Development and the Interaction of Enforcement Institutions
We examine how formal and informal contract enforcing institutions interact in a competitive market with asymmetric information where consumers do not observe quality before purchase. Firm level incentives for producing high quality can be achieved with an informal enforcement mechanism, reputation,...
Main Authors: | Dhillon, Amrita, Rigolini, Jamele |
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Format: | Journal Article |
Language: | EN |
Published: |
2012
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/10986/5647 |
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