Can Good Economics Ever Be Good Politics? Case Study of India's Power Sector

In recent years, the power sector in several developing countries has suffered from a frustrating gap between strong, pro-reform rhetoric at the political level, and weak, hesitant implementation of the reform measures on the ground. Focusing on th...

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Main Author: Lal, Sumir
Format: Publication
Language:English
en_US
Published: Washington, DC: World Bank 2012
Subjects:
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/06/6889244/can-good-economics-ever-good-politics-case-study-indias-power-sector
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/7032
id okr-10986-7032
recordtype oai_dc
spelling okr-10986-70322021-04-23T14:02:27Z Can Good Economics Ever Be Good Politics? Case Study of India's Power Sector Lal, Sumir ACCESS TO ELECTRICITY ACCOUNTABILITY ACCOUNTING AIRPORTS APPROACH AUTONOMY BALANCE BUREAUCRACY BUREAUCRATS CIVIL SOCIETY CONSUMER DISSATISFACTION CUSTOMER SERVICES DEFICITS DISTRIBUTION LOSSES ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY ELECTRIC SUPPLY ELECTRICITY ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS ELECTRICITY PRICES ELECTRICITY SECTOR ELECTRICITY SUPPLY ELECTRICITY UTILITIES ELECTRICITY UTILITY FISCAL DEFICIT GENERATION GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT HOUSING INDEPENDENT POWER PRODUCERS INSURANCE JURISDICTION LOCAL DISTRIBUTION MANAGERS MEDIA MIDDLE MANAGEMENT MISMANAGEMENT PENALTIES PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENT POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL WILL POOR HOUSEHOLDS POWER POWER PRODUCERS POWER SECTOR POWER SECTOR REFORM PRIVATIZATION PRODUCTIVITY PROFITABILITY PUBLIC OWNERSHIP PUBLIC PARTICIPATION PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SERVICES RATIONALIZATION REFORM IMPLEMENTATION REFORM POLICIES REFORM POLICY REFORM PROCESS REFORMS RETRENCHMENT ROUTES RURAL ELECTRIC RURAL ELECTRIFICATION SERVICE DELIVERY SUBSIDIARY TOP MANAGEMENT TRADE UNIONS TRANSPORT UTILITIES In recent years, the power sector in several developing countries has suffered from a frustrating gap between strong, pro-reform rhetoric at the political level, and weak, hesitant implementation of the reform measures on the ground. Focusing on the recent experience of power sector reform in India, this paper looks afresh at the problem of the rhetoric-implementation gap by taking the lack of political will as its starting point, and identifying the ingredients that comprise it in the current context of India. Assuming that people and institutions are not impartial but instead respond to political and economic incentives, it explains how the lack of political will often reflects rational political behavior. Using this more realistic framework, it examines the incentives, informal relationships, and interests that govern the behavior of people and institutions, and searches for the openings and opportunities that reformers must pursue. 2012-06-04T19:04:48Z 2012-06-04T19:04:48Z 2006 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/06/6889244/can-good-economics-ever-good-politics-case-study-indias-power-sector 978-0-8213-6680-6 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/7032 English en_US World Bank Working Paper No. 83 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo World Bank Washington, DC: World Bank Publications & Research :: Publication Publications & Research :: Publication South Asia India
repository_type Digital Repository
institution_category Foreign Institution
institution Digital Repositories
building World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection World Bank
language English
en_US
topic ACCESS TO ELECTRICITY
ACCOUNTABILITY
ACCOUNTING
AIRPORTS
APPROACH
AUTONOMY
BALANCE
BUREAUCRACY
BUREAUCRATS
CIVIL SOCIETY
CONSUMER DISSATISFACTION
CUSTOMER SERVICES
DEFICITS
DISTRIBUTION LOSSES
ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT
ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
ELECTRIC SUPPLY
ELECTRICITY
ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS
ELECTRICITY PRICES
ELECTRICITY SECTOR
ELECTRICITY SUPPLY
ELECTRICITY UTILITIES
ELECTRICITY UTILITY
FISCAL DEFICIT
GENERATION
GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT
HOUSING
INDEPENDENT POWER PRODUCERS
INSURANCE
JURISDICTION
LOCAL DISTRIBUTION
MANAGERS
MEDIA
MIDDLE MANAGEMENT
MISMANAGEMENT
PENALTIES
PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENT
POLITICAL POWER
POLITICAL WILL
POOR HOUSEHOLDS
POWER
POWER PRODUCERS
POWER SECTOR
POWER SECTOR REFORM
PRIVATIZATION
PRODUCTIVITY
PROFITABILITY
PUBLIC OWNERSHIP
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
PUBLIC POLICY
PUBLIC SECTOR
PUBLIC SERVICES
RATIONALIZATION
REFORM IMPLEMENTATION
REFORM POLICIES
REFORM POLICY
REFORM PROCESS
REFORMS
RETRENCHMENT
ROUTES
RURAL ELECTRIC
RURAL ELECTRIFICATION
SERVICE DELIVERY
SUBSIDIARY
TOP MANAGEMENT
TRADE UNIONS
TRANSPORT
UTILITIES
spellingShingle ACCESS TO ELECTRICITY
ACCOUNTABILITY
ACCOUNTING
AIRPORTS
APPROACH
AUTONOMY
BALANCE
BUREAUCRACY
BUREAUCRATS
CIVIL SOCIETY
CONSUMER DISSATISFACTION
CUSTOMER SERVICES
DEFICITS
DISTRIBUTION LOSSES
ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT
ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
ELECTRIC SUPPLY
ELECTRICITY
ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS
ELECTRICITY PRICES
ELECTRICITY SECTOR
ELECTRICITY SUPPLY
ELECTRICITY UTILITIES
ELECTRICITY UTILITY
FISCAL DEFICIT
GENERATION
GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT
HOUSING
INDEPENDENT POWER PRODUCERS
INSURANCE
JURISDICTION
LOCAL DISTRIBUTION
MANAGERS
MEDIA
MIDDLE MANAGEMENT
MISMANAGEMENT
PENALTIES
PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENT
POLITICAL POWER
POLITICAL WILL
POOR HOUSEHOLDS
POWER
POWER PRODUCERS
POWER SECTOR
POWER SECTOR REFORM
PRIVATIZATION
PRODUCTIVITY
PROFITABILITY
PUBLIC OWNERSHIP
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
PUBLIC POLICY
PUBLIC SECTOR
PUBLIC SERVICES
RATIONALIZATION
REFORM IMPLEMENTATION
REFORM POLICIES
REFORM POLICY
REFORM PROCESS
REFORMS
RETRENCHMENT
ROUTES
RURAL ELECTRIC
RURAL ELECTRIFICATION
SERVICE DELIVERY
SUBSIDIARY
TOP MANAGEMENT
TRADE UNIONS
TRANSPORT
UTILITIES
Lal, Sumir
Can Good Economics Ever Be Good Politics? Case Study of India's Power Sector
geographic_facet South Asia
India
relation World Bank Working Paper No. 83
description In recent years, the power sector in several developing countries has suffered from a frustrating gap between strong, pro-reform rhetoric at the political level, and weak, hesitant implementation of the reform measures on the ground. Focusing on the recent experience of power sector reform in India, this paper looks afresh at the problem of the rhetoric-implementation gap by taking the lack of political will as its starting point, and identifying the ingredients that comprise it in the current context of India. Assuming that people and institutions are not impartial but instead respond to political and economic incentives, it explains how the lack of political will often reflects rational political behavior. Using this more realistic framework, it examines the incentives, informal relationships, and interests that govern the behavior of people and institutions, and searches for the openings and opportunities that reformers must pursue.
format Publications & Research :: Publication
author Lal, Sumir
author_facet Lal, Sumir
author_sort Lal, Sumir
title Can Good Economics Ever Be Good Politics? Case Study of India's Power Sector
title_short Can Good Economics Ever Be Good Politics? Case Study of India's Power Sector
title_full Can Good Economics Ever Be Good Politics? Case Study of India's Power Sector
title_fullStr Can Good Economics Ever Be Good Politics? Case Study of India's Power Sector
title_full_unstemmed Can Good Economics Ever Be Good Politics? Case Study of India's Power Sector
title_sort can good economics ever be good politics? case study of india's power sector
publisher Washington, DC: World Bank
publishDate 2012
url http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/06/6889244/can-good-economics-ever-good-politics-case-study-indias-power-sector
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/7032
_version_ 1764399013019254784