Identification Strategy : A Field Experiment on Dynamic Incentives in Rural Credit Markets
How do borrowers respond to improvements in a lender's ability to punish defaulters? This paper reports the results of a randomized field experiment in rural Malawi that examines the impact of fingerprinting borrowers in a context where a uniq...
| Main Authors: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
2012
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20101004091720 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/3921 |
| id |
okr-10986-3921 |
|---|---|
| recordtype |
oai_dc |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English |
| topic |
ACCESS TO CAPITAL ACCESS TO CREDIT ACCESS TO FORMAL CREDIT ACCOUNTING ADVERSE SELECTION AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS AGRICULTURAL LOAN AGRICULTURAL LOANS AGRICULTURE APPROVAL RATES ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION BANKRUPTCY BARTER BORROWER BORROWER BEHAVIOR BORROWER BEHAVIORS BORROWING BRANCH CASH FLOWS CHECKS COLLATERAL COMPANY COMPETITOR CONSUMER BANKRUPTCIES CONSUMER CREDIT CONSUMER FINANCE CONSUMER LOAN CONSUMER LOANS CONVERSIONS CORRUPTION COST ANALYSIS CREDIBILITY CREDIT ACCESS CREDIT AVAILABILITY CREDIT BUREAU CREDIT BUREAUS CREDIT CARD CREDIT CARDS CREDIT CONTRACT CREDIT DENIAL CREDIT EXPANSIONS CREDIT HISTORIES CREDIT HISTORY CREDIT HISTORY INFORMATION CREDIT INFORMATION CREDIT MARKET CREDIT MARKETS CREDIT OFFICER CREDIT OFFICERS CREDIT PERFORMANCE CREDIT PROVIDERS CREDIT REPORTING CREDIT SCORE DEBT DEBT RECOVERY DEFAULT INFORMATION DEFAULT RISK DEFAULTERS DEPENDENT DEPOSIT DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DONOR AGENCY DOWN PAYMENT DUMMY VARIABLE DUMMY VARIABLES ECONOMETRIC MODELS ECONOMETRICS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC RESEARCH ECONOMIC THEORY ECONOMICS RESEARCH EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT COSTS EXCHANGE RATE EXCLUSION EXPANSION EXPORT CROPS FARMER FARMERS FEDERAL RESERVE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM FINANCE CORPORATION FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCIAL INNOVATIONS FINANCIAL INSTITUTION FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION FINANCIAL MARKETS FINANCIAL RESOURCES FINANCIAL SUSTAINABILITY FIRMS FORMAL CREDIT FORMAL LOAN FORMAL LOANS FULL REPAYMENT FUNCTIONAL FORMS FUNGIBLE FUTURE CREDIT FUTURE LOANS FUTURE RESEARCH FUTURE STUDIES GDP GOOD CREDIT GREATER ACCESS GREEN REVOLUTION GROUP BORROWERS HIDDEN INFORMATION HOLDING HOUSEHOLD BANKRUPTCY ID IMPACT OF DEBT INCENTIVE EFFECTS INCOME INEQUALITY INFORMAL INSURANCE INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES INFORMATION ON BORROWERS INFORMATION SHARING INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY INITIAL LOAN INSURANCE MARKET INSURANCE MARKETS INTEREST RATE INTERNATIONAL BANK INVESTING JOINT LIABILITY LABOR MARKETS LATE PAYMENTS LEGAL PROCEEDINGS LEGAL REFORM LENDER LENDERS LIMITED ACCESS LIQUID ASSETS LOAN LOAN AMOUNT LOAN APPLICANTS LOAN APPLICATION LOAN APPLICATIONS LOAN APPROVAL LOAN CONTRACTS LOAN CUSTOMERS LOAN DECISIONS LOAN MARKETS LOAN MATURITY LOAN OFFICER LOAN OFFICERS LOAN POOL LOAN REPAYMENT LOAN REPAYMENTS LOAN SIZE LOAN SIZES LOAN TERMS MACROECONOMICS MARKET INFORMATION MARKET VALUE MATURITY DATE MICRO DATA MICROCREDIT MICROFINANCE MICROFINANCE INSTITUTION MORAL HAZARD NATIONAL CREDIT OUTSTANDING BALANCE OUTSTANDING BALANCES PERSONAL BANKRUPTCIES POLITICAL ECONOMY POSITIVE EFFECTS POTENTIAL BORROWERS PRINCIPAL AGENT MODEL PRIVATE CREDIT PROBABILITY OF DEFAULT PROBABILITY OF REPAYMENT PRODUCTION INPUTS PRODUCTIVE INVESTMENT PROFITABILITY PROSPECTIVE BORROWERS PUBLIC POLICY REPAYMENT REPAYMENT INCENTIVES REPAYMENT PERFORMANCE REPAYMENT RATE REPAYMENT RATES REPAYMENTS REPUDIATION RISK SHARING RURAL CREDIT RURAL CREDIT MARKETS RURAL FINANCE RURAL FINANCIAL MARKETS SAVINGS SAVINGS ACCOUNT SAVINGS PRODUCT SMALLHOLDER SMALLHOLDER FARMERS SUPPLIER SUPPLY OF CREDIT TRANSACTION TRANSACTION COSTS TURNOVER URBAN AREAS VILLAGE VILLAGES |
| spellingShingle |
ACCESS TO CAPITAL ACCESS TO CREDIT ACCESS TO FORMAL CREDIT ACCOUNTING ADVERSE SELECTION AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS AGRICULTURAL LOAN AGRICULTURAL LOANS AGRICULTURE APPROVAL RATES ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION BANKRUPTCY BARTER BORROWER BORROWER BEHAVIOR BORROWER BEHAVIORS BORROWING BRANCH CASH FLOWS CHECKS COLLATERAL COMPANY COMPETITOR CONSUMER BANKRUPTCIES CONSUMER CREDIT CONSUMER FINANCE CONSUMER LOAN CONSUMER LOANS CONVERSIONS CORRUPTION COST ANALYSIS CREDIBILITY CREDIT ACCESS CREDIT AVAILABILITY CREDIT BUREAU CREDIT BUREAUS CREDIT CARD CREDIT CARDS CREDIT CONTRACT CREDIT DENIAL CREDIT EXPANSIONS CREDIT HISTORIES CREDIT HISTORY CREDIT HISTORY INFORMATION CREDIT INFORMATION CREDIT MARKET CREDIT MARKETS CREDIT OFFICER CREDIT OFFICERS CREDIT PERFORMANCE CREDIT PROVIDERS CREDIT REPORTING CREDIT SCORE DEBT DEBT RECOVERY DEFAULT INFORMATION DEFAULT RISK DEFAULTERS DEPENDENT DEPOSIT DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DONOR AGENCY DOWN PAYMENT DUMMY VARIABLE DUMMY VARIABLES ECONOMETRIC MODELS ECONOMETRICS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC RESEARCH ECONOMIC THEORY ECONOMICS RESEARCH EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT COSTS EXCHANGE RATE EXCLUSION EXPANSION EXPORT CROPS FARMER FARMERS FEDERAL RESERVE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM FINANCE CORPORATION FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCIAL INNOVATIONS FINANCIAL INSTITUTION FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION FINANCIAL MARKETS FINANCIAL RESOURCES FINANCIAL SUSTAINABILITY FIRMS FORMAL CREDIT FORMAL LOAN FORMAL LOANS FULL REPAYMENT FUNCTIONAL FORMS FUNGIBLE FUTURE CREDIT FUTURE LOANS FUTURE RESEARCH FUTURE STUDIES GDP GOOD CREDIT GREATER ACCESS GREEN REVOLUTION GROUP BORROWERS HIDDEN INFORMATION HOLDING HOUSEHOLD BANKRUPTCY ID IMPACT OF DEBT INCENTIVE EFFECTS INCOME INEQUALITY INFORMAL INSURANCE INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES INFORMATION ON BORROWERS INFORMATION SHARING INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY INITIAL LOAN INSURANCE MARKET INSURANCE MARKETS INTEREST RATE INTERNATIONAL BANK INVESTING JOINT LIABILITY LABOR MARKETS LATE PAYMENTS LEGAL PROCEEDINGS LEGAL REFORM LENDER LENDERS LIMITED ACCESS LIQUID ASSETS LOAN LOAN AMOUNT LOAN APPLICANTS LOAN APPLICATION LOAN APPLICATIONS LOAN APPROVAL LOAN CONTRACTS LOAN CUSTOMERS LOAN DECISIONS LOAN MARKETS LOAN MATURITY LOAN OFFICER LOAN OFFICERS LOAN POOL LOAN REPAYMENT LOAN REPAYMENTS LOAN SIZE LOAN SIZES LOAN TERMS MACROECONOMICS MARKET INFORMATION MARKET VALUE MATURITY DATE MICRO DATA MICROCREDIT MICROFINANCE MICROFINANCE INSTITUTION MORAL HAZARD NATIONAL CREDIT OUTSTANDING BALANCE OUTSTANDING BALANCES PERSONAL BANKRUPTCIES POLITICAL ECONOMY POSITIVE EFFECTS POTENTIAL BORROWERS PRINCIPAL AGENT MODEL PRIVATE CREDIT PROBABILITY OF DEFAULT PROBABILITY OF REPAYMENT PRODUCTION INPUTS PRODUCTIVE INVESTMENT PROFITABILITY PROSPECTIVE BORROWERS PUBLIC POLICY REPAYMENT REPAYMENT INCENTIVES REPAYMENT PERFORMANCE REPAYMENT RATE REPAYMENT RATES REPAYMENTS REPUDIATION RISK SHARING RURAL CREDIT RURAL CREDIT MARKETS RURAL FINANCE RURAL FINANCIAL MARKETS SAVINGS SAVINGS ACCOUNT SAVINGS PRODUCT SMALLHOLDER SMALLHOLDER FARMERS SUPPLIER SUPPLY OF CREDIT TRANSACTION TRANSACTION COSTS TURNOVER URBAN AREAS VILLAGE VILLAGES Giné, Xavier Goldberg, Jessica Yang, Dean Identification Strategy : A Field Experiment on Dynamic Incentives in Rural Credit Markets |
| geographic_facet |
The World Region The World Region |
| relation |
Policy Research working paper ; no. WPS 5438 |
| description |
How do borrowers respond to improvements
in a lender's ability to punish defaulters? This paper
reports the results of a randomized field experiment in
rural Malawi that examines the impact of fingerprinting
borrowers in a context where a unique identification system
is absent. Fingerprinting allows the lender to more
effectively use dynamic repayment incentives: withholding
future loans from past defaulters while rewarding good
borrowers with better loan terms. Consistent with a simple
model of borrower heterogeneity and information asymmetries,
fingerprinting led to substantially higher repayment rates
for borrowers with the highest ex ante default risk, but had
no effect for the rest of the borrowers. The change in
repayment rates is driven by reductions in adverse selection
(smaller loan sizes) and lower moral hazard (for example,
less diversion of loan-financed fertilizer from its intended
use on the cash crop). |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Giné, Xavier Goldberg, Jessica Yang, Dean |
| author_facet |
Giné, Xavier Goldberg, Jessica Yang, Dean |
| author_sort |
Giné, Xavier |
| title |
Identification Strategy : A Field Experiment on Dynamic Incentives in Rural Credit Markets |
| title_short |
Identification Strategy : A Field Experiment on Dynamic Incentives in Rural Credit Markets |
| title_full |
Identification Strategy : A Field Experiment on Dynamic Incentives in Rural Credit Markets |
| title_fullStr |
Identification Strategy : A Field Experiment on Dynamic Incentives in Rural Credit Markets |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Identification Strategy : A Field Experiment on Dynamic Incentives in Rural Credit Markets |
| title_sort |
identification strategy : a field experiment on dynamic incentives in rural credit markets |
| publishDate |
2012 |
| url |
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20101004091720 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/3921 |
| _version_ |
1764389029279694848 |
| spelling |
okr-10986-39212021-04-23T14:02:13Z Identification Strategy : A Field Experiment on Dynamic Incentives in Rural Credit Markets Giné, Xavier Goldberg, Jessica Yang, Dean ACCESS TO CAPITAL ACCESS TO CREDIT ACCESS TO FORMAL CREDIT ACCOUNTING ADVERSE SELECTION AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS AGRICULTURAL LOAN AGRICULTURAL LOANS AGRICULTURE APPROVAL RATES ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION BANKRUPTCY BARTER BORROWER BORROWER BEHAVIOR BORROWER BEHAVIORS BORROWING BRANCH CASH FLOWS CHECKS COLLATERAL COMPANY COMPETITOR CONSUMER BANKRUPTCIES CONSUMER CREDIT CONSUMER FINANCE CONSUMER LOAN CONSUMER LOANS CONVERSIONS CORRUPTION COST ANALYSIS CREDIBILITY CREDIT ACCESS CREDIT AVAILABILITY CREDIT BUREAU CREDIT BUREAUS CREDIT CARD CREDIT CARDS CREDIT CONTRACT CREDIT DENIAL CREDIT EXPANSIONS CREDIT HISTORIES CREDIT HISTORY CREDIT HISTORY INFORMATION CREDIT INFORMATION CREDIT MARKET CREDIT MARKETS CREDIT OFFICER CREDIT OFFICERS CREDIT PERFORMANCE CREDIT PROVIDERS CREDIT REPORTING CREDIT SCORE DEBT DEBT RECOVERY DEFAULT INFORMATION DEFAULT RISK DEFAULTERS DEPENDENT DEPOSIT DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DONOR AGENCY DOWN PAYMENT DUMMY VARIABLE DUMMY VARIABLES ECONOMETRIC MODELS ECONOMETRICS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC RESEARCH ECONOMIC THEORY ECONOMICS RESEARCH EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT COSTS EXCHANGE RATE EXCLUSION EXPANSION EXPORT CROPS FARMER FARMERS FEDERAL RESERVE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM FINANCE CORPORATION FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCIAL INNOVATIONS FINANCIAL INSTITUTION FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION FINANCIAL MARKETS FINANCIAL RESOURCES FINANCIAL SUSTAINABILITY FIRMS FORMAL CREDIT FORMAL LOAN FORMAL LOANS FULL REPAYMENT FUNCTIONAL FORMS FUNGIBLE FUTURE CREDIT FUTURE LOANS FUTURE RESEARCH FUTURE STUDIES GDP GOOD CREDIT GREATER ACCESS GREEN REVOLUTION GROUP BORROWERS HIDDEN INFORMATION HOLDING HOUSEHOLD BANKRUPTCY ID IMPACT OF DEBT INCENTIVE EFFECTS INCOME INEQUALITY INFORMAL INSURANCE INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES INFORMATION ON BORROWERS INFORMATION SHARING INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY INITIAL LOAN INSURANCE MARKET INSURANCE MARKETS INTEREST RATE INTERNATIONAL BANK INVESTING JOINT LIABILITY LABOR MARKETS LATE PAYMENTS LEGAL PROCEEDINGS LEGAL REFORM LENDER LENDERS LIMITED ACCESS LIQUID ASSETS LOAN LOAN AMOUNT LOAN APPLICANTS LOAN APPLICATION LOAN APPLICATIONS LOAN APPROVAL LOAN CONTRACTS LOAN CUSTOMERS LOAN DECISIONS LOAN MARKETS LOAN MATURITY LOAN OFFICER LOAN OFFICERS LOAN POOL LOAN REPAYMENT LOAN REPAYMENTS LOAN SIZE LOAN SIZES LOAN TERMS MACROECONOMICS MARKET INFORMATION MARKET VALUE MATURITY DATE MICRO DATA MICROCREDIT MICROFINANCE MICROFINANCE INSTITUTION MORAL HAZARD NATIONAL CREDIT OUTSTANDING BALANCE OUTSTANDING BALANCES PERSONAL BANKRUPTCIES POLITICAL ECONOMY POSITIVE EFFECTS POTENTIAL BORROWERS PRINCIPAL AGENT MODEL PRIVATE CREDIT PROBABILITY OF DEFAULT PROBABILITY OF REPAYMENT PRODUCTION INPUTS PRODUCTIVE INVESTMENT PROFITABILITY PROSPECTIVE BORROWERS PUBLIC POLICY REPAYMENT REPAYMENT INCENTIVES REPAYMENT PERFORMANCE REPAYMENT RATE REPAYMENT RATES REPAYMENTS REPUDIATION RISK SHARING RURAL CREDIT RURAL CREDIT MARKETS RURAL FINANCE RURAL FINANCIAL MARKETS SAVINGS SAVINGS ACCOUNT SAVINGS PRODUCT SMALLHOLDER SMALLHOLDER FARMERS SUPPLIER SUPPLY OF CREDIT TRANSACTION TRANSACTION COSTS TURNOVER URBAN AREAS VILLAGE VILLAGES How do borrowers respond to improvements in a lender's ability to punish defaulters? This paper reports the results of a randomized field experiment in rural Malawi that examines the impact of fingerprinting borrowers in a context where a unique identification system is absent. Fingerprinting allows the lender to more effectively use dynamic repayment incentives: withholding future loans from past defaulters while rewarding good borrowers with better loan terms. Consistent with a simple model of borrower heterogeneity and information asymmetries, fingerprinting led to substantially higher repayment rates for borrowers with the highest ex ante default risk, but had no effect for the rest of the borrowers. The change in repayment rates is driven by reductions in adverse selection (smaller loan sizes) and lower moral hazard (for example, less diversion of loan-financed fertilizer from its intended use on the cash crop). 2012-03-19T18:42:12Z 2012-03-19T18:42:12Z 2010-10-01 http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20101004091720 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/3921 English Policy Research working paper ; no. WPS 5438 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper The World Region The World Region |