Limited Access Orders in the Developing World : A New Approach to the Problems of Development
The upper-income, advanced industrial countries of the world today all have market economies with open competition, competitive multi-party democratic political systems, and a secure government monopoly over violence. Such open access orders, howe...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2012
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2007/09/8332470/limited-access-orders-developing-world-new-approach-problems-development http://hdl.handle.net/10986/7341 |
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okr-10986-73412021-04-23T14:02:34Z Limited Access Orders in the Developing World : A New Approach to the Problems of Development North, Douglass C. Wallis, John Joseph Webb, Steven B. Weingast, Barry R. ACCESS TO THE INTERNET AID ASSETS AUTONOMY BANKS BARRIER BASIC SERVICES BRIBES BUSINESS CORPORATIONS CELL PHONES CELL-PHONE CENTRAL BANKS CIVIL SOCIETY COLLAPSE COLLAPSES COLLECTIVE COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY COMPANY COMPETITIVE MARKET CONSOLIDATION CORPORATE INSTITUTIONS CORPORATE ORGANIZATION CORPORATIONS CORRUPT CRIPPLE CRISES CUSTOM DEMOCRACIES DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES DIRECT CLAIM DISPUTE RESOLUTION DIVISION OF LABOR DRIVERS ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES ECONOMIC ACTIVITY ECONOMIC COMPETITION ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC THEORY ECONOMICS ELECTRICITY EX ANTE EXPORT EARNINGS EXTERNALITIES FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FREEDOM OF SPEECH FULL POTENTIAL GLOBAL ECONOMY GLOBALIZATION GOVERNMENT REVENUE GOVERNMENT SERVICES GOVERNMENT TRANSPARENCY HARDWARE INCOME INCORPORATION INCORPORATION LAWS INDIVIDUALS INNOVATION INSTITUTION INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL INTERNATIONAL TRADE INVESTIGATION JOINT STOCK COMPANIES JOINT VENTURE JUDICIAL SYSTEMS JUDICIARIES JUDICIARY JUSTICE JUSTICES LABOR MARKETS LEADERSHIP LEGAL FRAMEWORK LEGAL PROTECTION LEGAL PROTECTIONS LEGAL SYSTEMS LICENSES LIMITED LIMITED ACCESS LIMITED LIABILITY LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES LIMITED LIABILITY CORPORATIONS MARKET ECONOMIES MARKET ECONOMY MATERIAL MEDIA MENU MENUS MONEY LAUNDERING MONOPOLY MONOPOLY PROFITS MOTIVATION MOVEMENT MULTINATIONAL NATURAL RESOURCES NETWORKS NEW TECHNOLOGIES NEW TECHNOLOGY OPEN ACCESS OPEN MARKET ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE PETTY CORRUPTION POLICE POLITICAL CONTROL POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL INTERESTS POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL PROCESS POLITICAL SCIENTISTS POLITICIANS PRIVATE CORPORATIONS PRIVATE NETWORKS PRIVATE SECTOR PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT PRIVATIZATION PRODUCTIVITY PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC FUNDS RADIO REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT RENTS RESULT RESULTS RULE OF LAW RULING PARTY SANCTIONS SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS SOCIAL STRUCTURES SOCIETIES SOCIETY STOCK CORPORATIONS STOCKHOLDERS TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER TELEPHONE TELEPHONES TELEVISION TORTS TRIAL TYPES OF ORGANIZATIONS UNION UNIVERSITIES USER VIOLENCE WEB WESTERN EUROPE The upper-income, advanced industrial countries of the world today all have market economies with open competition, competitive multi-party democratic political systems, and a secure government monopoly over violence. Such open access orders, however, are not the only norm and equilibrium type of society. The middle and low-income developing countries today, like all countries before about 1800, can be understood as limited access orders that maintain their equilibrium in a fundamentally different way. In limited access orders, the state does not have a secure monopoly on violence, and society organizes itself to control violence among the elite factions. A common feature of limited access orders is that political elites divide up control of the economy, each getting some share of the rents. Since outbreaks of violence reduce the rents, the elite factions have incentives to be peaceable most of the time. Adequate stability of the rents and thus of the social order requires limiting access and competition-hence a social order with a fundamentally different logic than the open access order. This paper lays out such a framework and explores some of its implications for the problems of development today. 2012-06-06T21:00:30Z 2012-06-06T21:00:30Z 2007-09 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2007/09/8332470/limited-access-orders-developing-world-new-approach-problems-development http://hdl.handle.net/10986/7341 English Policy Research Working Paper; No. 4359 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research |
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Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English |
| topic |
ACCESS TO THE INTERNET AID ASSETS AUTONOMY BANKS BARRIER BASIC SERVICES BRIBES BUSINESS CORPORATIONS CELL PHONES CELL-PHONE CENTRAL BANKS CIVIL SOCIETY COLLAPSE COLLAPSES COLLECTIVE COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY COMPANY COMPETITIVE MARKET CONSOLIDATION CORPORATE INSTITUTIONS CORPORATE ORGANIZATION CORPORATIONS CORRUPT CRIPPLE CRISES CUSTOM DEMOCRACIES DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES DIRECT CLAIM DISPUTE RESOLUTION DIVISION OF LABOR DRIVERS ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES ECONOMIC ACTIVITY ECONOMIC COMPETITION ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC THEORY ECONOMICS ELECTRICITY EX ANTE EXPORT EARNINGS EXTERNALITIES FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FREEDOM OF SPEECH FULL POTENTIAL GLOBAL ECONOMY GLOBALIZATION GOVERNMENT REVENUE GOVERNMENT SERVICES GOVERNMENT TRANSPARENCY HARDWARE INCOME INCORPORATION INCORPORATION LAWS INDIVIDUALS INNOVATION INSTITUTION INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL INTERNATIONAL TRADE INVESTIGATION JOINT STOCK COMPANIES JOINT VENTURE JUDICIAL SYSTEMS JUDICIARIES JUDICIARY JUSTICE JUSTICES LABOR MARKETS LEADERSHIP LEGAL FRAMEWORK LEGAL PROTECTION LEGAL PROTECTIONS LEGAL SYSTEMS LICENSES LIMITED LIMITED ACCESS LIMITED LIABILITY LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES LIMITED LIABILITY CORPORATIONS MARKET ECONOMIES MARKET ECONOMY MATERIAL MEDIA MENU MENUS MONEY LAUNDERING MONOPOLY MONOPOLY PROFITS MOTIVATION MOVEMENT MULTINATIONAL NATURAL RESOURCES NETWORKS NEW TECHNOLOGIES NEW TECHNOLOGY OPEN ACCESS OPEN MARKET ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE PETTY CORRUPTION POLICE POLITICAL CONTROL POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL INTERESTS POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL PROCESS POLITICAL SCIENTISTS POLITICIANS PRIVATE CORPORATIONS PRIVATE NETWORKS PRIVATE SECTOR PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT PRIVATIZATION PRODUCTIVITY PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC FUNDS RADIO REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT RENTS RESULT RESULTS RULE OF LAW RULING PARTY SANCTIONS SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS SOCIAL STRUCTURES SOCIETIES SOCIETY STOCK CORPORATIONS STOCKHOLDERS TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER TELEPHONE TELEPHONES TELEVISION TORTS TRIAL TYPES OF ORGANIZATIONS UNION UNIVERSITIES USER VIOLENCE WEB WESTERN EUROPE |
| spellingShingle |
ACCESS TO THE INTERNET AID ASSETS AUTONOMY BANKS BARRIER BASIC SERVICES BRIBES BUSINESS CORPORATIONS CELL PHONES CELL-PHONE CENTRAL BANKS CIVIL SOCIETY COLLAPSE COLLAPSES COLLECTIVE COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY COMPANY COMPETITIVE MARKET CONSOLIDATION CORPORATE INSTITUTIONS CORPORATE ORGANIZATION CORPORATIONS CORRUPT CRIPPLE CRISES CUSTOM DEMOCRACIES DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES DIRECT CLAIM DISPUTE RESOLUTION DIVISION OF LABOR DRIVERS ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES ECONOMIC ACTIVITY ECONOMIC COMPETITION ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC THEORY ECONOMICS ELECTRICITY EX ANTE EXPORT EARNINGS EXTERNALITIES FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FREEDOM OF SPEECH FULL POTENTIAL GLOBAL ECONOMY GLOBALIZATION GOVERNMENT REVENUE GOVERNMENT SERVICES GOVERNMENT TRANSPARENCY HARDWARE INCOME INCORPORATION INCORPORATION LAWS INDIVIDUALS INNOVATION INSTITUTION INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL INTERNATIONAL TRADE INVESTIGATION JOINT STOCK COMPANIES JOINT VENTURE JUDICIAL SYSTEMS JUDICIARIES JUDICIARY JUSTICE JUSTICES LABOR MARKETS LEADERSHIP LEGAL FRAMEWORK LEGAL PROTECTION LEGAL PROTECTIONS LEGAL SYSTEMS LICENSES LIMITED LIMITED ACCESS LIMITED LIABILITY LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES LIMITED LIABILITY CORPORATIONS MARKET ECONOMIES MARKET ECONOMY MATERIAL MEDIA MENU MENUS MONEY LAUNDERING MONOPOLY MONOPOLY PROFITS MOTIVATION MOVEMENT MULTINATIONAL NATURAL RESOURCES NETWORKS NEW TECHNOLOGIES NEW TECHNOLOGY OPEN ACCESS OPEN MARKET ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE PETTY CORRUPTION POLICE POLITICAL CONTROL POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL INTERESTS POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL PROCESS POLITICAL SCIENTISTS POLITICIANS PRIVATE CORPORATIONS PRIVATE NETWORKS PRIVATE SECTOR PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT PRIVATIZATION PRODUCTIVITY PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC FUNDS RADIO REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT RENTS RESULT RESULTS RULE OF LAW RULING PARTY SANCTIONS SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS SOCIAL STRUCTURES SOCIETIES SOCIETY STOCK CORPORATIONS STOCKHOLDERS TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER TELEPHONE TELEPHONES TELEVISION TORTS TRIAL TYPES OF ORGANIZATIONS UNION UNIVERSITIES USER VIOLENCE WEB WESTERN EUROPE North, Douglass C. Wallis, John Joseph Webb, Steven B. Weingast, Barry R. Limited Access Orders in the Developing World : A New Approach to the Problems of Development |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper; No. 4359 |
| description |
The upper-income, advanced industrial
countries of the world today all have market economies with
open competition, competitive multi-party democratic
political systems, and a secure government monopoly over
violence. Such open access orders, however, are not the
only norm and equilibrium type of society. The middle and
low-income developing countries today, like all countries
before about 1800, can be understood as limited access
orders that maintain their equilibrium in a fundamentally
different way. In limited access orders, the state does not
have a secure monopoly on violence, and society organizes
itself to control violence among the elite factions. A
common feature of limited access orders is that political
elites divide up control of the economy, each getting some
share of the rents. Since outbreaks of violence reduce the
rents, the elite factions have incentives to be peaceable
most of the time. Adequate stability of the rents and thus
of the social order requires limiting access and
competition-hence a social order with a fundamentally
different logic than the open access order. This paper lays
out such a framework and explores some of its implications
for the problems of development today. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
North, Douglass C. Wallis, John Joseph Webb, Steven B. Weingast, Barry R. |
| author_facet |
North, Douglass C. Wallis, John Joseph Webb, Steven B. Weingast, Barry R. |
| author_sort |
North, Douglass C. |
| title |
Limited Access Orders in the Developing World : A New Approach to the Problems of Development |
| title_short |
Limited Access Orders in the Developing World : A New Approach to the Problems of Development |
| title_full |
Limited Access Orders in the Developing World : A New Approach to the Problems of Development |
| title_fullStr |
Limited Access Orders in the Developing World : A New Approach to the Problems of Development |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Limited Access Orders in the Developing World : A New Approach to the Problems of Development |
| title_sort |
limited access orders in the developing world : a new approach to the problems of development |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2012 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2007/09/8332470/limited-access-orders-developing-world-new-approach-problems-development http://hdl.handle.net/10986/7341 |
| _version_ |
1764402360042389504 |