A Kleptocrat's Survival Guide : Autocratic Longevity in the Face of Civil Conflict
Autocratic regimes are quite often short-lived kleptocracies formed and maintained through force and used to appropriate wealth from subjects. Some of these autocracies collapse after only a year or two of plundering while others manage to survive...
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2012
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2007/04/7524371/kleptocrats-survival-guide-autocratic-longevity-face-civil-conflict http://hdl.handle.net/10986/7025 |
| id |
okr-10986-7025 |
|---|---|
| recordtype |
oai_dc |
| spelling |
okr-10986-70252021-04-23T14:02:33Z A Kleptocrat's Survival Guide : Autocratic Longevity in the Face of Civil Conflict Milante, Gary AUTHORITY CIVIL CONFLICT CIVIL PEACE CIVIL SOCIETY CONFLICT COSTS OF CONFLICT CRIME DEMOCRACY SCORE DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DISARMAMENT DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ECONOMICS RESEARCH EQUATIONS EQUILIBRIUM ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION ETHNIC GROUPS FUTURE RESEARCH GDP GDP PER CAPITA GUERRILLA WARFARE GUERRILLAS IDEAS INCOME INCOME PER CAPITA INDUSTRIALIZATION INEQUALITY MARGINAL COSTS MONOPOLY NASH EQUILIBRIUM NATURAL RESOURCES POLARIZATION POLITICAL CONFLICT POLITICAL TRANSITIONS POSITIVE EXTERNALITY POST-CONFLICT PROPERTY RIGHTS REBELLION REBELLIONS RISK NEUTRAL SOCIETY TARGETING TAXATION THE GAMBIA TOTAL OUTPUT TRANSITION ECONOMIES VIOLENCE WEALTH Autocratic regimes are quite often short-lived kleptocracies formed and maintained through force and used to appropriate wealth from subjects. Some of these autocracies collapse after only a year or two of plundering while others manage to survive for 15 or 20 years. This paper asks why some autocratic regimes survive while others fail. A database of political regimes from 1960 to 2003 is introduced and accompanies the paper in an appendix. A model of political survival suggests that autocrats exchange constraints on their executive power for their continued survival. The relationship between payouts from successful rebellion and ease of rebellion determines how willing kleptocrats are to extend the political franchise and protect their power. Results show that extremely oppressive regimes and great expenditures on security are likely to accompany the most difficult environments for defense of the state. The model is used to identify the costs of pervasive political conflict and to decompose the "civil peace dividend" enjoyed by inclusive democracies that do not suffer from the malady of kleptocratic rule. Finally, the model suggests that slow democratization pushed by the autocratic elites to guarantee their survival, accompanied by stable development, may be the best path toward a democratic future for many fragile states. 2012-06-04T18:31:14Z 2012-06-04T18:31:14Z 2007-04 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2007/04/7524371/kleptocrats-survival-guide-autocratic-longevity-face-civil-conflict http://hdl.handle.net/10986/7025 English Policy Research Working Paper; No. 4186 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English |
| topic |
AUTHORITY CIVIL CONFLICT CIVIL PEACE CIVIL SOCIETY CONFLICT COSTS OF CONFLICT CRIME DEMOCRACY SCORE DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DISARMAMENT DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ECONOMICS RESEARCH EQUATIONS EQUILIBRIUM ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION ETHNIC GROUPS FUTURE RESEARCH GDP GDP PER CAPITA GUERRILLA WARFARE GUERRILLAS IDEAS INCOME INCOME PER CAPITA INDUSTRIALIZATION INEQUALITY MARGINAL COSTS MONOPOLY NASH EQUILIBRIUM NATURAL RESOURCES POLARIZATION POLITICAL CONFLICT POLITICAL TRANSITIONS POSITIVE EXTERNALITY POST-CONFLICT PROPERTY RIGHTS REBELLION REBELLIONS RISK NEUTRAL SOCIETY TARGETING TAXATION THE GAMBIA TOTAL OUTPUT TRANSITION ECONOMIES VIOLENCE WEALTH |
| spellingShingle |
AUTHORITY CIVIL CONFLICT CIVIL PEACE CIVIL SOCIETY CONFLICT COSTS OF CONFLICT CRIME DEMOCRACY SCORE DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DISARMAMENT DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ECONOMICS RESEARCH EQUATIONS EQUILIBRIUM ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION ETHNIC GROUPS FUTURE RESEARCH GDP GDP PER CAPITA GUERRILLA WARFARE GUERRILLAS IDEAS INCOME INCOME PER CAPITA INDUSTRIALIZATION INEQUALITY MARGINAL COSTS MONOPOLY NASH EQUILIBRIUM NATURAL RESOURCES POLARIZATION POLITICAL CONFLICT POLITICAL TRANSITIONS POSITIVE EXTERNALITY POST-CONFLICT PROPERTY RIGHTS REBELLION REBELLIONS RISK NEUTRAL SOCIETY TARGETING TAXATION THE GAMBIA TOTAL OUTPUT TRANSITION ECONOMIES VIOLENCE WEALTH Milante, Gary A Kleptocrat's Survival Guide : Autocratic Longevity in the Face of Civil Conflict |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper; No. 4186 |
| description |
Autocratic regimes are quite often
short-lived kleptocracies formed and maintained through
force and used to appropriate wealth from subjects. Some of
these autocracies collapse after only a year or two of
plundering while others manage to survive for 15 or 20
years. This paper asks why some autocratic regimes survive
while others fail. A database of political regimes from 1960
to 2003 is introduced and accompanies the paper in an
appendix. A model of political survival suggests that
autocrats exchange constraints on their executive power for
their continued survival. The relationship between payouts
from successful rebellion and ease of rebellion determines
how willing kleptocrats are to extend the political
franchise and protect their power. Results show that
extremely oppressive regimes and great expenditures on
security are likely to accompany the most difficult
environments for defense of the state. The model is used to
identify the costs of pervasive political conflict and to
decompose the "civil peace dividend" enjoyed by
inclusive democracies that do not suffer from the malady of
kleptocratic rule. Finally, the model suggests that slow
democratization pushed by the autocratic elites to guarantee
their survival, accompanied by stable development, may be
the best path toward a democratic future for many fragile states. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Milante, Gary |
| author_facet |
Milante, Gary |
| author_sort |
Milante, Gary |
| title |
A Kleptocrat's Survival Guide : Autocratic Longevity in the Face of Civil Conflict |
| title_short |
A Kleptocrat's Survival Guide : Autocratic Longevity in the Face of Civil Conflict |
| title_full |
A Kleptocrat's Survival Guide : Autocratic Longevity in the Face of Civil Conflict |
| title_fullStr |
A Kleptocrat's Survival Guide : Autocratic Longevity in the Face of Civil Conflict |
| title_full_unstemmed |
A Kleptocrat's Survival Guide : Autocratic Longevity in the Face of Civil Conflict |
| title_sort |
kleptocrat's survival guide : autocratic longevity in the face of civil conflict |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2012 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2007/04/7524371/kleptocrats-survival-guide-autocratic-longevity-face-civil-conflict http://hdl.handle.net/10986/7025 |
| _version_ |
1764401773105119232 |