The Impact of Lifting Firing Restrictions on Firms : Evidence from a State-Level Labor Law Amendment
Stringent employment protection laws are argued to be a cause of reduced employment flexibility, slower growth and increased reliance on temporary employment contracts in many countries, including India. In 2014, the Indian state of Rajasthan amend...
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2022
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okr-10986-374172022-05-14T05:10:41Z The Impact of Lifting Firing Restrictions on Firms : Evidence from a State-Level Labor Law Amendment Chaudhary, Sarur Sharma, Siddharth LABOR REFORM DISTRIBUTION OF WORK TRADE UNIONS LABOR UNIONS WORKFORCE LABOR PRODUCTIVITY Stringent employment protection laws are argued to be a cause of reduced employment flexibility, slower growth and increased reliance on temporary employment contracts in many countries, including India. In 2014, the Indian state of Rajasthan amended labor laws to increase employment flexibility in firms. The most discussed of the amendments lifted the requirement for government approval for retrenching regular workers in medium-size factories. This paper first conducts a synthetic control analysis of the policy change using state-level panel data from 1980 to 2018, finding no evidence of an impact on aggregate manufacturing employment and output. The paper then uses firm-level panel data to conduct a difference-in-differences analysis of the main amendment, exploiting its size-dependent feature for identification. This analysis finds that the amendment reduced the implicit regulatory cost of labor in firms, but there is no discernible impact on their total employment and output. The amendment also led to firms substituting temporary (“contract”) workers for permanent workers. This collateral impact is contrary to the expectation that easing the flexibility of permanent employment arrangements would make them more attractive to firms. 2022-05-13T15:47:32Z 2022-05-13T15:47:32Z 2022-05-09 Working Paper http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/099751205092221721/IDU0de829349018930480b0a4ba0e627b6576af2 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/37417 English CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo World Bank Washington, DC: World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research India |
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World Bank |
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LABOR REFORM DISTRIBUTION OF WORK TRADE UNIONS LABOR UNIONS WORKFORCE LABOR PRODUCTIVITY |
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LABOR REFORM DISTRIBUTION OF WORK TRADE UNIONS LABOR UNIONS WORKFORCE LABOR PRODUCTIVITY Chaudhary, Sarur Sharma, Siddharth The Impact of Lifting Firing Restrictions on Firms : Evidence from a State-Level Labor Law Amendment |
geographic_facet |
India |
description |
Stringent employment protection laws
are argued to be a cause of reduced employment flexibility,
slower growth and increased reliance on temporary employment
contracts in many countries, including India. In 2014, the
Indian state of Rajasthan amended labor laws to increase
employment flexibility in firms. The most discussed of the
amendments lifted the requirement for government approval
for retrenching regular workers in medium-size factories.
This paper first conducts a synthetic control analysis of
the policy change using state-level panel data from 1980 to
2018, finding no evidence of an impact on aggregate
manufacturing employment and output. The paper then uses
firm-level panel data to conduct a difference-in-differences
analysis of the main amendment, exploiting its
size-dependent feature for identification. This analysis
finds that the amendment reduced the implicit regulatory
cost of labor in firms, but there is no discernible impact
on their total employment and output. The amendment also led
to firms substituting temporary (“contract”) workers for
permanent workers. This collateral impact is contrary to the
expectation that easing the flexibility of permanent
employment arrangements would make them more attractive to firms. |
format |
Working Paper |
author |
Chaudhary, Sarur Sharma, Siddharth |
author_facet |
Chaudhary, Sarur Sharma, Siddharth |
author_sort |
Chaudhary, Sarur |
title |
The Impact of Lifting Firing Restrictions on Firms : Evidence from a State-Level Labor Law Amendment |
title_short |
The Impact of Lifting Firing Restrictions on Firms : Evidence from a State-Level Labor Law Amendment |
title_full |
The Impact of Lifting Firing Restrictions on Firms : Evidence from a State-Level Labor Law Amendment |
title_fullStr |
The Impact of Lifting Firing Restrictions on Firms : Evidence from a State-Level Labor Law Amendment |
title_full_unstemmed |
The Impact of Lifting Firing Restrictions on Firms : Evidence from a State-Level Labor Law Amendment |
title_sort |
impact of lifting firing restrictions on firms : evidence from a state-level labor law amendment |
publisher |
Washington, DC: World Bank |
publishDate |
2022 |
url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/099751205092221721/IDU0de829349018930480b0a4ba0e627b6576af2 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/37417 |
_version_ |
1764487136467222528 |