Implications for Climate-Change Policy of Research on Cooperation in Social Dilemmas
The problem of climate change seems to be a tragedy of the commons: despite the global benefits of reducing green-house gas emissions, no individual has any incentive to reduce his or her own emissions. Yet many people are making efforts to reduce...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
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2012
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| Online Access: | http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20090720154009 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4199 |
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okr-10986-41992021-04-23T14:02:16Z Implications for Climate-Change Policy of Research on Cooperation in Social Dilemmas Irwin, Timothy AIR AIR TRAVEL ATMOSPHERIC CONCENTRATION CARBON CARBON CREDITS CARBON MARKETS CARBON NEUTRAL CITIES CLEAN ENERGY CLIMATE CLIMATE CHANGE CLIMATE-CHANGE CLIMATE-CHANGE POLICY CO COLLECTIVE ACTION COMMON PROPERTY COMMON PROPERTY RESOURCE COMMONS COOPERATIVE EQUILIBRIUM DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DISCOUNT RATES ECOLOGICAL EFFECTS ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR ECONOMIC THEORY EMISSIONS FROM SOURCES EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS EQUILIBRIA EQUILIBRIUM ESTIMATES OF EMISSIONS EXTERNALITY FINANCIAL LOSS FISHERY FOREST FOREST OWNERS FOSSIL FUELS GAS GAS EMISSIONS GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE GLOBAL EMISSIONS GLOBAL GREENHOUSE-GAS GLOBAL WARMING GREENHOUSE GREENHOUSE GASES GREENHOUSE-GAS GREENHOUSE-GAS EMISSIONS INTERVENTION IPCC LOCAL COMMONS MONETARY INCENTIVES MONETARY UNITS NATURAL RESOURCES PROBABILITY PROPERTY RIGHTS PURCHASE OF OFFSETS RENEWABLE ENERGY RESOURCE USE The problem of climate change seems to be a tragedy of the commons: despite the global benefits of reducing green-house gas emissions, no individual has any incentive to reduce his or her own emissions. Yet many people are making efforts to reduce emissions and putting pressure on businesses and governments to do the same. Although the size of these efforts is unclear, their very existence might seem puzzling. The efforts are consistent, however, with some theoretical and empirical evidence about the extent of cooperation in other social dilemmas. This evidence does not imply that greenhouse-gas emissions will be reduced to desirable levels, but it does suggest that the potential for voluntary cooperation should not be ignored. It also suggests that cooperation can be promoted by (i) allowing cooperators to punish defectors without withdrawing their own cooperation; (ii) publicly emphasizing the social benefits and extent of cooperation and the social norms that require it; and (iii) improving the quantity and timeliness of public information about cooperation and defection. 2012-03-19T19:11:41Z 2012-03-19T19:11:41Z 2009-07-01 http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20090720154009 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4199 English Policy Research working paper ; no. WPS 5006 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper The World Region The World Region |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English |
| topic |
AIR AIR TRAVEL ATMOSPHERIC CONCENTRATION CARBON CARBON CREDITS CARBON MARKETS CARBON NEUTRAL CITIES CLEAN ENERGY CLIMATE CLIMATE CHANGE CLIMATE-CHANGE CLIMATE-CHANGE POLICY CO COLLECTIVE ACTION COMMON PROPERTY COMMON PROPERTY RESOURCE COMMONS COOPERATIVE EQUILIBRIUM DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DISCOUNT RATES ECOLOGICAL EFFECTS ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR ECONOMIC THEORY EMISSIONS FROM SOURCES EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS EQUILIBRIA EQUILIBRIUM ESTIMATES OF EMISSIONS EXTERNALITY FINANCIAL LOSS FISHERY FOREST FOREST OWNERS FOSSIL FUELS GAS GAS EMISSIONS GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE GLOBAL EMISSIONS GLOBAL GREENHOUSE-GAS GLOBAL WARMING GREENHOUSE GREENHOUSE GASES GREENHOUSE-GAS GREENHOUSE-GAS EMISSIONS INTERVENTION IPCC LOCAL COMMONS MONETARY INCENTIVES MONETARY UNITS NATURAL RESOURCES PROBABILITY PROPERTY RIGHTS PURCHASE OF OFFSETS RENEWABLE ENERGY RESOURCE USE |
| spellingShingle |
AIR AIR TRAVEL ATMOSPHERIC CONCENTRATION CARBON CARBON CREDITS CARBON MARKETS CARBON NEUTRAL CITIES CLEAN ENERGY CLIMATE CLIMATE CHANGE CLIMATE-CHANGE CLIMATE-CHANGE POLICY CO COLLECTIVE ACTION COMMON PROPERTY COMMON PROPERTY RESOURCE COMMONS COOPERATIVE EQUILIBRIUM DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DISCOUNT RATES ECOLOGICAL EFFECTS ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR ECONOMIC THEORY EMISSIONS FROM SOURCES EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS EQUILIBRIA EQUILIBRIUM ESTIMATES OF EMISSIONS EXTERNALITY FINANCIAL LOSS FISHERY FOREST FOREST OWNERS FOSSIL FUELS GAS GAS EMISSIONS GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE GLOBAL EMISSIONS GLOBAL GREENHOUSE-GAS GLOBAL WARMING GREENHOUSE GREENHOUSE GASES GREENHOUSE-GAS GREENHOUSE-GAS EMISSIONS INTERVENTION IPCC LOCAL COMMONS MONETARY INCENTIVES MONETARY UNITS NATURAL RESOURCES PROBABILITY PROPERTY RIGHTS PURCHASE OF OFFSETS RENEWABLE ENERGY RESOURCE USE Irwin, Timothy Implications for Climate-Change Policy of Research on Cooperation in Social Dilemmas |
| geographic_facet |
The World Region The World Region |
| relation |
Policy Research working paper ; no. WPS 5006 |
| description |
The problem of climate change seems to
be a tragedy of the commons: despite the global benefits of
reducing green-house gas emissions, no individual has any
incentive to reduce his or her own emissions. Yet many
people are making efforts to reduce emissions and putting
pressure on businesses and governments to do the same.
Although the size of these efforts is unclear, their very
existence might seem puzzling. The efforts are consistent,
however, with some theoretical and empirical evidence about
the extent of cooperation in other social dilemmas. This
evidence does not imply that greenhouse-gas emissions will
be reduced to desirable levels, but it does suggest that the
potential for voluntary cooperation should not be ignored.
It also suggests that cooperation can be promoted by (i)
allowing cooperators to punish defectors without withdrawing
their own cooperation; (ii) publicly emphasizing the social
benefits and extent of cooperation and the social norms that
require it; and (iii) improving the quantity and timeliness
of public information about cooperation and defection. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Irwin, Timothy |
| author_facet |
Irwin, Timothy |
| author_sort |
Irwin, Timothy |
| title |
Implications for Climate-Change Policy of Research on Cooperation in Social Dilemmas |
| title_short |
Implications for Climate-Change Policy of Research on Cooperation in Social Dilemmas |
| title_full |
Implications for Climate-Change Policy of Research on Cooperation in Social Dilemmas |
| title_fullStr |
Implications for Climate-Change Policy of Research on Cooperation in Social Dilemmas |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Implications for Climate-Change Policy of Research on Cooperation in Social Dilemmas |
| title_sort |
implications for climate-change policy of research on cooperation in social dilemmas |
| publishDate |
2012 |
| url |
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20090720154009 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4199 |
| _version_ |
1764390373346508800 |