Corporate Governance at the World Bank and the Dilemma of Global Governance

Most major decisions at the World Bank are made by its Board of Executive Directors. While some countries enjoy the opportunity to serve on this powerful body, most countries rarely, if ever, get that chance. This gives rise to the question: Does board membership lead to higher funding from the Worl...

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Main Authors:	Kaja, Ashwin, Werker, Eric
Format:	Journal Article
Published:	World Bank 2012
Subjects:	banks board members board membership commercial loans company corporate board corporate finance corporate governance corporations debt distribution of net income equality fiscal policy intergovernmental transfers legislation limited loan commitments member states shareholders society
Online Access:	http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4519

id	okr-10986-4519
recordtype	oai_dc
spelling	okr-10986-45192021-04-23T14:02:18Z Corporate Governance at the World Bank and the Dilemma of Global Governance Kaja, Ashwin Werker, Eric banks board members board membership commercial loans company corporate board corporate finance corporate governance corporations debt distribution of net income equality fiscal policy intergovernmental transfers legislation limited loan commitments member states shareholders society Most major decisions at the World Bank are made by its Board of Executive Directors. While some countries enjoy the opportunity to serve on this powerful body, most countries rarely, if ever, get that chance. This gives rise to the question: Does board membership lead to higher funding from the World Bank's two main development financing institutions, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Development Association (IDA). Empirical analysis shows that developing countries serving on the board can expect more than double the funding from the IBRD as countries not on the board. In absolute terms, countries on the board receive an average $60 million “bonus” in IBRD loans, an amount that rises in years when IBRD loans are in high demand, particularly for countries in the most influential seats. This effect is more likely driven by informal rules and norms in the boardroom than by the power of the vote itself. No significant effect is found in IDA funding. These results point to challenges of global governance through representative institutions. 2012-03-30T07:12:38Z 2012-03-30T07:12:38Z 2010-08-30 Journal Article World Bank Economic Review 1564-698X http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4519 CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo World Bank World Bank Journal Article Africa Latin America & Caribbean Europe and Central Asia Egypt, Arab Republic of Brazil
repository_type	Digital Repository
institution_category	Foreign Institution
institution	Digital Repositories
building	World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection	World Bank
topic	banks board members board membership commercial loans company corporate board corporate finance corporate governance corporations debt distribution of net income equality fiscal policy intergovernmental transfers legislation limited loan commitments member states shareholders society
spellingShingle	banks board members board membership commercial loans company corporate board corporate finance corporate governance corporations debt distribution of net income equality fiscal policy intergovernmental transfers legislation limited loan commitments member states shareholders society Kaja, Ashwin Werker, Eric Corporate Governance at the World Bank and the Dilemma of Global Governance
geographic_facet	Africa Latin America & Caribbean Europe and Central Asia Egypt, Arab Republic of Brazil
description	Most major decisions at the World Bank are made by its Board of Executive Directors. While some countries enjoy the opportunity to serve on this powerful body, most countries rarely, if ever, get that chance. This gives rise to the question: Does board membership lead to higher funding from the World Bank's two main development financing institutions, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Development Association (IDA). Empirical analysis shows that developing countries serving on the board can expect more than double the funding from the IBRD as countries not on the board. In absolute terms, countries on the board receive an average $60 million “bonus” in IBRD loans, an amount that rises in years when IBRD loans are in high demand, particularly for countries in the most influential seats. This effect is more likely driven by informal rules and norms in the boardroom than by the power of the vote itself. No significant effect is found in IDA funding. These results point to challenges of global governance through representative institutions.
format	Journal Article
author	Kaja, Ashwin Werker, Eric
author_facet	Kaja, Ashwin Werker, Eric
author_sort	Kaja, Ashwin
title	Corporate Governance at the World Bank and the Dilemma of Global Governance
title_short	Corporate Governance at the World Bank and the Dilemma of Global Governance
title_full	Corporate Governance at the World Bank and the Dilemma of Global Governance
title_fullStr	Corporate Governance at the World Bank and the Dilemma of Global Governance
title_full_unstemmed	Corporate Governance at the World Bank and the Dilemma of Global Governance
title_sort	corporate governance at the world bank and the dilemma of global governance
publisher	World Bank
publishDate	2012
url	http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4519
_version_	1764391718510133248

Corporate Governance at the World Bank and the Dilemma of Global Governance

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