When Do Legislators Pass on “Pork”? The Determinants of Legislator Utilization of a Constituency Development Fund in India

The authors examine a unique public spending program that is proliferating across developing countries, the constituency development fund, to investigate when legislators exert more effort on behalf of their constituents. Using data from India, the...

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Main Authors: Keefer, Philip, Khemani, Stuti
Format: Policy Research Working Paper
Language:English
Published: 2012
Subjects:
Online Access:http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20090511143351
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4123
id okr-10986-4123
recordtype oai_dc
spelling okr-10986-41232021-04-23T14:02:15Z When Do Legislators Pass on “Pork”? The Determinants of Legislator Utilization of a Constituency Development Fund in India Keefer, Philip Khemani, Stuti BUREAUCRACY CANDIDATES COALITION GOVERNMENTS COMPETITORS COMPTROLLER CONSTITUENCIES CONSTITUENCY CONSTITUENT CONSTITUENTS DEMOCRACIES DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY DISCRIMINATION ELECTION ELECTIONS ELECTORAL SYSTEMS ELECTORATE ENTREPRENEURS ENTREPRENEURSHIP LEGISLATION LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY LEGISLATIVE DECISION LEGISLATOR LEGISLATORS MAJORITIES MP NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS NATIONAL LEGISLATORS PARLIAMENT PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS POLITICAL AFFILIATION POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL LANDSCAPE POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL PARTY POLITICAL REPRESENTATION POLITICAL SCIENCE POLITICIANS PRIME MINISTER PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC POLICY REPRESENTATIVES SPONSOR VOTING VOTING BEHAVIOR VOTING RIGHTS The authors examine a unique public spending program that is proliferating across developing countries, the constituency development fund, to investigate when legislators exert more effort on behalf of their constituents. Using data from India, they find that legislator effort is significantly lower in constituencies where voters are more attached to political parties. They are also lower in constituencies that are reserved for members of socially disadvantaged groups (lower castes), specifically in those reserved constituencies that are candidate strongholds. This result is robust to controls for alternate explanations and implies that legislators pass on pork when voters are more attached to political parties or influenced by identity issues. These findings have implications for the evaluation of constituency development funds. They also provide a new answer to a central issue in political economy, the conditions under which legislators seek to "bring home the pork" to constituents, that attaches great importance to the role of political parties. 2012-03-19T19:10:22Z 2012-03-19T19:10:22Z 2009-05-01 http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20090511143351 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4123 English Policy Research working paper ; no. WPS 4929 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper South Asia South Asia South Asia Asia India
repository_type Digital Repository
institution_category Foreign Institution
institution Digital Repositories
building World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection World Bank
language English
topic BUREAUCRACY
CANDIDATES
COALITION GOVERNMENTS
COMPETITORS
COMPTROLLER
CONSTITUENCIES
CONSTITUENCY
CONSTITUENT
CONSTITUENTS
DEMOCRACIES
DEMOCRACY
DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY
DISCRIMINATION
ELECTION
ELECTIONS
ELECTORAL SYSTEMS
ELECTORATE
ENTREPRENEURS
ENTREPRENEURSHIP
LEGISLATION
LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY
LEGISLATIVE DECISION
LEGISLATOR
LEGISLATORS
MAJORITIES
MP
NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS
NATIONAL LEGISLATORS
PARLIAMENT
PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE
PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS
POLITICAL AFFILIATION
POLITICAL ECONOMY
POLITICAL LANDSCAPE
POLITICAL PARTIES
POLITICAL PARTY
POLITICAL REPRESENTATION
POLITICAL SCIENCE
POLITICIANS
PRIME MINISTER
PUBLIC GOOD
PUBLIC OFFICIALS
PUBLIC POLICY
REPRESENTATIVES
SPONSOR
VOTING
VOTING BEHAVIOR
VOTING RIGHTS
spellingShingle BUREAUCRACY
CANDIDATES
COALITION GOVERNMENTS
COMPETITORS
COMPTROLLER
CONSTITUENCIES
CONSTITUENCY
CONSTITUENT
CONSTITUENTS
DEMOCRACIES
DEMOCRACY
DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY
DISCRIMINATION
ELECTION
ELECTIONS
ELECTORAL SYSTEMS
ELECTORATE
ENTREPRENEURS
ENTREPRENEURSHIP
LEGISLATION
LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY
LEGISLATIVE DECISION
LEGISLATOR
LEGISLATORS
MAJORITIES
MP
NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS
NATIONAL LEGISLATORS
PARLIAMENT
PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE
PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS
POLITICAL AFFILIATION
POLITICAL ECONOMY
POLITICAL LANDSCAPE
POLITICAL PARTIES
POLITICAL PARTY
POLITICAL REPRESENTATION
POLITICAL SCIENCE
POLITICIANS
PRIME MINISTER
PUBLIC GOOD
PUBLIC OFFICIALS
PUBLIC POLICY
REPRESENTATIVES
SPONSOR
VOTING
VOTING BEHAVIOR
VOTING RIGHTS
Keefer, Philip
Khemani, Stuti
When Do Legislators Pass on “Pork”? The Determinants of Legislator Utilization of a Constituency Development Fund in India
geographic_facet South Asia
South Asia
South Asia
Asia
India
relation Policy Research working paper ; no. WPS 4929
description The authors examine a unique public spending program that is proliferating across developing countries, the constituency development fund, to investigate when legislators exert more effort on behalf of their constituents. Using data from India, they find that legislator effort is significantly lower in constituencies where voters are more attached to political parties. They are also lower in constituencies that are reserved for members of socially disadvantaged groups (lower castes), specifically in those reserved constituencies that are candidate strongholds. This result is robust to controls for alternate explanations and implies that legislators pass on pork when voters are more attached to political parties or influenced by identity issues. These findings have implications for the evaluation of constituency development funds. They also provide a new answer to a central issue in political economy, the conditions under which legislators seek to "bring home the pork" to constituents, that attaches great importance to the role of political parties.
format Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
author Keefer, Philip
Khemani, Stuti
author_facet Keefer, Philip
Khemani, Stuti
author_sort Keefer, Philip
title When Do Legislators Pass on “Pork”? The Determinants of Legislator Utilization of a Constituency Development Fund in India
title_short When Do Legislators Pass on “Pork”? The Determinants of Legislator Utilization of a Constituency Development Fund in India
title_full When Do Legislators Pass on “Pork”? The Determinants of Legislator Utilization of a Constituency Development Fund in India
title_fullStr When Do Legislators Pass on “Pork”? The Determinants of Legislator Utilization of a Constituency Development Fund in India
title_full_unstemmed When Do Legislators Pass on “Pork”? The Determinants of Legislator Utilization of a Constituency Development Fund in India
title_sort when do legislators pass on “pork”? the determinants of legislator utilization of a constituency development fund in india
publishDate 2012
url http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20090511143351
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4123
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