Stigma and the Take-up of Social Programs
Empirical studies send mixed messages as to the magnitude of social stigma associated with the take-up of social transfers and the impact of stigma on take-up. These mixed signals may be related to the fact that stigma and program participation are...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
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2012
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| Online Access: | http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20090616103420 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4155 |
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okr-10986-41552021-04-23T14:02:15Z Stigma and the Take-up of Social Programs Ewoudou, Jacques Tsimpo, Clarence Wodon, Quentin AGGREGATE DEMAND AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS DISABILITY ECONOMETRICS ECONOMIC COST ECONOMIC RESEARCH ECONOMIC THEORY FAMILIES FAMILY MEMBER FAMILY RESOURCES GAME THEORY HOUSEHOLDS HOUSING INCOME INCOME LEVEL INEQUALITY INTERNATIONAL BANK JOB LOSS MEDICAID NASH EQUILIBRIUM PENSIONER PENSIONERS POLITICAL ECONOMY PUBLIC FINANCE RECEIPT SOCIAL ASSISTANCE SOCIAL EXCLUSION SOCIAL SERVICE STRATEGIC COMPLEMENTARITIES TAKE-UP RATE TAKE-UP RATES TAX BENEFITS UTILITY FUNCTION WEALTH WELFARE SYSTEM Empirical studies send mixed messages as to the magnitude of social stigma associated with the take-up of social transfers and the impact of stigma on take-up. These mixed signals may be related to the fact that stigma and program participation are likely to be jointly determined. If there is a high (low) degree of participation in a program, stigma is likely to be lower (higher) due at least in part to that high (low) degree of participation. This is because the more eligible persons participate, the less one can single out specific individuals for stigma because they use the program. This note suggests this theoretically with a simple model showing that we may have in an idealized setting two equilibria: one with stigma and zero participation in a social program, and one with perfect participation and no stigma. 2012-03-19T19:10:55Z 2012-03-19T19:10:55Z 2009-06-01 http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20090616103420 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4155 English Policy Research working paper ; no. WPS 4962 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper The World Region The World Region |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English |
| topic |
AGGREGATE DEMAND AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS DISABILITY ECONOMETRICS ECONOMIC COST ECONOMIC RESEARCH ECONOMIC THEORY FAMILIES FAMILY MEMBER FAMILY RESOURCES GAME THEORY HOUSEHOLDS HOUSING INCOME INCOME LEVEL INEQUALITY INTERNATIONAL BANK JOB LOSS MEDICAID NASH EQUILIBRIUM PENSIONER PENSIONERS POLITICAL ECONOMY PUBLIC FINANCE RECEIPT SOCIAL ASSISTANCE SOCIAL EXCLUSION SOCIAL SERVICE STRATEGIC COMPLEMENTARITIES TAKE-UP RATE TAKE-UP RATES TAX BENEFITS UTILITY FUNCTION WEALTH WELFARE SYSTEM |
| spellingShingle |
AGGREGATE DEMAND AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS DISABILITY ECONOMETRICS ECONOMIC COST ECONOMIC RESEARCH ECONOMIC THEORY FAMILIES FAMILY MEMBER FAMILY RESOURCES GAME THEORY HOUSEHOLDS HOUSING INCOME INCOME LEVEL INEQUALITY INTERNATIONAL BANK JOB LOSS MEDICAID NASH EQUILIBRIUM PENSIONER PENSIONERS POLITICAL ECONOMY PUBLIC FINANCE RECEIPT SOCIAL ASSISTANCE SOCIAL EXCLUSION SOCIAL SERVICE STRATEGIC COMPLEMENTARITIES TAKE-UP RATE TAKE-UP RATES TAX BENEFITS UTILITY FUNCTION WEALTH WELFARE SYSTEM Ewoudou, Jacques Tsimpo, Clarence Wodon, Quentin Stigma and the Take-up of Social Programs |
| geographic_facet |
The World Region The World Region |
| relation |
Policy Research working paper ; no. WPS 4962 |
| description |
Empirical studies send mixed messages as
to the magnitude of social stigma associated with the
take-up of social transfers and the impact of stigma on
take-up. These mixed signals may be related to the fact that
stigma and program participation are likely to be jointly
determined. If there is a high (low) degree of participation
in a program, stigma is likely to be lower (higher) due at
least in part to that high (low) degree of participation.
This is because the more eligible persons participate, the
less one can single out specific individuals for stigma
because they use the program. This note suggests this
theoretically with a simple model showing that we may have
in an idealized setting two equilibria: one with stigma and
zero participation in a social program, and one with perfect
participation and no stigma. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Ewoudou, Jacques Tsimpo, Clarence Wodon, Quentin |
| author_facet |
Ewoudou, Jacques Tsimpo, Clarence Wodon, Quentin |
| author_sort |
Ewoudou, Jacques |
| title |
Stigma and the Take-up of Social Programs |
| title_short |
Stigma and the Take-up of Social Programs |
| title_full |
Stigma and the Take-up of Social Programs |
| title_fullStr |
Stigma and the Take-up of Social Programs |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Stigma and the Take-up of Social Programs |
| title_sort |
stigma and the take-up of social programs |
| publishDate |
2012 |
| url |
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20090616103420 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4155 |
| _version_ |
1764390180468293632 |