMOUNT OF POWER; REGIONAL ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE; ECONOMIC GROWTH RATE; REAL GDP; CAREER COMPENSATION; VALUE ADDED; BUREAUCRATIC PERFORMANCE; BUREAUCRATIC SYSTEM; FISCAL REVENUE; SOCIOECONOMIC VARIABLES; ECONOMIC REGION; CAREER TRACK; SUMMARY STATISTIC; DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTIC; LIGHT INTENSITY; TERTIARY SECTOR; INDUSTRIAL VALUE; CAREER ADVANCEMENT; POLITICAL CONNECTIONS; RATCHET EFFECT; FIRST YEAR; POLITICAL COMPETITION; ECONOMETRIC MODEL; ECONOMIC STATISTIC; STRATEGIC COMPETITION; TARGET SETTING; DATA MANIPULATION; SAMPLE SURVEY; WEIGHTED AVERAGE; POLITICAL INCENTIVE; CATERING SECTOR; INDUSTRIAL SECTOR; CITY GOVERNMENT; LOCAL DEVELOPMENT; PARTY COMMITTEE; NEGATIVE VALUE; SMALL AREA; LOW DENSITY; LOCAL CONDITION; AGGREGATE OUTCOME; INSURANCE SECTOR; COMPLEMENTARY FACTOR; GOVERNMENT BEHAVIOR; COAL MINE; TOTAL OUTPUT; ADMINISTRATIVE BOUNDARY; COMMUNIST PARTY; GENERAL LITERATURE; ADMINISTRATIVE RANKS; POLITICAL MECHANISM; CONSTRUCTION ENTERPRISE; PROFESSIONAL LIFE; DATA PROCESSING; PERFORMANCE METRICS; RAW DATA; CRIMINAL PENALTY; REGRESSION RESULTS; REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION; STANDARD DEVIATION; NEGATIVE SIGN; SOLID LINE; ROBUSTNESS CHECK; FREIGHT VOLUME; BASELINE REGRESSION; EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION; HIGH PROBABILITY; JOB LOSS; GEOGRAPHIC PROXIMITY; SUBSEQUENT YEARS; TAKE TIME; ENTRY DATE; CITY LEADERSHIP; PERSONAL NETWORK; LOWER COSTS; OTHER SECTORS; ADMINISTRATIVE LEVEL; PARSIMONIOUS MODEL; LINEAR TREND; COMMON POLITICAL; MARGINAL RETURN; PARTY DISCIPLINE; STATISTICAL AGENCY; LIMITED INFORMATION; PREFECTURE GOVERNMENTS; RECENT YEARS; AIR FORCE; CLOUD COVER; HUMAN SETTLEMENT; GOVERNMENT PLAY; CITY OFFICIAL; ETHNIC MINORITIES; AVAILABLE DATA; COLLECTED DATA; GREAT POWER; LOCAL POLITICIAN; PROMOTION RATE; GOVERNMENT CADRE; SOCIOECONOMIC CONDITIONS; STATISTICAL YEARBOOK; DESCRIPTIVE STATISTIC; SATELLITE DATA; FIXED EFFECT; FITTED VALUE; MEASUREMENT ERROR; TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION; PERFORMANCE REPORTING; COMPETITION FRAMEWORK; INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT; STATE CAPACITY; RESEARCH SUPPORT; SEVERAL REASONS; MACROECONOMIC ANALYSIS; FINANCIAL INTEREST; EMPIRICAL RESULT; CENTRALIZED STATE; INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT; DELIVERING SERVICES; PUBLIC SERVICES; PRIVATE BENEFIT; RENT SEEKER; PUBLIC CHOICE; BUREAUCRATIC QUALITY; ACROSS PROVINCE; LOCAL ECONOMY; PROMOTING GROWTH; PERFORMANCE INCENTIVE; GOOD PERFORMANCE; ADMINISTRATIVE HIERARCHY; DATA QUALITY; INFORMATION ASYMMETRY; OPEN ACCESS; RELATIVE PERFORMANCE; DEVELOPMENT POLICY Xu, Gang Xu, L. Colin Si, Ruichao Bureaucrats, Tournament Competition, and Performance Manipulation : Evidence from Chinese Cities |
| geographic_facet |
East Asia and Pacific East Asia and Pacific China |
| description |
Tournament competition is viewed as
motivating bureaucrats in promoting growth. This paper
examines how this incentive leads to economic performance
manipulation. Using data from Chinese cities, the analysis
shows that performance exaggeration increases over the
course of the first term of the top bureaucrat, peaking in
the last year of his or her term. Winning a tournament
competition is behind this performance manipulation:
political rivals reinforce each other in exaggerating
performance, and political competition intensifies the
tendency for manipulation. Performance exaggeration leads to
higher chances of promotion, but the ratchet effect (that
is, better performance today leading to a higher target
tomorrow) and the potential to blame predecessors induce
restraint. A good local institutional environment also
restrains performance manipulation. |
| format |
Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Xu, Gang Xu, L. Colin Si, Ruichao |
| author_facet |
Xu, Gang Xu, L. Colin Si, Ruichao |
| author_sort |
Xu, Gang |
| title |
Bureaucrats, Tournament Competition, and Performance Manipulation : Evidence from Chinese Cities |
| title_short |
Bureaucrats, Tournament Competition, and Performance Manipulation : Evidence from Chinese Cities |
| title_full |
Bureaucrats, Tournament Competition, and Performance Manipulation : Evidence from Chinese Cities |
| title_fullStr |
Bureaucrats, Tournament Competition, and Performance Manipulation : Evidence from Chinese Cities |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Bureaucrats, Tournament Competition, and Performance Manipulation : Evidence from Chinese Cities |
| title_sort |
bureaucrats, tournament competition, and performance manipulation : evidence from chinese cities |
| publisher |
Washington, DC: World Bank |
| publishDate |
2022 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/430701644941429406/Bureaucrats-Tournament-Competition-and-Performance-Manipulation-Evidence-from-Chinese-Cities http://hdl.handle.net/10986/37014 |
| _version_ |
1764486340016078848 |
| spelling |
okr-10986-370142022-02-23T05:10:36Z Bureaucrats, Tournament Competition, and Performance Manipulation : Evidence from Chinese Cities Xu, Gang Xu, L. Colin Si, Ruichao DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH GROUP; TIME-VARYING VARIABLE; POLITICAL CYCLE; LINEAR TIME TREND; BUREAU OF STATISTIC; PUBLIC SECTOR JOB; PRIOR WORK EXPERIENCE; QUALITY OF BUREAUCRACY; LOCAL ECONOMIC GROWTH; OPEN DOOR; REAL ECONOMIC ACTIVITY; LOCAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET; HIGH POPULATION DENSITY; LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT; LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL; AMOUNT OF POWER; REGIONAL ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE; ECONOMIC GROWTH RATE; REAL GDP; CAREER COMPENSATION; VALUE ADDED; BUREAUCRATIC PERFORMANCE; BUREAUCRATIC SYSTEM; FISCAL REVENUE; SOCIOECONOMIC VARIABLES; ECONOMIC REGION; CAREER TRACK; SUMMARY STATISTIC; DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTIC; LIGHT INTENSITY; TERTIARY SECTOR; INDUSTRIAL VALUE; CAREER ADVANCEMENT; POLITICAL CONNECTIONS; RATCHET EFFECT; FIRST YEAR; POLITICAL COMPETITION; ECONOMETRIC MODEL; ECONOMIC STATISTIC; STRATEGIC COMPETITION; TARGET SETTING; DATA MANIPULATION; SAMPLE SURVEY; WEIGHTED AVERAGE; POLITICAL INCENTIVE; CATERING SECTOR; INDUSTRIAL SECTOR; CITY GOVERNMENT; LOCAL DEVELOPMENT; PARTY COMMITTEE; NEGATIVE VALUE; SMALL AREA; LOW DENSITY; LOCAL CONDITION; AGGREGATE OUTCOME; INSURANCE SECTOR; COMPLEMENTARY FACTOR; GOVERNMENT BEHAVIOR; COAL MINE; TOTAL OUTPUT; ADMINISTRATIVE BOUNDARY; COMMUNIST PARTY; GENERAL LITERATURE; ADMINISTRATIVE RANKS; POLITICAL MECHANISM; CONSTRUCTION ENTERPRISE; PROFESSIONAL LIFE; DATA PROCESSING; PERFORMANCE METRICS; RAW DATA; CRIMINAL PENALTY; REGRESSION RESULTS; REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION; STANDARD DEVIATION; NEGATIVE SIGN; SOLID LINE; ROBUSTNESS CHECK; FREIGHT VOLUME; BASELINE REGRESSION; EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION; HIGH PROBABILITY; JOB LOSS; GEOGRAPHIC PROXIMITY; SUBSEQUENT YEARS; TAKE TIME; ENTRY DATE; CITY LEADERSHIP; PERSONAL NETWORK; LOWER COSTS; OTHER SECTORS; ADMINISTRATIVE LEVEL; PARSIMONIOUS MODEL; LINEAR TREND; COMMON POLITICAL; MARGINAL RETURN; PARTY DISCIPLINE; STATISTICAL AGENCY; LIMITED INFORMATION; PREFECTURE GOVERNMENTS; RECENT YEARS; AIR FORCE; CLOUD COVER; HUMAN SETTLEMENT; GOVERNMENT PLAY; CITY OFFICIAL; ETHNIC MINORITIES; AVAILABLE DATA; COLLECTED DATA; GREAT POWER; LOCAL POLITICIAN; PROMOTION RATE; GOVERNMENT CADRE; SOCIOECONOMIC CONDITIONS; STATISTICAL YEARBOOK; DESCRIPTIVE STATISTIC; SATELLITE DATA; FIXED EFFECT; FITTED VALUE; MEASUREMENT ERROR; TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION; PERFORMANCE REPORTING; COMPETITION FRAMEWORK; INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT; STATE CAPACITY; RESEARCH SUPPORT; SEVERAL REASONS; MACROECONOMIC ANALYSIS; FINANCIAL INTEREST; EMPIRICAL RESULT; CENTRALIZED STATE; INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT; DELIVERING SERVICES; PUBLIC SERVICES; PRIVATE BENEFIT; RENT SEEKER; PUBLIC CHOICE; BUREAUCRATIC QUALITY; ACROSS PROVINCE; LOCAL ECONOMY; PROMOTING GROWTH; PERFORMANCE INCENTIVE; GOOD PERFORMANCE; ADMINISTRATIVE HIERARCHY; DATA QUALITY; INFORMATION ASYMMETRY; OPEN ACCESS; RELATIVE PERFORMANCE; DEVELOPMENT POLICY Tournament competition is viewed as motivating bureaucrats in promoting growth. This paper examines how this incentive leads to economic performance manipulation. Using data from Chinese cities, the analysis shows that performance exaggeration increases over the course of the first term of the top bureaucrat, peaking in the last year of his or her term. Winning a tournament competition is behind this performance manipulation: political rivals reinforce each other in exaggerating performance, and political competition intensifies the tendency for manipulation. Performance exaggeration leads to higher chances of promotion, but the ratchet effect (that is, better performance today leading to a higher target tomorrow) and the potential to blame predecessors induce restraint. A good local institutional environment also restrains performance manipulation. 2022-02-22T18:53:53Z 2022-02-22T18:53:53Z 2022-02-15 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/430701644941429406/Bureaucrats-Tournament-Competition-and-Performance-Manipulation-Evidence-from-Chinese-Cities http://hdl.handle.net/10986/37014 English CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo World Bank Washington, DC: World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research East Asia and Pacific East Asia and Pacific China |