Costs of Taxation and Benefits of Public Goods with Multiple Taxes and Goods
The recent public economics literature involves an apparent consensus that income effects reduce the costs of raising revenues and hence increase the desirable level of public good provision. Higher taxes can indeed reduce the demand for leisure --...
Main Authors: | , |
---|---|
Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Published: |
2012
|
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20100901082448 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/3895 |
Summary: | The recent public economics literature
involves an apparent consensus that income effects reduce
the costs of raising revenues and hence increase the
desirable level of public good provision. Higher taxes can
indeed reduce the demand for leisure -- and hence increase
the supply of taxed labor -- through income effects.
However, the consensus is wrong because the income effects
of taxes must be considered symmetrically with those from
provision of public goods. This paper uses a model with
multiple public goods and taxes to derive consistent
measures of the marginal benefits of publicly-provided goods
and their marginal social costs. With this model, the
authors show that either compensated approaches excluding
these income effects or uncompensated approaches including
them may be used. If an uncompensated measure of the
marginal cost of funds is used, however, the benefits of
providing public goods should be adjusted with a simple,
benefit multiplier not previously seen in the literature.
Once this is done, the optimal level of public provision is
independent of whether compensated or uncompensated
approaches are used. Proper accounting for these income
effects -- or their omission using a compensated approach --
appears to substantially raise the hurdle for government
provision where there are substantial taxes bearing on labor. |
---|