Can Risk Averse Competitive Input Providers Serve Farmers Efficiently in Developing Countries?

Under price ceilings and quality floors for agricultural inputs in cash crop sectors in developing countries where credit markets are weak, imperfect information on the ability of farmers to pay for their inputs at the end of the cropping season ma...

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Main Authors: Makdissi, Paul, Wodon, Quentin
Format: Policy Research Working Paper
Language:English
Published: 2012
Subjects:
Online Access:http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20090429161327
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4112
id okr-10986-4112
recordtype oai_dc
spelling okr-10986-41122021-04-23T14:02:15Z Can Risk Averse Competitive Input Providers Serve Farmers Efficiently in Developing Countries? Makdissi, Paul Wodon, Quentin AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS AGRICULTURAL INPUTS AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION SYSTEMS AGRICULTURAL SECTORS AGRICULTURE COCOA COFFEE COMMODITY CONSUMER SURPLUS CONTRACT FARMING CORRUPTION COTTON COTTON PRODUCTION COTTON SECTOR CREDIT MARKETS CREDIT RATING CREDIT RATING SYSTEM CROP CROPPING CROPS ECONOMIC MODELS ELASTICITY ELASTICITY OF DEMAND ELASTICITY OF SUPPLY EQUILIBRIUM EXPECTED UTILITY EXPECTED VALUE EXPORT CROPS FARM FARMER FARMERS FERTILIZERS FREE ACCESS GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES GROUNDNUT HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INEFFICIENCY INELASTIC DEMAND INEQUALITY INTERNATIONAL BANK LABOR MARKET LABOR MARKETS MARGINAL BENEFITS MARGINAL COST NASH EQUILIBRIUM NATURAL RESOURCES OLIGOPOLY OPTIMIZATION PERFECT COMPETITION POLITICAL ECONOMY PRICE CEILINGS PRIVATIZATION PRODUCE PRODUCER ORGANIZATIONS PRODUCTION COST PRODUCTION FUNCTION PRODUCTION SYSTEMS PUBLIC GOOD REPAYMENT RISK AVERSE RISK AVERSION RURAL CREDIT SEEDS SMALL SCALE FARMERS SOCIAL WELFARE TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS UTILITY FUNCTION WEALTH Under price ceilings and quality floors for agricultural inputs in cash crop sectors in developing countries where credit markets are weak, imperfect information on the ability of farmers to pay for their inputs at the end of the cropping season may lead the decentralized production of those inputs by risk averse private input providers to be inefficient. A coordinating agency and/or subsidies for new farmers could help to produce and distribute more agricultural inputs, thereby increasing the profits for input providers while also enabling more farmers to produce the crops that are key to their livelihood. 2012-03-19T19:10:11Z 2012-03-19T19:10:11Z 2009-04-01 http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20090429161327 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4112 English Policy Research working paper ; no. WPS 4922 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper The World Region The World Region
repository_type Digital Repository
institution_category Foreign Institution
institution Digital Repositories
building World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection World Bank
language English
topic AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT
AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS
AGRICULTURAL INPUTS
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION SYSTEMS
AGRICULTURAL SECTORS
AGRICULTURE
COCOA
COFFEE
COMMODITY
CONSUMER SURPLUS
CONTRACT FARMING
CORRUPTION
COTTON
COTTON PRODUCTION
COTTON SECTOR
CREDIT MARKETS
CREDIT RATING
CREDIT RATING SYSTEM
CROP
CROPPING
CROPS
ECONOMIC MODELS
ELASTICITY
ELASTICITY OF DEMAND
ELASTICITY OF SUPPLY
EQUILIBRIUM
EXPECTED UTILITY
EXPECTED VALUE
EXPORT CROPS
FARM
FARMER
FARMERS
FERTILIZERS
FREE ACCESS
GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES
GROUNDNUT
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
INEFFICIENCY
INELASTIC DEMAND
INEQUALITY
INTERNATIONAL BANK
LABOR MARKET
LABOR MARKETS
MARGINAL BENEFITS
MARGINAL COST
NASH EQUILIBRIUM
NATURAL RESOURCES
OLIGOPOLY
OPTIMIZATION
PERFECT COMPETITION
POLITICAL ECONOMY
PRICE CEILINGS
PRIVATIZATION
PRODUCE
PRODUCER ORGANIZATIONS
PRODUCTION COST
PRODUCTION FUNCTION
PRODUCTION SYSTEMS
PUBLIC GOOD
REPAYMENT
RISK AVERSE
RISK AVERSION
RURAL CREDIT
SEEDS
SMALL SCALE FARMERS
SOCIAL WELFARE
TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS
UTILITY FUNCTION
WEALTH
spellingShingle AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT
AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS
AGRICULTURAL INPUTS
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION SYSTEMS
AGRICULTURAL SECTORS
AGRICULTURE
COCOA
COFFEE
COMMODITY
CONSUMER SURPLUS
CONTRACT FARMING
CORRUPTION
COTTON
COTTON PRODUCTION
COTTON SECTOR
CREDIT MARKETS
CREDIT RATING
CREDIT RATING SYSTEM
CROP
CROPPING
CROPS
ECONOMIC MODELS
ELASTICITY
ELASTICITY OF DEMAND
ELASTICITY OF SUPPLY
EQUILIBRIUM
EXPECTED UTILITY
EXPECTED VALUE
EXPORT CROPS
FARM
FARMER
FARMERS
FERTILIZERS
FREE ACCESS
GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES
GROUNDNUT
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
INEFFICIENCY
INELASTIC DEMAND
INEQUALITY
INTERNATIONAL BANK
LABOR MARKET
LABOR MARKETS
MARGINAL BENEFITS
MARGINAL COST
NASH EQUILIBRIUM
NATURAL RESOURCES
OLIGOPOLY
OPTIMIZATION
PERFECT COMPETITION
POLITICAL ECONOMY
PRICE CEILINGS
PRIVATIZATION
PRODUCE
PRODUCER ORGANIZATIONS
PRODUCTION COST
PRODUCTION FUNCTION
PRODUCTION SYSTEMS
PUBLIC GOOD
REPAYMENT
RISK AVERSE
RISK AVERSION
RURAL CREDIT
SEEDS
SMALL SCALE FARMERS
SOCIAL WELFARE
TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS
UTILITY FUNCTION
WEALTH
Makdissi, Paul
Wodon, Quentin
Can Risk Averse Competitive Input Providers Serve Farmers Efficiently in Developing Countries?
geographic_facet The World Region
The World Region
relation Policy Research working paper ; no. WPS 4922
description Under price ceilings and quality floors for agricultural inputs in cash crop sectors in developing countries where credit markets are weak, imperfect information on the ability of farmers to pay for their inputs at the end of the cropping season may lead the decentralized production of those inputs by risk averse private input providers to be inefficient. A coordinating agency and/or subsidies for new farmers could help to produce and distribute more agricultural inputs, thereby increasing the profits for input providers while also enabling more farmers to produce the crops that are key to their livelihood.
format Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
author Makdissi, Paul
Wodon, Quentin
author_facet Makdissi, Paul
Wodon, Quentin
author_sort Makdissi, Paul
title Can Risk Averse Competitive Input Providers Serve Farmers Efficiently in Developing Countries?
title_short Can Risk Averse Competitive Input Providers Serve Farmers Efficiently in Developing Countries?
title_full Can Risk Averse Competitive Input Providers Serve Farmers Efficiently in Developing Countries?
title_fullStr Can Risk Averse Competitive Input Providers Serve Farmers Efficiently in Developing Countries?
title_full_unstemmed Can Risk Averse Competitive Input Providers Serve Farmers Efficiently in Developing Countries?
title_sort can risk averse competitive input providers serve farmers efficiently in developing countries?
publishDate 2012
url http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20090429161327
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4112
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