Fiscal Decentralization in Rentier Regions: Evidence from Russia

The paper argues that governments in regions that rely heavily on intergovernmental transfers and natural resource rents face serious distortions in their incentive structure. As a result, such regions tend to have more fiscally centralized governments than the regional characteristics would suggest...

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Main Authors: Freinkman, Lev, Plekhanov, Alexander
Format: Journal Article
Language:EN
Published: 2012
Subjects:
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/10986/5748
id okr-10986-5748
recordtype oai_dc
spelling okr-10986-57482021-04-23T14:02:23Z Fiscal Decentralization in Rentier Regions: Evidence from Russia Freinkman, Lev Plekhanov, Alexander Intergovernmental Relations Federalism Secession H770 Socialist Systems and Transitional Economies: Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics P250 Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions: Public Economics P350 Regional Economic Activity: Growth, Development, and Changes R110 The paper argues that governments in regions that rely heavily on intergovernmental transfers and natural resource rents face serious distortions in their incentive structure. As a result, such regions tend to have more fiscally centralized governments than the regional characteristics would suggest. Data on Russian regions in the late 1990s-early 2000s support this hypothesis. Advancing intraregional fiscal decentralization in rentier regions could reduce policy distortions, and make the subnational environment more supportive of economic development. 2012-03-30T07:34:21Z 2012-03-30T07:34:21Z 2009 Journal Article World Development 0305750X http://hdl.handle.net/10986/5748 EN http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo World Bank Journal Article Russian Federation
repository_type Digital Repository
institution_category Foreign Institution
institution Digital Repositories
building World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection World Bank
language EN
topic Intergovernmental Relations
Federalism
Secession H770
Socialist Systems and Transitional Economies: Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics P250
Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions: Public Economics P350
Regional Economic Activity: Growth, Development, and Changes R110
spellingShingle Intergovernmental Relations
Federalism
Secession H770
Socialist Systems and Transitional Economies: Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics P250
Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions: Public Economics P350
Regional Economic Activity: Growth, Development, and Changes R110
Freinkman, Lev
Plekhanov, Alexander
Fiscal Decentralization in Rentier Regions: Evidence from Russia
geographic_facet Russian Federation
relation http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo
description The paper argues that governments in regions that rely heavily on intergovernmental transfers and natural resource rents face serious distortions in their incentive structure. As a result, such regions tend to have more fiscally centralized governments than the regional characteristics would suggest. Data on Russian regions in the late 1990s-early 2000s support this hypothesis. Advancing intraregional fiscal decentralization in rentier regions could reduce policy distortions, and make the subnational environment more supportive of economic development.
format Journal Article
author Freinkman, Lev
Plekhanov, Alexander
author_facet Freinkman, Lev
Plekhanov, Alexander
author_sort Freinkman, Lev
title Fiscal Decentralization in Rentier Regions: Evidence from Russia
title_short Fiscal Decentralization in Rentier Regions: Evidence from Russia
title_full Fiscal Decentralization in Rentier Regions: Evidence from Russia
title_fullStr Fiscal Decentralization in Rentier Regions: Evidence from Russia
title_full_unstemmed Fiscal Decentralization in Rentier Regions: Evidence from Russia
title_sort fiscal decentralization in rentier regions: evidence from russia
publishDate 2012
url http://hdl.handle.net/10986/5748
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