How Viable Are Unemployment Insurance Savings Accounts? Simulation Results for Slovenia

Applying a methodology similar to Feldstein and Altman (1998) to Slovenia's unemployment insurance (UI) system, the paper shows that unemployment insurance savings accounts (UISAs) are a viable alternative to a modest, but not generous, UI system. Under the modest regime, only one quarter of wo...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Vodopivec, Milan
Format: Journal Article
Language:EN
Published: 2012
Subjects:
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4998
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spelling okr-10986-49982021-04-23T14:02:20Z How Viable Are Unemployment Insurance Savings Accounts? Simulation Results for Slovenia Vodopivec, Milan Personal Finance D140 Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities Redistributive Effects Environmental Taxes and Subsidies H230 Unemployment Insurance Severance Pay Plant Closings J650 Applying a methodology similar to Feldstein and Altman (1998) to Slovenia's unemployment insurance (UI) system, the paper shows that unemployment insurance savings accounts (UISAs) are a viable alternative to a modest, but not generous, UI system. Under the modest regime, only one quarter of workers end their working life with a negative cumulative balance and 43% ever experience a negative UISA balance; in contrast, under the generous regime, 49% of workers end their working life with a negative cumulative balance and 66% ever experience a negative balance. The simulations also show that the level of redistribution under UISAs lags behind the redistribution implied by the UI system. 2012-03-30T07:30:46Z 2012-03-30T07:30:46Z 2010 Journal Article Comparative Economic Studies 08887233 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4998 EN http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo World Bank Journal Article Slovenia
repository_type Digital Repository
institution_category Foreign Institution
institution Digital Repositories
building World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection World Bank
language EN
topic Personal Finance D140
Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities
Redistributive Effects
Environmental Taxes and Subsidies H230
Unemployment Insurance
Severance Pay
Plant Closings J650
spellingShingle Personal Finance D140
Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities
Redistributive Effects
Environmental Taxes and Subsidies H230
Unemployment Insurance
Severance Pay
Plant Closings J650
Vodopivec, Milan
How Viable Are Unemployment Insurance Savings Accounts? Simulation Results for Slovenia
geographic_facet Slovenia
relation http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo
description Applying a methodology similar to Feldstein and Altman (1998) to Slovenia's unemployment insurance (UI) system, the paper shows that unemployment insurance savings accounts (UISAs) are a viable alternative to a modest, but not generous, UI system. Under the modest regime, only one quarter of workers end their working life with a negative cumulative balance and 43% ever experience a negative UISA balance; in contrast, under the generous regime, 49% of workers end their working life with a negative cumulative balance and 66% ever experience a negative balance. The simulations also show that the level of redistribution under UISAs lags behind the redistribution implied by the UI system.
format Journal Article
author Vodopivec, Milan
author_facet Vodopivec, Milan
author_sort Vodopivec, Milan
title How Viable Are Unemployment Insurance Savings Accounts? Simulation Results for Slovenia
title_short How Viable Are Unemployment Insurance Savings Accounts? Simulation Results for Slovenia
title_full How Viable Are Unemployment Insurance Savings Accounts? Simulation Results for Slovenia
title_fullStr How Viable Are Unemployment Insurance Savings Accounts? Simulation Results for Slovenia
title_full_unstemmed How Viable Are Unemployment Insurance Savings Accounts? Simulation Results for Slovenia
title_sort how viable are unemployment insurance savings accounts? simulation results for slovenia
publishDate 2012
url http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4998
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