Bidders’ Entry and Auctioneer’s Rejection : Applying a Double Selection Model to Road Procurement Auctions
Limited competition has been a serious concern in infrastructure procurement. Importantly, however, there are normally a number of potential bidders initially showing interest in proposed projects. This paper focuses on tackling the question why th...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
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2012
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| Online Access: | http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20090304112718 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4051 |
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okr-10986-40512021-04-23T14:02:14Z Bidders’ Entry and Auctioneer’s Rejection : Applying a Double Selection Model to Road Procurement Auctions Estache, Antonio Iimi, Atsushi AFFILIATED AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS AUCTION AUCTION MARKETS AUCTION PROCESS AUCTIONS BID BID EVALUATION BID EVALUATION STAGE BID PRICE BIDDER BIDDERS BIDDING BIDDING DOCUMENTS BIDS BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP BUYER CAPABILITIES CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS COMPETITION COMPETITIVE BIDDING COMPETITIVE TENDERS COMPETITIVENESS CONSTRUCTION WORKS CONTRACT CONTRACT COST CONTRACT DURATION CONTRACTORS CONTRACTS COST ESTIMATE COST ESTIMATES CREDIBILITY CREDITOR DATA DATABASE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPING COUNTRY DUMMY VARIABLES EQUIPMENT EVALUATION SYSTEM EXCHANGE EXPENDITURE FINANCE GOOD GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT HOLDING INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT INSTRUMENTS INTEREST INTERNATIONAL BANK INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS JOINT VENTURE LACK OF COMPETITION LOCAL BUSINESS MARKET MARKET COMPETITION MARKET CONCENTRATION MARKET CONDITIONS MARKETPLACE POLITICAL ECONOMY POTENTIAL BIDDERS PRICE AUCTIONS PRICE BID PRICE COMPARISON PRICE COMPETITION PRICE CRITERIA PRICE EFFECT PRICE EVALUATION PRICES PRIVATE SECTOR PROCUREMENT PROCUREMENT CONTRACTS PROCUREMENT PRACTICES PROCUREMENT PROCEDURE PRODUCT PROFITS PROSPECTIVE BIDDERS PUBLIC PUBLIC CONTRACTS PUBLIC PROCUREMENT PUBLIC PROCUREMENT SYSTEMS PUBLIC SPENDING PUBLIC WORKS PURCHASING QUALIFICATION REQUIREMENTS QUALIFIED BIDDERS RENEGOTIATION RESERVE RESULT RESULTS SALE SHARE SUPPLY TECHNICAL BIDS TECHNICAL QUALIFICATION TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS TELECOM TENDER NOTICES TENDER PROCESS TENDERING TENDERS TRANSACTION TRANSACTION COSTS TRANSACTIONS TRANSPARENCY VALUE WEB WINNING BID Limited competition has been a serious concern in infrastructure procurement. Importantly, however, there are normally a number of potential bidders initially showing interest in proposed projects. This paper focuses on tackling the question why these initially interested bidders fade out. An empirical problem is that no bids of fading-out firms are observable. They could decide not to enter the process at the beginning of the tendering or may be technically disqualified at any point in the selection process. This paper applies the double selection model to procurement data from road development projects in developing countries and examines why competition ends up restricted. It shows that bidders are self-selective and auctioneers also tend to limit participation depending on the size of contracts. Therefore, limited competition would likely lead to high infrastructure procurement costs. 2012-03-19T19:09:06Z 2012-03-19T19:09:06Z 2009-03-01 http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20090304112718 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4051 English Policy Research working paper ; no. WPS 4855 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper The World Region The World Region |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English |
| topic |
AFFILIATED AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS AUCTION AUCTION MARKETS AUCTION PROCESS AUCTIONS BID BID EVALUATION BID EVALUATION STAGE BID PRICE BIDDER BIDDERS BIDDING BIDDING DOCUMENTS BIDS BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP BUYER CAPABILITIES CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS COMPETITION COMPETITIVE BIDDING COMPETITIVE TENDERS COMPETITIVENESS CONSTRUCTION WORKS CONTRACT CONTRACT COST CONTRACT DURATION CONTRACTORS CONTRACTS COST ESTIMATE COST ESTIMATES CREDIBILITY CREDITOR DATA DATABASE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPING COUNTRY DUMMY VARIABLES EQUIPMENT EVALUATION SYSTEM EXCHANGE EXPENDITURE FINANCE GOOD GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT HOLDING INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT INSTRUMENTS INTEREST INTERNATIONAL BANK INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS JOINT VENTURE LACK OF COMPETITION LOCAL BUSINESS MARKET MARKET COMPETITION MARKET CONCENTRATION MARKET CONDITIONS MARKETPLACE POLITICAL ECONOMY POTENTIAL BIDDERS PRICE AUCTIONS PRICE BID PRICE COMPARISON PRICE COMPETITION PRICE CRITERIA PRICE EFFECT PRICE EVALUATION PRICES PRIVATE SECTOR PROCUREMENT PROCUREMENT CONTRACTS PROCUREMENT PRACTICES PROCUREMENT PROCEDURE PRODUCT PROFITS PROSPECTIVE BIDDERS PUBLIC PUBLIC CONTRACTS PUBLIC PROCUREMENT PUBLIC PROCUREMENT SYSTEMS PUBLIC SPENDING PUBLIC WORKS PURCHASING QUALIFICATION REQUIREMENTS QUALIFIED BIDDERS RENEGOTIATION RESERVE RESULT RESULTS SALE SHARE SUPPLY TECHNICAL BIDS TECHNICAL QUALIFICATION TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS TELECOM TENDER NOTICES TENDER PROCESS TENDERING TENDERS TRANSACTION TRANSACTION COSTS TRANSACTIONS TRANSPARENCY VALUE WEB WINNING BID |
| spellingShingle |
AFFILIATED AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS AUCTION AUCTION MARKETS AUCTION PROCESS AUCTIONS BID BID EVALUATION BID EVALUATION STAGE BID PRICE BIDDER BIDDERS BIDDING BIDDING DOCUMENTS BIDS BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP BUYER CAPABILITIES CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS COMPETITION COMPETITIVE BIDDING COMPETITIVE TENDERS COMPETITIVENESS CONSTRUCTION WORKS CONTRACT CONTRACT COST CONTRACT DURATION CONTRACTORS CONTRACTS COST ESTIMATE COST ESTIMATES CREDIBILITY CREDITOR DATA DATABASE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPING COUNTRY DUMMY VARIABLES EQUIPMENT EVALUATION SYSTEM EXCHANGE EXPENDITURE FINANCE GOOD GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT HOLDING INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT INSTRUMENTS INTEREST INTERNATIONAL BANK INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS JOINT VENTURE LACK OF COMPETITION LOCAL BUSINESS MARKET MARKET COMPETITION MARKET CONCENTRATION MARKET CONDITIONS MARKETPLACE POLITICAL ECONOMY POTENTIAL BIDDERS PRICE AUCTIONS PRICE BID PRICE COMPARISON PRICE COMPETITION PRICE CRITERIA PRICE EFFECT PRICE EVALUATION PRICES PRIVATE SECTOR PROCUREMENT PROCUREMENT CONTRACTS PROCUREMENT PRACTICES PROCUREMENT PROCEDURE PRODUCT PROFITS PROSPECTIVE BIDDERS PUBLIC PUBLIC CONTRACTS PUBLIC PROCUREMENT PUBLIC PROCUREMENT SYSTEMS PUBLIC SPENDING PUBLIC WORKS PURCHASING QUALIFICATION REQUIREMENTS QUALIFIED BIDDERS RENEGOTIATION RESERVE RESULT RESULTS SALE SHARE SUPPLY TECHNICAL BIDS TECHNICAL QUALIFICATION TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS TELECOM TENDER NOTICES TENDER PROCESS TENDERING TENDERS TRANSACTION TRANSACTION COSTS TRANSACTIONS TRANSPARENCY VALUE WEB WINNING BID Estache, Antonio Iimi, Atsushi Bidders’ Entry and Auctioneer’s Rejection : Applying a Double Selection Model to Road Procurement Auctions |
| geographic_facet |
The World Region The World Region |
| relation |
Policy Research working paper ; no. WPS 4855 |
| description |
Limited competition has been a serious
concern in infrastructure procurement. Importantly, however,
there are normally a number of potential bidders initially
showing interest in proposed projects. This paper focuses on
tackling the question why these initially interested bidders
fade out. An empirical problem is that no bids of fading-out
firms are observable. They could decide not to enter the
process at the beginning of the tendering or may be
technically disqualified at any point in the selection
process. This paper applies the double selection model to
procurement data from road development projects in
developing countries and examines why competition ends up
restricted. It shows that bidders are self-selective and
auctioneers also tend to limit participation depending on
the size of contracts. Therefore, limited competition would
likely lead to high infrastructure procurement costs. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Estache, Antonio Iimi, Atsushi |
| author_facet |
Estache, Antonio Iimi, Atsushi |
| author_sort |
Estache, Antonio |
| title |
Bidders’ Entry and Auctioneer’s Rejection : Applying a Double Selection Model to Road Procurement Auctions |
| title_short |
Bidders’ Entry and Auctioneer’s Rejection : Applying a Double Selection Model to Road Procurement Auctions |
| title_full |
Bidders’ Entry and Auctioneer’s Rejection : Applying a Double Selection Model to Road Procurement Auctions |
| title_fullStr |
Bidders’ Entry and Auctioneer’s Rejection : Applying a Double Selection Model to Road Procurement Auctions |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Bidders’ Entry and Auctioneer’s Rejection : Applying a Double Selection Model to Road Procurement Auctions |
| title_sort |
bidders’ entry and auctioneer’s rejection : applying a double selection model to road procurement auctions |
| publishDate |
2012 |
| url |
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20090304112718 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4051 |
| _version_ |
1764389690014695424 |