Signatures for Sale : How Nominee Services for Shell Companies are Abused to Conceal Beneficial Owners

This report analyzes a family of related corporate arrangements in which nominees act as agents of principals in control of shell companies. It focuses on how nominee arrangements can be abused to facilitate financial crime by obscuring the identity of those in control of shell companies and on poli...

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Main Authors:	Nielson, Daniel Lafayette, Sharman, Jason Campbell
Format:	Report
Language:	English
Published:	Washington, DC: World Bank 2022
Subjects:	REDUCTION OF CORRUPTION CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STAR INITIATIVE FINANCIAL CRIME MONEY LAUNDERING
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/099233504212213207/IDU001f26893087ae0443108a610078194d7562a http://hdl.handle.net/10986/37335

id	okr-10986-37335
recordtype	oai_dc
spelling	okr-10986-373352022-09-20T00:08:30Z Signatures for Sale : How Nominee Services for Shell Companies are Abused to Conceal Beneficial Owners Nielson, Daniel Lafayette Sharman, Jason Campbell REDUCTION OF CORRUPTION CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STAR INITIATIVE FINANCIAL CRIME MONEY LAUNDERING This report analyzes a family of related corporate arrangements in which nominees act as agents of principals in control of shell companies. It focuses on how nominee arrangements can be abused to facilitate financial crime by obscuring the identity of those in control of shell companies and on policies designed to counter such abuses. The report draws evidence from a global mystery shopping exercise based on thousands of solicitations for shell companies, as well as marketing information from shell company providers, and journalistic and policy research on the topic. Nominee arrangements are currently both a threat and a missed opportunity for policy makers. Such arrangements are critical to corporate beneficial ownership transparency as a major but underappreciated point of vulnerability. Strengthening the regulation of nominee arrangements can enhance the transparency of shell companies and help reduce financial crime. Taking best advantage of this opportunity requires greater attention to the transparency of nominee arrangements, better practical enforcement of rules, and replacement of a single country-by-country approach in national evaluations with a more multijurisdictional perspective. 2022-04-26T13:30:19Z 2022-04-26T13:30:19Z 2022-04-21 Report http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/099233504212213207/IDU001f26893087ae0443108a610078194d7562a http://hdl.handle.net/10986/37335 English CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo World Bank Washington, DC: World Bank Report Publications & Research
repository_type	Digital Repository
institution_category	Foreign Institution
institution	Digital Repositories
building	World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection	World Bank
language	English
topic	REDUCTION OF CORRUPTION CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STAR INITIATIVE FINANCIAL CRIME MONEY LAUNDERING
spellingShingle	REDUCTION OF CORRUPTION CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STAR INITIATIVE FINANCIAL CRIME MONEY LAUNDERING Nielson, Daniel Lafayette Sharman, Jason Campbell Signatures for Sale : How Nominee Services for Shell Companies are Abused to Conceal Beneficial Owners
description	This report analyzes a family of related corporate arrangements in which nominees act as agents of principals in control of shell companies. It focuses on how nominee arrangements can be abused to facilitate financial crime by obscuring the identity of those in control of shell companies and on policies designed to counter such abuses. The report draws evidence from a global mystery shopping exercise based on thousands of solicitations for shell companies, as well as marketing information from shell company providers, and journalistic and policy research on the topic. Nominee arrangements are currently both a threat and a missed opportunity for policy makers. Such arrangements are critical to corporate beneficial ownership transparency as a major but underappreciated point of vulnerability. Strengthening the regulation of nominee arrangements can enhance the transparency of shell companies and help reduce financial crime. Taking best advantage of this opportunity requires greater attention to the transparency of nominee arrangements, better practical enforcement of rules, and replacement of a single country-by-country approach in national evaluations with a more multijurisdictional perspective.
format	Report
author	Nielson, Daniel Lafayette Sharman, Jason Campbell
author_facet	Nielson, Daniel Lafayette Sharman, Jason Campbell
author_sort	Nielson, Daniel Lafayette
title	Signatures for Sale : How Nominee Services for Shell Companies are Abused to Conceal Beneficial Owners
title_short	Signatures for Sale : How Nominee Services for Shell Companies are Abused to Conceal Beneficial Owners
title_full	Signatures for Sale : How Nominee Services for Shell Companies are Abused to Conceal Beneficial Owners
title_fullStr	Signatures for Sale : How Nominee Services for Shell Companies are Abused to Conceal Beneficial Owners
title_full_unstemmed	Signatures for Sale : How Nominee Services for Shell Companies are Abused to Conceal Beneficial Owners
title_sort	signatures for sale : how nominee services for shell companies are abused to conceal beneficial owners
publisher	Washington, DC: World Bank
publishDate	2022
url	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/099233504212213207/IDU001f26893087ae0443108a610078194d7562a http://hdl.handle.net/10986/37335
_version_	1764486972732080128

Signatures for Sale : How Nominee Services for Shell Companies are Abused to Conceal Beneficial Owners

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