Does IDA Engage in Defensive Lending?
Multilateral development banks are frequently accused of "defensive lending," the practice of extending new loans purely in order to ensure that existing loans are repaid. This paper empirically examine this hypothesis using data on lend...
Main Authors: | , |
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Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2012
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2007/08/8178721/ida-engage-defensive-lending http://hdl.handle.net/10986/7279 |
Summary: | Multilateral development banks are
frequently accused of "defensive lending," the
practice of extending new loans purely in order to ensure
that existing loans are repaid. This paper empirically
examine this hypothesis using data on lending by and
repayments to the International Development Association
(IDA), which is the largest provider of concessional
development loans to low-income countries. The authors
argue that key institutional features of IDA both (i)
potentially create incentives for defensive lending, and
(ii) enable particularly sharp tests of the defensive
lending hypothesis. The authors find that there is a
surprisingly robust partial correlation between
disbursements on new IDA loans and repayments on existing
loans. However, a closer look at the evidence suggests that
defensive lending is unlikely to be a major explanation for
this partial correlation. |
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