Incentives, Supervision, and Sharecropper Productivity
Though sharecropping remains widespread, its determinants are still poorly understood and the debate over the extent of moral hazard is far from settled. We address both issues by analyzing the role of landlord supervision. When landlords vary in their cost of supervision, otherwise identical share-...
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okr-10986-58762021-04-23T14:02:23Z Incentives, Supervision, and Sharecropper Productivity Jacoby, Hanan G. Mansuri, Ghazala Economic Development: Agriculture Natural Resources Energy Environment Other Primary Products O130 Economic Development: Regional, Urban, and Rural Analyses Transportation O180 Micro Analysis of Farm Firms, Farm Households, and Farm Input Markets Q120 Though sharecropping remains widespread, its determinants are still poorly understood and the debate over the extent of moral hazard is far from settled. We address both issues by analyzing the role of landlord supervision. When landlords vary in their cost of supervision, otherwise identical share-tenants can have different productivity. Unique data on monitoring frequency collected from share-tenants in rural Pakistan confirms that, controlling for selection, 'supervised' tenants are significantly more productive than 'unsupervised' ones. Also, landlords' decisions regarding monitoring and incentives offered to tenants depend importantly on the cost of supervision. 2012-03-30T07:34:58Z 2012-03-30T07:34:58Z 2009 Journal Article Journal of Development Economics 03043878 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/5876 EN http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo World Bank Journal Article Pakistan |
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Foreign Institution |
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World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
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World Bank |
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EN |
topic |
Economic Development: Agriculture Natural Resources Energy Environment Other Primary Products O130 Economic Development: Regional, Urban, and Rural Analyses Transportation O180 Micro Analysis of Farm Firms, Farm Households, and Farm Input Markets Q120 |
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Economic Development: Agriculture Natural Resources Energy Environment Other Primary Products O130 Economic Development: Regional, Urban, and Rural Analyses Transportation O180 Micro Analysis of Farm Firms, Farm Households, and Farm Input Markets Q120 Jacoby, Hanan G. Mansuri, Ghazala Incentives, Supervision, and Sharecropper Productivity |
geographic_facet |
Pakistan |
relation |
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo |
description |
Though sharecropping remains widespread, its determinants are still poorly understood and the debate over the extent of moral hazard is far from settled. We address both issues by analyzing the role of landlord supervision. When landlords vary in their cost of supervision, otherwise identical share-tenants can have different productivity. Unique data on monitoring frequency collected from share-tenants in rural Pakistan confirms that, controlling for selection, 'supervised' tenants are significantly more productive than 'unsupervised' ones. Also, landlords' decisions regarding monitoring and incentives offered to tenants depend importantly on the cost of supervision. |
format |
Journal Article |
author |
Jacoby, Hanan G. Mansuri, Ghazala |
author_facet |
Jacoby, Hanan G. Mansuri, Ghazala |
author_sort |
Jacoby, Hanan G. |
title |
Incentives, Supervision, and Sharecropper Productivity |
title_short |
Incentives, Supervision, and Sharecropper Productivity |
title_full |
Incentives, Supervision, and Sharecropper Productivity |
title_fullStr |
Incentives, Supervision, and Sharecropper Productivity |
title_full_unstemmed |
Incentives, Supervision, and Sharecropper Productivity |
title_sort |
incentives, supervision, and sharecropper productivity |
publishDate |
2012 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/5876 |
_version_ |
1764396627721715712 |