Partial Peace Rebel Groups Inside and Outside Civil War Ssettlements
Previous research proposes that peace is more likely to become durable if all rebel groups are included in the settlement reached. The argument implies that if actors are excluded and continue to pursue the military course, this could have a destab...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
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Washington, DC: World Bank
2012
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2008/03/9121378/partial-peace-rebel-groups-inside-outside-civil-war-settlements http://hdl.handle.net/10986/6556 |
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okr-10986-65562021-04-23T14:02:31Z Partial Peace Rebel Groups Inside and Outside Civil War Ssettlements Nilsson, Desirée ARMED CONFLICT ARMED CONFLICTS BATTLE CIVIL PEACE CIVIL WAR CIVIL WARS COLD WAR CONFLICT CONFLICT MANAGEMENT CONFLICT RESEARCH CONFLICT RESOLUTION COSTS OF WAR DEATHS DEMOBILIZATION DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM DURATION OF PEACE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FIGHTING INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS INTERNATIONAL SECURITY INTERNATIONAL STUDIES INTRASTATE CONFLICTS MEETING MILITARY POWER NATIONS NEGOTIATION NEGOTIATIONS PEACE PEACE ACCORDS PEACE AGREEMENTS PEACE PROCESS PEACE PROCESSES PEACE RESEARCH PEACE SETTLEMENTS PEACEBUILDING PEACEKEEPERS PEACEKEEPING PEACEKEEPING FORCES PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS PEACEMAKING POST-CONFLICT REBEL REBEL GROUP REBEL GROUPS REBELS VIOLENCE VIOLENT CONFLICT WAR DURATION WARFARE Previous research proposes that peace is more likely to become durable if all rebel groups are included in the settlement reached. The argument implies that if actors are excluded and continue to pursue the military course, this could have a destabilizing effect on the actors that have signed an agreement. This article argues that all-inclusive peace deals - signed by the government and all rebel groups - are not the panacea for peace that many seem to believe. Given that the parties are strategic actors who are forward-looking when making their decisions, the signatories should anticipate that the excluded parties may continue to fight. Therefore, the risk of violent challenges from outside actors is likely to already be factored into the decision-making calculus when the signatories decide to reach a deal, and so does not affect their commitment to peace. Implications from this theoretical argument are tested using unique data on the conflict behavior of the government and each of the rebel groups in internal armed conflicts during the post-Cold War period. The results are well in line with the theoretical expectations and show that whether an agreement leaves out some actor does not affect whether the signatories stick to peace. The results demonstrate that even when excluded rebel groups engage in conflict, this does not affect the signatories' commitment to peace. Hence, the findings suggest that partial peace is possible. 2012-05-29T16:58:50Z 2012-05-29T16:58:50Z 2008-03 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2008/03/9121378/partial-peace-rebel-groups-inside-outside-civil-war-settlements http://hdl.handle.net/10986/6556 English Policy Research Working Paper; No. 4572 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank Washington, DC: World Bank Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English |
| topic |
ARMED CONFLICT ARMED CONFLICTS BATTLE CIVIL PEACE CIVIL WAR CIVIL WARS COLD WAR CONFLICT CONFLICT MANAGEMENT CONFLICT RESEARCH CONFLICT RESOLUTION COSTS OF WAR DEATHS DEMOBILIZATION DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM DURATION OF PEACE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FIGHTING INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS INTERNATIONAL SECURITY INTERNATIONAL STUDIES INTRASTATE CONFLICTS MEETING MILITARY POWER NATIONS NEGOTIATION NEGOTIATIONS PEACE PEACE ACCORDS PEACE AGREEMENTS PEACE PROCESS PEACE PROCESSES PEACE RESEARCH PEACE SETTLEMENTS PEACEBUILDING PEACEKEEPERS PEACEKEEPING PEACEKEEPING FORCES PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS PEACEMAKING POST-CONFLICT REBEL REBEL GROUP REBEL GROUPS REBELS VIOLENCE VIOLENT CONFLICT WAR DURATION WARFARE |
| spellingShingle |
ARMED CONFLICT ARMED CONFLICTS BATTLE CIVIL PEACE CIVIL WAR CIVIL WARS COLD WAR CONFLICT CONFLICT MANAGEMENT CONFLICT RESEARCH CONFLICT RESOLUTION COSTS OF WAR DEATHS DEMOBILIZATION DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM DURATION OF PEACE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FIGHTING INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS INTERNATIONAL SECURITY INTERNATIONAL STUDIES INTRASTATE CONFLICTS MEETING MILITARY POWER NATIONS NEGOTIATION NEGOTIATIONS PEACE PEACE ACCORDS PEACE AGREEMENTS PEACE PROCESS PEACE PROCESSES PEACE RESEARCH PEACE SETTLEMENTS PEACEBUILDING PEACEKEEPERS PEACEKEEPING PEACEKEEPING FORCES PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS PEACEMAKING POST-CONFLICT REBEL REBEL GROUP REBEL GROUPS REBELS VIOLENCE VIOLENT CONFLICT WAR DURATION WARFARE Nilsson, Desirée Partial Peace Rebel Groups Inside and Outside Civil War Ssettlements |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper; No. 4572 |
| description |
Previous research proposes that peace is
more likely to become durable if all rebel groups are
included in the settlement reached. The argument implies
that if actors are excluded and continue to pursue the
military course, this could have a destabilizing effect on
the actors that have signed an agreement. This article
argues that all-inclusive peace deals - signed by the
government and all rebel groups - are not the panacea for
peace that many seem to believe. Given that the parties are
strategic actors who are forward-looking when making their
decisions, the signatories should anticipate that the
excluded parties may continue to fight. Therefore, the risk
of violent challenges from outside actors is likely to
already be factored into the decision-making calculus when
the signatories decide to reach a deal, and so does not
affect their commitment to peace. Implications from this
theoretical argument are tested using unique data on the
conflict behavior of the government and each of the rebel
groups in internal armed conflicts during the post-Cold War
period. The results are well in line with the theoretical
expectations and show that whether an agreement leaves out
some actor does not affect whether the signatories stick to
peace. The results demonstrate that even when excluded rebel
groups engage in conflict, this does not affect the
signatories' commitment to peace. Hence, the findings
suggest that partial peace is possible. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Nilsson, Desirée |
| author_facet |
Nilsson, Desirée |
| author_sort |
Nilsson, Desirée |
| title |
Partial Peace Rebel Groups Inside and Outside Civil War Ssettlements |
| title_short |
Partial Peace Rebel Groups Inside and Outside Civil War Ssettlements |
| title_full |
Partial Peace Rebel Groups Inside and Outside Civil War Ssettlements |
| title_fullStr |
Partial Peace Rebel Groups Inside and Outside Civil War Ssettlements |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Partial Peace Rebel Groups Inside and Outside Civil War Ssettlements |
| title_sort |
partial peace rebel groups inside and outside civil war ssettlements |
| publisher |
Washington, DC: World Bank |
| publishDate |
2012 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2008/03/9121378/partial-peace-rebel-groups-inside-outside-civil-war-settlements http://hdl.handle.net/10986/6556 |
| _version_ |
1764400468524531712 |