Does IDA Engage in Defensive Lending?

Multilateral development banks are frequently accused of "defensive lending," the practice of extending new loans purely in order to ensure that existing loans are repaid. This paper empirically examine this hypothesis using data on lend...

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Main Authors: Geginat, Carolin, Kraay, Aart
Format: Policy Research Working Paper
Language:English
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2012
Subjects:
GDP
GNP
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2007/08/8178721/ida-engage-defensive-lending
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/7279
id okr-10986-7279
recordtype oai_dc
spelling okr-10986-72792021-04-23T14:02:34Z Does IDA Engage in Defensive Lending? Geginat, Carolin Kraay, Aart ACCOUNTING ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES AMOUNT OF DEBT ARREARS BAILOUTS BALANCE SHEET BALANCE SHEETS BANK LENDING BANK POLICY BENCHMARK BIASES BORROWER BORROWING CAPITAL ADEQUACY CAPITAL ADEQUACY REQUIREMENTS CASH FLOWS COMMERCIAL LENDERS COMMERCIAL LENDING CREDITORS CREDITS CREDITWORTHINESS CREDITWORTHY BORROWER CREDITWORTHY BORROWERS DEBT DEBT BURDEN DEBT BURDENS DEBT ISSUES DEBT OUTSTANDING DEBT RELIEF DEBT SERVICE DEBT SERVICE OBLIGATIONS DEBT SERVICE PAYMENTS DEBT SERVICING DEBT STOCKS DEBT-SERVICE DEBTOR DEBTOR COUNTRY DEBTORS DEBTS DEPENDENT DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPMENT BANKS DEVELOPMENT FINANCE DISBURSEMENT DISBURSEMENTS DUMMY VARIABLE DUMMY VARIABLES ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC POLICY ECONOMIC SYSTEM ECONOMIC SYSTEMS EFFECT OF DEBT ELASTICITY EXCHANGE RATES EXTERNAL DEBT FINANCIAL COSTS FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FINANCIAL SYSTEM FUTURE DEBT GDP GDP PER CAPITA GNP GRACE PERIOD GRACE PERIODS HIGH DEBT INCOME INCOME STATEMENT INCREASE IN DEBT INDEBTED INDEBTED COUNTRIES INDEBTED POOR COUNTRIES INDEBTEDNESS INTERNATIONAL BANK INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS LARGE BORROWERS LARGE DEBT LENDERS LENDING DECISIONS LEVELS OF DEBT LIQUIDITY LIQUIDITY CRISIS LOAN LOANS TO COUNTRIES MACROECONOMICS MATURITIES MONETARY FUND MORAL HAZARD MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS MULTILATERAL LENDER MULTILATERAL LENDERS NEGOTIATIONS NON-PERFORMING LOANS PAYMENT OF DEBT PER CAPITA INCOME PER CAPITA INCOMES PORTFOLIO PORTFOLIO PERFORMANCE POVERTY ALLEVIATION PRESENT VALUE PROCUREMENT PUBLIC POLICY RECIPIENT COUNTRIES REPAYMENT REPAYMENT CAPACITY REPAYMENT DIFFICULTIES REPAYMENT OF LOANS REPAYMENT PERIOD REPAYMENTS RULE OF LAW TOTAL DEBT TRUST FUND Multilateral development banks are frequently accused of "defensive lending," the practice of extending new loans purely in order to ensure that existing loans are repaid. This paper empirically examine this hypothesis using data on lending by and repayments to the International Development Association (IDA), which is the largest provider of concessional development loans to low-income countries. The authors argue that key institutional features of IDA both (i) potentially create incentives for defensive lending, and (ii) enable particularly sharp tests of the defensive lending hypothesis. The authors find that there is a surprisingly robust partial correlation between disbursements on new IDA loans and repayments on existing loans. However, a closer look at the evidence suggests that defensive lending is unlikely to be a major explanation for this partial correlation. 2012-06-06T17:47:42Z 2012-06-06T17:47:42Z 2007-08 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2007/08/8178721/ida-engage-defensive-lending http://hdl.handle.net/10986/7279 English Policy Research Working Paper; No. 4328 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research
repository_type Digital Repository
institution_category Foreign Institution
institution Digital Repositories
building World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection World Bank
language English
topic ACCOUNTING
ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES
AMOUNT OF DEBT
ARREARS
BAILOUTS
BALANCE SHEET
BALANCE SHEETS
BANK LENDING
BANK POLICY
BENCHMARK
BIASES
BORROWER
BORROWING
CAPITAL ADEQUACY
CAPITAL ADEQUACY REQUIREMENTS
CASH FLOWS
COMMERCIAL LENDERS
COMMERCIAL LENDING
CREDITORS
CREDITS
CREDITWORTHINESS
CREDITWORTHY BORROWER
CREDITWORTHY BORROWERS
DEBT
DEBT BURDEN
DEBT BURDENS
DEBT ISSUES
DEBT OUTSTANDING
DEBT RELIEF
DEBT SERVICE
DEBT SERVICE OBLIGATIONS
DEBT SERVICE PAYMENTS
DEBT SERVICING
DEBT STOCKS
DEBT-SERVICE
DEBTOR
DEBTOR COUNTRY
DEBTORS
DEBTS
DEPENDENT
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
DEVELOPMENT BANKS
DEVELOPMENT FINANCE
DISBURSEMENT
DISBURSEMENTS
DUMMY VARIABLE
DUMMY VARIABLES
ECONOMIC GROWTH
ECONOMIC POLICY
ECONOMIC SYSTEM
ECONOMIC SYSTEMS
EFFECT OF DEBT
ELASTICITY
EXCHANGE RATES
EXTERNAL DEBT
FINANCIAL COSTS
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
FINANCIAL SYSTEM
FUTURE DEBT
GDP
GDP PER CAPITA
GNP
GRACE PERIOD
GRACE PERIODS
HIGH DEBT
INCOME
INCOME STATEMENT
INCREASE IN DEBT
INDEBTED
INDEBTED COUNTRIES
INDEBTED POOR COUNTRIES
INDEBTEDNESS
INTERNATIONAL BANK
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
LARGE BORROWERS
LARGE DEBT
LENDERS
LENDING DECISIONS
LEVELS OF DEBT
LIQUIDITY
LIQUIDITY CRISIS
LOAN
LOANS TO COUNTRIES
MACROECONOMICS
MATURITIES
MONETARY FUND
MORAL HAZARD
MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS
MULTILATERAL LENDER
MULTILATERAL LENDERS
NEGOTIATIONS
NON-PERFORMING LOANS
PAYMENT OF DEBT
PER CAPITA INCOME
PER CAPITA INCOMES
PORTFOLIO
PORTFOLIO PERFORMANCE
POVERTY ALLEVIATION
PRESENT VALUE
PROCUREMENT
PUBLIC POLICY
RECIPIENT COUNTRIES
REPAYMENT
REPAYMENT CAPACITY
REPAYMENT DIFFICULTIES
REPAYMENT OF LOANS
REPAYMENT PERIOD
REPAYMENTS
RULE OF LAW
TOTAL DEBT
TRUST FUND
spellingShingle ACCOUNTING
ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES
AMOUNT OF DEBT
ARREARS
BAILOUTS
BALANCE SHEET
BALANCE SHEETS
BANK LENDING
BANK POLICY
BENCHMARK
BIASES
BORROWER
BORROWING
CAPITAL ADEQUACY
CAPITAL ADEQUACY REQUIREMENTS
CASH FLOWS
COMMERCIAL LENDERS
COMMERCIAL LENDING
CREDITORS
CREDITS
CREDITWORTHINESS
CREDITWORTHY BORROWER
CREDITWORTHY BORROWERS
DEBT
DEBT BURDEN
DEBT BURDENS
DEBT ISSUES
DEBT OUTSTANDING
DEBT RELIEF
DEBT SERVICE
DEBT SERVICE OBLIGATIONS
DEBT SERVICE PAYMENTS
DEBT SERVICING
DEBT STOCKS
DEBT-SERVICE
DEBTOR
DEBTOR COUNTRY
DEBTORS
DEBTS
DEPENDENT
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
DEVELOPMENT BANKS
DEVELOPMENT FINANCE
DISBURSEMENT
DISBURSEMENTS
DUMMY VARIABLE
DUMMY VARIABLES
ECONOMIC GROWTH
ECONOMIC POLICY
ECONOMIC SYSTEM
ECONOMIC SYSTEMS
EFFECT OF DEBT
ELASTICITY
EXCHANGE RATES
EXTERNAL DEBT
FINANCIAL COSTS
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
FINANCIAL SYSTEM
FUTURE DEBT
GDP
GDP PER CAPITA
GNP
GRACE PERIOD
GRACE PERIODS
HIGH DEBT
INCOME
INCOME STATEMENT
INCREASE IN DEBT
INDEBTED
INDEBTED COUNTRIES
INDEBTED POOR COUNTRIES
INDEBTEDNESS
INTERNATIONAL BANK
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
LARGE BORROWERS
LARGE DEBT
LENDERS
LENDING DECISIONS
LEVELS OF DEBT
LIQUIDITY
LIQUIDITY CRISIS
LOAN
LOANS TO COUNTRIES
MACROECONOMICS
MATURITIES
MONETARY FUND
MORAL HAZARD
MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS
MULTILATERAL LENDER
MULTILATERAL LENDERS
NEGOTIATIONS
NON-PERFORMING LOANS
PAYMENT OF DEBT
PER CAPITA INCOME
PER CAPITA INCOMES
PORTFOLIO
PORTFOLIO PERFORMANCE
POVERTY ALLEVIATION
PRESENT VALUE
PROCUREMENT
PUBLIC POLICY
RECIPIENT COUNTRIES
REPAYMENT
REPAYMENT CAPACITY
REPAYMENT DIFFICULTIES
REPAYMENT OF LOANS
REPAYMENT PERIOD
REPAYMENTS
RULE OF LAW
TOTAL DEBT
TRUST FUND
Geginat, Carolin
Kraay, Aart
Does IDA Engage in Defensive Lending?
relation Policy Research Working Paper; No. 4328
description Multilateral development banks are frequently accused of "defensive lending," the practice of extending new loans purely in order to ensure that existing loans are repaid. This paper empirically examine this hypothesis using data on lending by and repayments to the International Development Association (IDA), which is the largest provider of concessional development loans to low-income countries. The authors argue that key institutional features of IDA both (i) potentially create incentives for defensive lending, and (ii) enable particularly sharp tests of the defensive lending hypothesis. The authors find that there is a surprisingly robust partial correlation between disbursements on new IDA loans and repayments on existing loans. However, a closer look at the evidence suggests that defensive lending is unlikely to be a major explanation for this partial correlation.
format Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
author Geginat, Carolin
Kraay, Aart
author_facet Geginat, Carolin
Kraay, Aart
author_sort Geginat, Carolin
title Does IDA Engage in Defensive Lending?
title_short Does IDA Engage in Defensive Lending?
title_full Does IDA Engage in Defensive Lending?
title_fullStr Does IDA Engage in Defensive Lending?
title_full_unstemmed Does IDA Engage in Defensive Lending?
title_sort does ida engage in defensive lending?
publisher World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate 2012
url http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2007/08/8178721/ida-engage-defensive-lending
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/7279
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