Fiscal Decentralization in Rentier Regions: Evidence from Russia
The paper argues that governments in regions that rely heavily on intergovernmental transfers and natural resource rents face serious distortions in their incentive structure. As a result, such regions tend to have more fiscally centralized governments than the regional characteristics would suggest...
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okr-10986-57482021-04-23T14:02:23Z Fiscal Decentralization in Rentier Regions: Evidence from Russia Freinkman, Lev Plekhanov, Alexander Intergovernmental Relations Federalism Secession H770 Socialist Systems and Transitional Economies: Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics P250 Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions: Public Economics P350 Regional Economic Activity: Growth, Development, and Changes R110 The paper argues that governments in regions that rely heavily on intergovernmental transfers and natural resource rents face serious distortions in their incentive structure. As a result, such regions tend to have more fiscally centralized governments than the regional characteristics would suggest. Data on Russian regions in the late 1990s-early 2000s support this hypothesis. Advancing intraregional fiscal decentralization in rentier regions could reduce policy distortions, and make the subnational environment more supportive of economic development. 2012-03-30T07:34:21Z 2012-03-30T07:34:21Z 2009 Journal Article World Development 0305750X http://hdl.handle.net/10986/5748 EN http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo World Bank Journal Article Russian Federation |
repository_type |
Digital Repository |
institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
institution |
Digital Repositories |
building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
collection |
World Bank |
language |
EN |
topic |
Intergovernmental Relations Federalism Secession H770 Socialist Systems and Transitional Economies: Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics P250 Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions: Public Economics P350 Regional Economic Activity: Growth, Development, and Changes R110 |
spellingShingle |
Intergovernmental Relations Federalism Secession H770 Socialist Systems and Transitional Economies: Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics P250 Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions: Public Economics P350 Regional Economic Activity: Growth, Development, and Changes R110 Freinkman, Lev Plekhanov, Alexander Fiscal Decentralization in Rentier Regions: Evidence from Russia |
geographic_facet |
Russian Federation |
relation |
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo |
description |
The paper argues that governments in regions that rely heavily on intergovernmental transfers and natural resource rents face serious distortions in their incentive structure. As a result, such regions tend to have more fiscally centralized governments than the regional characteristics would suggest. Data on Russian regions in the late 1990s-early 2000s support this hypothesis. Advancing intraregional fiscal decentralization in rentier regions could reduce policy distortions, and make the subnational environment more supportive of economic development. |
format |
Journal Article |
author |
Freinkman, Lev Plekhanov, Alexander |
author_facet |
Freinkman, Lev Plekhanov, Alexander |
author_sort |
Freinkman, Lev |
title |
Fiscal Decentralization in Rentier Regions: Evidence from Russia |
title_short |
Fiscal Decentralization in Rentier Regions: Evidence from Russia |
title_full |
Fiscal Decentralization in Rentier Regions: Evidence from Russia |
title_fullStr |
Fiscal Decentralization in Rentier Regions: Evidence from Russia |
title_full_unstemmed |
Fiscal Decentralization in Rentier Regions: Evidence from Russia |
title_sort |
fiscal decentralization in rentier regions: evidence from russia |
publishDate |
2012 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/5748 |
_version_ |
1764396165163384832 |