Why Official Bailouts Tend Not to Work: An Example Motivated by Greece 2010

The authors use recent events in Greece to illustrate that official bailouts tend not to work when countries have fundamental fiscal ('insolvency') problems and construct a two-period numerical example to explain why this should not come as a surprise.

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Chamley, Christophe P., Pinto, Brian
Format:	Journal Article
Language:	EN
Published:	2012
Subjects:	Fiscal Policy E620 Studies of Particular Policy Episodes E650
Online Access:	http://hdl.handle.net/10986/5506

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recordtype	oai_dc
spelling	okr-10986-55062021-04-23T14:02:22Z Why Official Bailouts Tend Not to Work: An Example Motivated by Greece 2010 Chamley, Christophe P. Pinto, Brian Fiscal Policy E620 Studies of Particular Policy Episodes E650 The authors use recent events in Greece to illustrate that official bailouts tend not to work when countries have fundamental fiscal ('insolvency') problems and construct a two-period numerical example to explain why this should not come as a surprise. 2012-03-30T07:33:09Z 2012-03-30T07:33:09Z 2011 Journal Article Economists' Voice 15533832 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/5506 EN http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo World Bank Journal Article Greece
repository_type	Digital Repository
institution_category	Foreign Institution
institution	Digital Repositories
building	World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection	World Bank
language	EN
topic	Fiscal Policy E620 Studies of Particular Policy Episodes E650
spellingShingle	Fiscal Policy E620 Studies of Particular Policy Episodes E650 Chamley, Christophe P. Pinto, Brian Why Official Bailouts Tend Not to Work: An Example Motivated by Greece 2010
geographic_facet	Greece
relation	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo
description	The authors use recent events in Greece to illustrate that official bailouts tend not to work when countries have fundamental fiscal ('insolvency') problems and construct a two-period numerical example to explain why this should not come as a surprise.
format	Journal Article
author	Chamley, Christophe P. Pinto, Brian
author_facet	Chamley, Christophe P. Pinto, Brian
author_sort	Chamley, Christophe P.
title	Why Official Bailouts Tend Not to Work: An Example Motivated by Greece 2010
title_short	Why Official Bailouts Tend Not to Work: An Example Motivated by Greece 2010
title_full	Why Official Bailouts Tend Not to Work: An Example Motivated by Greece 2010
title_fullStr	Why Official Bailouts Tend Not to Work: An Example Motivated by Greece 2010
title_full_unstemmed	Why Official Bailouts Tend Not to Work: An Example Motivated by Greece 2010
title_sort	why official bailouts tend not to work: an example motivated by greece 2010
publishDate	2012
url	http://hdl.handle.net/10986/5506
_version_	1764395294490886144

Why Official Bailouts Tend Not to Work: An Example Motivated by Greece 2010

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