Can Risk Averse Competitive Input Providers Serve Farmers Efficiently in Developing Countries?
Under price ceilings and quality floors for agricultural inputs in cash crop sectors in developing countries where credit markets are weak, imperfect information on the ability of farmers to pay for their inputs at the end of the cropping season ma...
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okr-10986-41122021-04-23T14:02:15Z Can Risk Averse Competitive Input Providers Serve Farmers Efficiently in Developing Countries? Makdissi, Paul Wodon, Quentin AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS AGRICULTURAL INPUTS AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION SYSTEMS AGRICULTURAL SECTORS AGRICULTURE COCOA COFFEE COMMODITY CONSUMER SURPLUS CONTRACT FARMING CORRUPTION COTTON COTTON PRODUCTION COTTON SECTOR CREDIT MARKETS CREDIT RATING CREDIT RATING SYSTEM CROP CROPPING CROPS ECONOMIC MODELS ELASTICITY ELASTICITY OF DEMAND ELASTICITY OF SUPPLY EQUILIBRIUM EXPECTED UTILITY EXPECTED VALUE EXPORT CROPS FARM FARMER FARMERS FERTILIZERS FREE ACCESS GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES GROUNDNUT HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INEFFICIENCY INELASTIC DEMAND INEQUALITY INTERNATIONAL BANK LABOR MARKET LABOR MARKETS MARGINAL BENEFITS MARGINAL COST NASH EQUILIBRIUM NATURAL RESOURCES OLIGOPOLY OPTIMIZATION PERFECT COMPETITION POLITICAL ECONOMY PRICE CEILINGS PRIVATIZATION PRODUCE PRODUCER ORGANIZATIONS PRODUCTION COST PRODUCTION FUNCTION PRODUCTION SYSTEMS PUBLIC GOOD REPAYMENT RISK AVERSE RISK AVERSION RURAL CREDIT SEEDS SMALL SCALE FARMERS SOCIAL WELFARE TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS UTILITY FUNCTION WEALTH Under price ceilings and quality floors for agricultural inputs in cash crop sectors in developing countries where credit markets are weak, imperfect information on the ability of farmers to pay for their inputs at the end of the cropping season may lead the decentralized production of those inputs by risk averse private input providers to be inefficient. A coordinating agency and/or subsidies for new farmers could help to produce and distribute more agricultural inputs, thereby increasing the profits for input providers while also enabling more farmers to produce the crops that are key to their livelihood. 2012-03-19T19:10:11Z 2012-03-19T19:10:11Z 2009-04-01 http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20090429161327 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4112 English Policy Research working paper ; no. WPS 4922 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper The World Region The World Region |
repository_type |
Digital Repository |
institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
institution |
Digital Repositories |
building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
collection |
World Bank |
language |
English |
topic |
AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS AGRICULTURAL INPUTS AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION SYSTEMS AGRICULTURAL SECTORS AGRICULTURE COCOA COFFEE COMMODITY CONSUMER SURPLUS CONTRACT FARMING CORRUPTION COTTON COTTON PRODUCTION COTTON SECTOR CREDIT MARKETS CREDIT RATING CREDIT RATING SYSTEM CROP CROPPING CROPS ECONOMIC MODELS ELASTICITY ELASTICITY OF DEMAND ELASTICITY OF SUPPLY EQUILIBRIUM EXPECTED UTILITY EXPECTED VALUE EXPORT CROPS FARM FARMER FARMERS FERTILIZERS FREE ACCESS GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES GROUNDNUT HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INEFFICIENCY INELASTIC DEMAND INEQUALITY INTERNATIONAL BANK LABOR MARKET LABOR MARKETS MARGINAL BENEFITS MARGINAL COST NASH EQUILIBRIUM NATURAL RESOURCES OLIGOPOLY OPTIMIZATION PERFECT COMPETITION POLITICAL ECONOMY PRICE CEILINGS PRIVATIZATION PRODUCE PRODUCER ORGANIZATIONS PRODUCTION COST PRODUCTION FUNCTION PRODUCTION SYSTEMS PUBLIC GOOD REPAYMENT RISK AVERSE RISK AVERSION RURAL CREDIT SEEDS SMALL SCALE FARMERS SOCIAL WELFARE TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS UTILITY FUNCTION WEALTH |
spellingShingle |
AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS AGRICULTURAL INPUTS AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION SYSTEMS AGRICULTURAL SECTORS AGRICULTURE COCOA COFFEE COMMODITY CONSUMER SURPLUS CONTRACT FARMING CORRUPTION COTTON COTTON PRODUCTION COTTON SECTOR CREDIT MARKETS CREDIT RATING CREDIT RATING SYSTEM CROP CROPPING CROPS ECONOMIC MODELS ELASTICITY ELASTICITY OF DEMAND ELASTICITY OF SUPPLY EQUILIBRIUM EXPECTED UTILITY EXPECTED VALUE EXPORT CROPS FARM FARMER FARMERS FERTILIZERS FREE ACCESS GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES GROUNDNUT HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INEFFICIENCY INELASTIC DEMAND INEQUALITY INTERNATIONAL BANK LABOR MARKET LABOR MARKETS MARGINAL BENEFITS MARGINAL COST NASH EQUILIBRIUM NATURAL RESOURCES OLIGOPOLY OPTIMIZATION PERFECT COMPETITION POLITICAL ECONOMY PRICE CEILINGS PRIVATIZATION PRODUCE PRODUCER ORGANIZATIONS PRODUCTION COST PRODUCTION FUNCTION PRODUCTION SYSTEMS PUBLIC GOOD REPAYMENT RISK AVERSE RISK AVERSION RURAL CREDIT SEEDS SMALL SCALE FARMERS SOCIAL WELFARE TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS UTILITY FUNCTION WEALTH Makdissi, Paul Wodon, Quentin Can Risk Averse Competitive Input Providers Serve Farmers Efficiently in Developing Countries? |
geographic_facet |
The World Region The World Region |
relation |
Policy Research working paper ; no. WPS 4922 |
description |
Under price ceilings and quality floors
for agricultural inputs in cash crop sectors in developing
countries where credit markets are weak, imperfect
information on the ability of farmers to pay for their
inputs at the end of the cropping season may lead the
decentralized production of those inputs by risk averse
private input providers to be inefficient. A coordinating
agency and/or subsidies for new farmers could help to
produce and distribute more agricultural inputs, thereby
increasing the profits for input providers while also
enabling more farmers to produce the crops that are key to
their livelihood. |
format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
author |
Makdissi, Paul Wodon, Quentin |
author_facet |
Makdissi, Paul Wodon, Quentin |
author_sort |
Makdissi, Paul |
title |
Can Risk Averse Competitive Input Providers Serve Farmers Efficiently
in Developing Countries? |
title_short |
Can Risk Averse Competitive Input Providers Serve Farmers Efficiently
in Developing Countries? |
title_full |
Can Risk Averse Competitive Input Providers Serve Farmers Efficiently
in Developing Countries? |
title_fullStr |
Can Risk Averse Competitive Input Providers Serve Farmers Efficiently
in Developing Countries? |
title_full_unstemmed |
Can Risk Averse Competitive Input Providers Serve Farmers Efficiently
in Developing Countries? |
title_sort |
can risk averse competitive input providers serve farmers efficiently
in developing countries? |
publishDate |
2012 |
url |
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20090429161327 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4112 |
_version_ |
1764389970900942848 |