Political Alternation as a Restraint on Investing in Influence : Evidence from the Post-Communist Transition
The authors develop and implement a method for measuring the frequency of changes in power among distinct leaders and ideologically distinct parties that is comparable across political systems. The authors find that more frequent alternation in pow...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2012
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2008/10/9911985/political-alternation-restraint-investing-influence-evidence-post-communist-transition http://hdl.handle.net/10986/6932 |
| Summary: | The authors develop and implement a
method for measuring the frequency of changes in power among
distinct leaders and ideologically distinct parties that is
comparable across political systems. The authors find that
more frequent alternation in power is associated with the
emergence of better governance in post communist countries.
The results are consistent with the hypothesis that firms
seek durable protection from the state, which implies that
expected political alternation is relevant to the decision
whether to invest in influence with the governing party or,
alternatively, to demand institutions that apply predictable
rules, with equality of treatment, regardless of the party
in power. |
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