Political Violence and Economic Growth
This paper analyzes the economic growth impact of organized political violence. First, the authors articulate the theoretical underpinnings of the growth impact of political violence in a popular model of growth under uncertainty. The authors show...
Main Authors: | , |
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Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2012
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2008/08/9766080/political-violence-economic-growth http://hdl.handle.net/10986/6805 |
Summary: | This paper analyzes the economic growth
impact of organized political violence. First, the authors
articulate the theoretical underpinnings of the growth
impact of political violence in a popular model of growth
under uncertainty. The authors show that, under plausible
assumptions regarding attitudes toward risk, the overall
effects of organized political violence are likely to be
much higher than its direct capital destruction impact.
Second, using a quantitative model of violence that
distinguishes between three levels of political violence
(riots, coups, and civil war), the authors use predicted
probabilities of aggregate violence and its three
manifestations to identify their growth effects in an
encompassing growth model. Panel regressions suggest that
organized political violence, especially civil war,
significantly lowers long-term economic growth. Moreover,
unlike most previous studies, the authors also find ethnic
fractionalization to have a negative and direct effect on
growth, though its effect is substantially ameliorated by
the institutions specific to a non-factional partial
democracy. Third, the results show that Sub-Saharan Africa
has been disproportionately impacted by civil war, which
explains a substantial share of its economic decline,
including the widening income gap relative to East Asia.
Civil wars have also been costly for Sub-Saharan Africa.
For the case of Sudan, a typical large African country
experiencing a long-duration conflict, the cost of war
amounts to $46 billion (in 2000 fixed prices), which is
roughly double the country's current stock of external
debt. Fourth, the authors suggest that to break free from
its conflict-underdevelopment trap, Africa needs to better
manage its ethnic diversity. The way to do this would be to
develop inclusive, non-factional democracy. A democratic
but factional polity would not work, and would be only
marginally better than an authoritarian regime. |
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