Banking on Politics

New data are presented for a large number of countries on how frequently former high-ranking politicians become bank directors. Politician-banker connections at this level are relatively rare, but their frequency is robustly correlated with many important characteristics of banks and institutions. A...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Braun, Matías, Raddatz, Claudio
Format:	Journal Article
Published:	World Bank 2012
Subjects:	accountability accounting bank regulation banking regulation banking sector banking sector development banking system banks boards of directors capital requirements commercial banks financial regulation financial systems macroeconomics net interest margin private banks productivity profitability return on assets small banks
Online Access:	http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4521

id	okr-10986-4521
recordtype	oai_dc
spelling	okr-10986-45212021-04-23T14:02:18Z Banking on Politics Braun, Matías Raddatz, Claudio accountability accounting bank regulation banking regulation banking sector banking sector development banking system banks boards of directors capital requirements commercial banks financial regulation financial systems macroeconomics net interest margin private banks productivity profitability return on assets small banks New data are presented for a large number of countries on how frequently former high-ranking politicians become bank directors. Politician-banker connections at this level are relatively rare, but their frequency is robustly correlated with many important characteristics of banks and institutions. At the micro level, banks that are politically connected are larger and more profitable than other banks, despite being less leveraged and having less risk. At the country level, this connectedness is strongly negatively related to economic development. Controlling for this, the analysis finds that the phenomenon is more prevalent where institutions are weaker and governments more powerful but less accountable. Bank regulation tends to be more pro-banker and the banking system less developed where connectedness is higher. A benign, public-interest view is hard to reconcile with these patterns. 2012-03-30T07:12:38Z 2012-03-30T07:12:38Z 2010-08-30 Journal Article World Bank Economic Review 1564-698X http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4521 CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo World Bank World Bank Journal Article Africa Europe and Central Asia Latin America & Caribbean East Asia and Pacific Brazil Egypt, Arab Republic of
repository_type	Digital Repository
institution_category	Foreign Institution
institution	Digital Repositories
building	World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection	World Bank
topic	accountability accounting bank regulation banking regulation banking sector banking sector development banking system banks boards of directors capital requirements commercial banks financial regulation financial systems macroeconomics net interest margin private banks productivity profitability return on assets small banks
spellingShingle	accountability accounting bank regulation banking regulation banking sector banking sector development banking system banks boards of directors capital requirements commercial banks financial regulation financial systems macroeconomics net interest margin private banks productivity profitability return on assets small banks Braun, Matías Raddatz, Claudio Banking on Politics
geographic_facet	Africa Europe and Central Asia Latin America & Caribbean East Asia and Pacific Brazil Egypt, Arab Republic of
description	New data are presented for a large number of countries on how frequently former high-ranking politicians become bank directors. Politician-banker connections at this level are relatively rare, but their frequency is robustly correlated with many important characteristics of banks and institutions. At the micro level, banks that are politically connected are larger and more profitable than other banks, despite being less leveraged and having less risk. At the country level, this connectedness is strongly negatively related to economic development. Controlling for this, the analysis finds that the phenomenon is more prevalent where institutions are weaker and governments more powerful but less accountable. Bank regulation tends to be more pro-banker and the banking system less developed where connectedness is higher. A benign, public-interest view is hard to reconcile with these patterns.
format	Journal Article
author	Braun, Matías Raddatz, Claudio
author_facet	Braun, Matías Raddatz, Claudio
author_sort	Braun, Matías
title	Banking on Politics
title_short	Banking on Politics
title_full	Banking on Politics
title_fullStr	Banking on Politics
title_full_unstemmed	Banking on Politics
title_sort	banking on politics
publisher	World Bank
publishDate	2012
url	http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4521
_version_	1764391727279374336

Banking on Politics

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