Transactional Governance Structures : New Cross-Country Data and an Application to the Effect of Uncertainty
To what extent are personal trust, mutual interests, and third parties important in enforcing agreements to trade How do firms combine these to form transactional governance structures This paper answers these questions in a whole-economy, cross-co...
| Main Authors: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
| Published: |
Washington, DC : World Bank
2022
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/099738507052218969/IDU0fb2722fc057f10461708ce60933971e612b2 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/37668 |
| Summary: | To what extent are personal trust,
mutual interests, and third parties important in enforcing
agreements to trade How do firms combine these to form
transactional governance structures This paper answers these
questions in a whole-economy, cross-country setting that
considers a full spectrum of transactional-governance
strategies. The data collection requires a new survey
question answerable in any context. The question is applied
in six South American countries using representative
samples, with the resultant survey weights facilitating a
whole-economy analysis. Without imposing an a priori model,
latent class analysis estimates meaningful governance
structures. Bilateralism is always used. Law is never used
alone. Bilateralism and formal institutions are rarely
substitutes. Within country, inter-regional variation in
governance is greater than inter-country variation. The
usefulness of the data is shown by testing one element of
Williamson's discriminating-alignment agenda: greater
uncertainty in the transactional environment increases the
involvement of third parties. |
|---|