A Kleptocrat's Survival Guide : Autocratic Longevity in the Face of Civil Conflict
Autocratic regimes are quite often short-lived kleptocracies formed and maintained through force and used to appropriate wealth from subjects. Some of these autocracies collapse after only a year or two of plundering while others manage to survive...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2012
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2007/04/7524371/kleptocrats-survival-guide-autocratic-longevity-face-civil-conflict http://hdl.handle.net/10986/7025 |
| Summary: | Autocratic regimes are quite often
short-lived kleptocracies formed and maintained through
force and used to appropriate wealth from subjects. Some of
these autocracies collapse after only a year or two of
plundering while others manage to survive for 15 or 20
years. This paper asks why some autocratic regimes survive
while others fail. A database of political regimes from 1960
to 2003 is introduced and accompanies the paper in an
appendix. A model of political survival suggests that
autocrats exchange constraints on their executive power for
their continued survival. The relationship between payouts
from successful rebellion and ease of rebellion determines
how willing kleptocrats are to extend the political
franchise and protect their power. Results show that
extremely oppressive regimes and great expenditures on
security are likely to accompany the most difficult
environments for defense of the state. The model is used to
identify the costs of pervasive political conflict and to
decompose the "civil peace dividend" enjoyed by
inclusive democracies that do not suffer from the malady of
kleptocratic rule. Finally, the model suggests that slow
democratization pushed by the autocratic elites to guarantee
their survival, accompanied by stable development, may be
the best path toward a democratic future for many fragile states. |
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