When Do Legislators Pass on “Pork”? The Determinants of Legislator Utilization of a Constituency Development Fund in India
The authors examine a unique public spending program that is proliferating across developing countries, the constituency development fund, to investigate when legislators exert more effort on behalf of their constituents. Using data from India, the...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
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2012
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| Online Access: | http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20090511143351 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4123 |
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okr-10986-41232021-04-23T14:02:15Z When Do Legislators Pass on “Pork”? The Determinants of Legislator Utilization of a Constituency Development Fund in India Keefer, Philip Khemani, Stuti BUREAUCRACY CANDIDATES COALITION GOVERNMENTS COMPETITORS COMPTROLLER CONSTITUENCIES CONSTITUENCY CONSTITUENT CONSTITUENTS DEMOCRACIES DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY DISCRIMINATION ELECTION ELECTIONS ELECTORAL SYSTEMS ELECTORATE ENTREPRENEURS ENTREPRENEURSHIP LEGISLATION LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY LEGISLATIVE DECISION LEGISLATOR LEGISLATORS MAJORITIES MP NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS NATIONAL LEGISLATORS PARLIAMENT PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS POLITICAL AFFILIATION POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL LANDSCAPE POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL PARTY POLITICAL REPRESENTATION POLITICAL SCIENCE POLITICIANS PRIME MINISTER PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC POLICY REPRESENTATIVES SPONSOR VOTING VOTING BEHAVIOR VOTING RIGHTS The authors examine a unique public spending program that is proliferating across developing countries, the constituency development fund, to investigate when legislators exert more effort on behalf of their constituents. Using data from India, they find that legislator effort is significantly lower in constituencies where voters are more attached to political parties. They are also lower in constituencies that are reserved for members of socially disadvantaged groups (lower castes), specifically in those reserved constituencies that are candidate strongholds. This result is robust to controls for alternate explanations and implies that legislators pass on pork when voters are more attached to political parties or influenced by identity issues. These findings have implications for the evaluation of constituency development funds. They also provide a new answer to a central issue in political economy, the conditions under which legislators seek to "bring home the pork" to constituents, that attaches great importance to the role of political parties. 2012-03-19T19:10:22Z 2012-03-19T19:10:22Z 2009-05-01 http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20090511143351 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4123 English Policy Research working paper ; no. WPS 4929 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper South Asia South Asia South Asia Asia India |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English |
| topic |
BUREAUCRACY CANDIDATES COALITION GOVERNMENTS COMPETITORS COMPTROLLER CONSTITUENCIES CONSTITUENCY CONSTITUENT CONSTITUENTS DEMOCRACIES DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY DISCRIMINATION ELECTION ELECTIONS ELECTORAL SYSTEMS ELECTORATE ENTREPRENEURS ENTREPRENEURSHIP LEGISLATION LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY LEGISLATIVE DECISION LEGISLATOR LEGISLATORS MAJORITIES MP NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS NATIONAL LEGISLATORS PARLIAMENT PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS POLITICAL AFFILIATION POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL LANDSCAPE POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL PARTY POLITICAL REPRESENTATION POLITICAL SCIENCE POLITICIANS PRIME MINISTER PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC POLICY REPRESENTATIVES SPONSOR VOTING VOTING BEHAVIOR VOTING RIGHTS |
| spellingShingle |
BUREAUCRACY CANDIDATES COALITION GOVERNMENTS COMPETITORS COMPTROLLER CONSTITUENCIES CONSTITUENCY CONSTITUENT CONSTITUENTS DEMOCRACIES DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY DISCRIMINATION ELECTION ELECTIONS ELECTORAL SYSTEMS ELECTORATE ENTREPRENEURS ENTREPRENEURSHIP LEGISLATION LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY LEGISLATIVE DECISION LEGISLATOR LEGISLATORS MAJORITIES MP NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS NATIONAL LEGISLATORS PARLIAMENT PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS POLITICAL AFFILIATION POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL LANDSCAPE POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL PARTY POLITICAL REPRESENTATION POLITICAL SCIENCE POLITICIANS PRIME MINISTER PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC POLICY REPRESENTATIVES SPONSOR VOTING VOTING BEHAVIOR VOTING RIGHTS Keefer, Philip Khemani, Stuti When Do Legislators Pass on “Pork”? The Determinants of Legislator Utilization of a Constituency Development Fund in India |
| geographic_facet |
South Asia South Asia South Asia Asia India |
| relation |
Policy Research working paper ; no. WPS 4929 |
| description |
The authors examine a unique public
spending program that is proliferating across developing
countries, the constituency development fund, to investigate
when legislators exert more effort on behalf of their
constituents. Using data from India, they find that
legislator effort is significantly lower in constituencies
where voters are more attached to political parties. They
are also lower in constituencies that are reserved for
members of socially disadvantaged groups (lower castes),
specifically in those reserved constituencies that are
candidate strongholds. This result is robust to controls for
alternate explanations and implies that legislators pass on
pork when voters are more attached to political parties or
influenced by identity issues. These findings have
implications for the evaluation of constituency development
funds. They also provide a new answer to a central issue in
political economy, the conditions under which legislators
seek to "bring home the pork" to constituents,
that attaches great importance to the role of political parties. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Keefer, Philip Khemani, Stuti |
| author_facet |
Keefer, Philip Khemani, Stuti |
| author_sort |
Keefer, Philip |
| title |
When Do Legislators Pass on “Pork”? The Determinants of Legislator Utilization of a Constituency Development Fund in India |
| title_short |
When Do Legislators Pass on “Pork”? The Determinants of Legislator Utilization of a Constituency Development Fund in India |
| title_full |
When Do Legislators Pass on “Pork”? The Determinants of Legislator Utilization of a Constituency Development Fund in India |
| title_fullStr |
When Do Legislators Pass on “Pork”? The Determinants of Legislator Utilization of a Constituency Development Fund in India |
| title_full_unstemmed |
When Do Legislators Pass on “Pork”? The Determinants of Legislator Utilization of a Constituency Development Fund in India |
| title_sort |
when do legislators pass on “pork”? the determinants of legislator utilization of a constituency development fund in india |
| publishDate |
2012 |
| url |
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20090511143351 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4123 |
| _version_ |
1764390017937965056 |