Can Good Economics Ever Be Good Politics? Case Study of India's Power Sector
In recent years, the power sector in several developing countries has suffered from a frustrating gap between strong, pro-reform rhetoric at the political level, and weak, hesitant implementation of the reform measures on the ground. Focusing on th...
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2012
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/06/6889244/can-good-economics-ever-good-politics-case-study-indias-power-sector http://hdl.handle.net/10986/7032 |
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okr-10986-70322021-04-23T14:02:27Z Can Good Economics Ever Be Good Politics? Case Study of India's Power Sector Lal, Sumir ACCESS TO ELECTRICITY ACCOUNTABILITY ACCOUNTING AIRPORTS APPROACH AUTONOMY BALANCE BUREAUCRACY BUREAUCRATS CIVIL SOCIETY CONSUMER DISSATISFACTION CUSTOMER SERVICES DEFICITS DISTRIBUTION LOSSES ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY ELECTRIC SUPPLY ELECTRICITY ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS ELECTRICITY PRICES ELECTRICITY SECTOR ELECTRICITY SUPPLY ELECTRICITY UTILITIES ELECTRICITY UTILITY FISCAL DEFICIT GENERATION GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT HOUSING INDEPENDENT POWER PRODUCERS INSURANCE JURISDICTION LOCAL DISTRIBUTION MANAGERS MEDIA MIDDLE MANAGEMENT MISMANAGEMENT PENALTIES PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENT POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL WILL POOR HOUSEHOLDS POWER POWER PRODUCERS POWER SECTOR POWER SECTOR REFORM PRIVATIZATION PRODUCTIVITY PROFITABILITY PUBLIC OWNERSHIP PUBLIC PARTICIPATION PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SERVICES RATIONALIZATION REFORM IMPLEMENTATION REFORM POLICIES REFORM POLICY REFORM PROCESS REFORMS RETRENCHMENT ROUTES RURAL ELECTRIC RURAL ELECTRIFICATION SERVICE DELIVERY SUBSIDIARY TOP MANAGEMENT TRADE UNIONS TRANSPORT UTILITIES In recent years, the power sector in several developing countries has suffered from a frustrating gap between strong, pro-reform rhetoric at the political level, and weak, hesitant implementation of the reform measures on the ground. Focusing on the recent experience of power sector reform in India, this paper looks afresh at the problem of the rhetoric-implementation gap by taking the lack of political will as its starting point, and identifying the ingredients that comprise it in the current context of India. Assuming that people and institutions are not impartial but instead respond to political and economic incentives, it explains how the lack of political will often reflects rational political behavior. Using this more realistic framework, it examines the incentives, informal relationships, and interests that govern the behavior of people and institutions, and searches for the openings and opportunities that reformers must pursue. 2012-06-04T19:04:48Z 2012-06-04T19:04:48Z 2006 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/06/6889244/can-good-economics-ever-good-politics-case-study-indias-power-sector 978-0-8213-6680-6 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/7032 English en_US World Bank Working Paper No. 83 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo World Bank Washington, DC: World Bank Publications & Research :: Publication Publications & Research :: Publication South Asia India |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
ACCESS TO ELECTRICITY ACCOUNTABILITY ACCOUNTING AIRPORTS APPROACH AUTONOMY BALANCE BUREAUCRACY BUREAUCRATS CIVIL SOCIETY CONSUMER DISSATISFACTION CUSTOMER SERVICES DEFICITS DISTRIBUTION LOSSES ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY ELECTRIC SUPPLY ELECTRICITY ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS ELECTRICITY PRICES ELECTRICITY SECTOR ELECTRICITY SUPPLY ELECTRICITY UTILITIES ELECTRICITY UTILITY FISCAL DEFICIT GENERATION GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT HOUSING INDEPENDENT POWER PRODUCERS INSURANCE JURISDICTION LOCAL DISTRIBUTION MANAGERS MEDIA MIDDLE MANAGEMENT MISMANAGEMENT PENALTIES PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENT POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL WILL POOR HOUSEHOLDS POWER POWER PRODUCERS POWER SECTOR POWER SECTOR REFORM PRIVATIZATION PRODUCTIVITY PROFITABILITY PUBLIC OWNERSHIP PUBLIC PARTICIPATION PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SERVICES RATIONALIZATION REFORM IMPLEMENTATION REFORM POLICIES REFORM POLICY REFORM PROCESS REFORMS RETRENCHMENT ROUTES RURAL ELECTRIC RURAL ELECTRIFICATION SERVICE DELIVERY SUBSIDIARY TOP MANAGEMENT TRADE UNIONS TRANSPORT UTILITIES |
| spellingShingle |
ACCESS TO ELECTRICITY ACCOUNTABILITY ACCOUNTING AIRPORTS APPROACH AUTONOMY BALANCE BUREAUCRACY BUREAUCRATS CIVIL SOCIETY CONSUMER DISSATISFACTION CUSTOMER SERVICES DEFICITS DISTRIBUTION LOSSES ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY ELECTRIC SUPPLY ELECTRICITY ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS ELECTRICITY PRICES ELECTRICITY SECTOR ELECTRICITY SUPPLY ELECTRICITY UTILITIES ELECTRICITY UTILITY FISCAL DEFICIT GENERATION GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT HOUSING INDEPENDENT POWER PRODUCERS INSURANCE JURISDICTION LOCAL DISTRIBUTION MANAGERS MEDIA MIDDLE MANAGEMENT MISMANAGEMENT PENALTIES PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENT POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL WILL POOR HOUSEHOLDS POWER POWER PRODUCERS POWER SECTOR POWER SECTOR REFORM PRIVATIZATION PRODUCTIVITY PROFITABILITY PUBLIC OWNERSHIP PUBLIC PARTICIPATION PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SERVICES RATIONALIZATION REFORM IMPLEMENTATION REFORM POLICIES REFORM POLICY REFORM PROCESS REFORMS RETRENCHMENT ROUTES RURAL ELECTRIC RURAL ELECTRIFICATION SERVICE DELIVERY SUBSIDIARY TOP MANAGEMENT TRADE UNIONS TRANSPORT UTILITIES Lal, Sumir Can Good Economics Ever Be Good Politics? Case Study of India's Power Sector |
| geographic_facet |
South Asia India |
| relation |
World Bank Working Paper No. 83 |
| description |
In recent years, the power sector in
several developing countries has suffered from a frustrating
gap between strong, pro-reform rhetoric at the political
level, and weak, hesitant implementation of the reform
measures on the ground. Focusing on the recent experience of
power sector reform in India, this paper looks afresh at the
problem of the rhetoric-implementation gap by taking the
lack of political will as its starting point, and
identifying the ingredients that comprise it in the current
context of India. Assuming that people and institutions are
not impartial but instead respond to political and economic
incentives, it explains how the lack of political will often
reflects rational political behavior. Using this more
realistic framework, it examines the incentives, informal
relationships, and interests that govern the behavior of
people and institutions, and searches for the openings and
opportunities that reformers must pursue. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Publication |
| author |
Lal, Sumir |
| author_facet |
Lal, Sumir |
| author_sort |
Lal, Sumir |
| title |
Can Good Economics Ever Be Good Politics? Case Study of India's Power Sector |
| title_short |
Can Good Economics Ever Be Good Politics? Case Study of India's Power Sector |
| title_full |
Can Good Economics Ever Be Good Politics? Case Study of India's Power Sector |
| title_fullStr |
Can Good Economics Ever Be Good Politics? Case Study of India's Power Sector |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Can Good Economics Ever Be Good Politics? Case Study of India's Power Sector |
| title_sort |
can good economics ever be good politics? case study of india's power sector |
| publisher |
Washington, DC: World Bank |
| publishDate |
2012 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/06/6889244/can-good-economics-ever-good-politics-case-study-indias-power-sector http://hdl.handle.net/10986/7032 |
| _version_ |
1764399013019254784 |