Fiscal Federalism in Switzerland : Relevant Issues for Transition Economies in Central and Eastern Europe

Its highly fragmented structure of local governments and serious horizontal fiscal imbalances make Switzerland a surprisingly powerful model for Eastern European countries that are currently facing the challenge of fiscal decentralization. In spite of the substantial differences in the tradition and...

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Main Authors: Dafflon, Bernard, Tóth, Krisztina
Format: Policy Research Working Paper
Language:English
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2012
Subjects:
TAX
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/07/6027355/fiscal-federalism-switzerland-relevant-issues-transition-economies-central-eastern-europe
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8213
id okr-10986-8213
recordtype oai_dc
repository_type Digital Repository
institution_category Foreign Institution
institution Digital Repositories
building World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection World Bank
language English
topic ACCOUNTABILITY
ADMINISTRATIVE REGIONS
BUDGETARY AUTONOMY
BUREAUCRATIC CONTROL
CAPITAL EXPENDITURES
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS
CITIZENS
CONFEDERATION
CONSTITUENCY
CONSTITUTION
CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES
CONSTITUTIONS
COUNCILS
CURRENT EXPENDITURES
DEBT
DECISION-MAKING
DECISION-MAKING POWER
DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
DEFICITS
DEGREE OF AUTONOMY
DEMOCRACY
DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION
DEVOLUTION
DISTRICTS
ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES
ETHNIC GROUPS
EXPENDITURE
FEDERAL FINANCE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
FEDERAL STATES
FEDERALISM
FEDERATIONS
FINANCIAL CAPACITIES
FINANCIAL CAPACITY
FISCAL
FISCAL BURDEN
FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION
FISCAL DISCIPLINE
FISCAL EQUALIZATION
FISCAL FEDERALISM
FORMAL INSTITUTIONS
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
GOVERNMENT EXECUTIVES
GOVERNMENT LEVEL
GOVERNMENT SECTOR
GOVERNMENT SIZE
INCOME
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL RELATIONS
LARGE CITIES
LAWS
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
LEGISLATION
LEGISLATIVE POWER
LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT
LOCAL AUTHORITIES
LOCAL AUTONOMY
LOCAL FINANCE
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
LOCAL GOVERNMENT SIZE
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
LOCAL LEVEL
LOCAL PUBLIC FINANCE
LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT
LOCAL SPENDING
LOCAL TAXES
MACROECONOMIC STABILITY
MEMBER STATES
MINISTERS
MINISTRY OF FINANCE
MUNICIPAL COUNCILS
MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS
MUNICIPAL LEVEL
MUNICIPALITIES
NATIONAL BUDGET
NATIONAL LEVEL
NATIONALISM
PER CAPITA INCOME
POLITICIANS
PROVISIONS
PUBLIC EXPENDITURE
PUBLIC EXPENDITURES
PUBLIC FINANCE
PUBLIC FUNDS
PUBLIC GOODS
PUBLIC INVESTMENTS
PUBLIC POLICIES
PUBLIC POLICY
PUBLIC PROPERTY
PUBLIC REVENUES
PUBLIC SECTOR
PUBLIC SERVICE
PUBLIC SERVICE PROVISION
PUBLIC SERVICES
RECURRENT EXPENDITURES
REFERENDUM
RENT-SEEKING BEHAVIOR
REPRESENTATIVES
REVENUE ASSIGNMENT
REVENUE SHARING
REVENUE SOURCES
SCHOOL DISTRICTS
SENATE
SIZE OF GOVERNMENT
SMALL MUNICIPALITIES
SOCIAL CAPITAL
SOVEREIGNTY
STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT
SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENTS
SUBSIDIARITY PRINCIPLE
TAX
TAX ADMINISTRATION
TAX BURDEN
TAX RATES
TAX REVENUES
TAX SYSTEM
TAXATION
TRANSITION ECONOMIES
URBAN AREAS
USER CHARGES
VOTERS
VOTING
spellingShingle ACCOUNTABILITY
ADMINISTRATIVE REGIONS
BUDGETARY AUTONOMY
BUREAUCRATIC CONTROL
CAPITAL EXPENDITURES
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS
CITIZENS
CONFEDERATION
CONSTITUENCY
CONSTITUTION
CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES
CONSTITUTIONS
COUNCILS
CURRENT EXPENDITURES
DEBT
DECISION-MAKING
DECISION-MAKING POWER
DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
DEFICITS
DEGREE OF AUTONOMY
DEMOCRACY
DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION
DEVOLUTION
DISTRICTS
ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES
ETHNIC GROUPS
EXPENDITURE
FEDERAL FINANCE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
FEDERAL STATES
FEDERALISM
FEDERATIONS
FINANCIAL CAPACITIES
FINANCIAL CAPACITY
FISCAL
FISCAL BURDEN
FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION
FISCAL DISCIPLINE
FISCAL EQUALIZATION
FISCAL FEDERALISM
FORMAL INSTITUTIONS
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
GOVERNMENT EXECUTIVES
GOVERNMENT LEVEL
GOVERNMENT SECTOR
GOVERNMENT SIZE
INCOME
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL RELATIONS
LARGE CITIES
LAWS
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
LEGISLATION
LEGISLATIVE POWER
LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT
LOCAL AUTHORITIES
LOCAL AUTONOMY
LOCAL FINANCE
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
LOCAL GOVERNMENT SIZE
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
LOCAL LEVEL
LOCAL PUBLIC FINANCE
LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT
LOCAL SPENDING
LOCAL TAXES
MACROECONOMIC STABILITY
MEMBER STATES
MINISTERS
MINISTRY OF FINANCE
MUNICIPAL COUNCILS
MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS
MUNICIPAL LEVEL
MUNICIPALITIES
NATIONAL BUDGET
NATIONAL LEVEL
NATIONALISM
PER CAPITA INCOME
POLITICIANS
PROVISIONS
PUBLIC EXPENDITURE
PUBLIC EXPENDITURES
PUBLIC FINANCE
PUBLIC FUNDS
PUBLIC GOODS
PUBLIC INVESTMENTS
PUBLIC POLICIES
PUBLIC POLICY
PUBLIC PROPERTY
PUBLIC REVENUES
PUBLIC SECTOR
PUBLIC SERVICE
PUBLIC SERVICE PROVISION
PUBLIC SERVICES
RECURRENT EXPENDITURES
REFERENDUM
RENT-SEEKING BEHAVIOR
REPRESENTATIVES
REVENUE ASSIGNMENT
REVENUE SHARING
REVENUE SOURCES
SCHOOL DISTRICTS
SENATE
SIZE OF GOVERNMENT
SMALL MUNICIPALITIES
SOCIAL CAPITAL
SOVEREIGNTY
STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT
SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENTS
SUBSIDIARITY PRINCIPLE
TAX
TAX ADMINISTRATION
TAX BURDEN
TAX RATES
TAX REVENUES
TAX SYSTEM
TAXATION
TRANSITION ECONOMIES
URBAN AREAS
USER CHARGES
VOTERS
VOTING
Dafflon, Bernard
Tóth, Krisztina
Fiscal Federalism in Switzerland : Relevant Issues for Transition Economies in Central and Eastern Europe
geographic_facet Europe and Central Asia
Switzerland
relation Policy Research Working Paper; No. 3655
description Its highly fragmented structure of local governments and serious horizontal fiscal imbalances make Switzerland a surprisingly powerful model for Eastern European countries that are currently facing the challenge of fiscal decentralization. In spite of the substantial differences in the tradition and current practice of intergovernmental fiscal relations, transition economies may learn valuable lessons from the Swiss case in the fields of direct democracy, horizontal cooperation, expenditure and revenue assignment, and fiscal discipline. Among other conclusions, the authors suggest that subnational authorities can effectively fend off recentralization attempts of the central government if they engage in spontaneous cooperation to enhance the efficiency of public service provision. Together with an adequate fiscal equalization scheme, interjurisdictional cooperation also permits the reconciliation of the objective of an increasing devolution of powers with the existing regional disparities. The authors also show that the principle of subsidiarity can best be safeguarded by anchoring the expenditure and revenue powers of subnational governments in the constitution or in a similarly strong law. With regard to fiscal discipline, the combination of a "golden rule" with direct democratic instruments of budget control is proven to be successful in enhancing the accountability of local politicians toward their constituencies.
format Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
author Dafflon, Bernard
Tóth, Krisztina
author_facet Dafflon, Bernard
Tóth, Krisztina
author_sort Dafflon, Bernard
title Fiscal Federalism in Switzerland : Relevant Issues for Transition Economies in Central and Eastern Europe
title_short Fiscal Federalism in Switzerland : Relevant Issues for Transition Economies in Central and Eastern Europe
title_full Fiscal Federalism in Switzerland : Relevant Issues for Transition Economies in Central and Eastern Europe
title_fullStr Fiscal Federalism in Switzerland : Relevant Issues for Transition Economies in Central and Eastern Europe
title_full_unstemmed Fiscal Federalism in Switzerland : Relevant Issues for Transition Economies in Central and Eastern Europe
title_sort fiscal federalism in switzerland : relevant issues for transition economies in central and eastern europe
publisher World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate 2012
url http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/07/6027355/fiscal-federalism-switzerland-relevant-issues-transition-economies-central-eastern-europe
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8213
_version_ 1764407517608148992
spelling okr-10986-82132021-04-23T14:02:43Z Fiscal Federalism in Switzerland : Relevant Issues for Transition Economies in Central and Eastern Europe Dafflon, Bernard Tóth, Krisztina ACCOUNTABILITY ADMINISTRATIVE REGIONS BUDGETARY AUTONOMY BUREAUCRATIC CONTROL CAPITAL EXPENDITURES CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS CITIZENS CONFEDERATION CONSTITUENCY CONSTITUTION CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES CONSTITUTIONS COUNCILS CURRENT EXPENDITURES DEBT DECISION-MAKING DECISION-MAKING POWER DECISION-MAKING PROCESS DEFICITS DEGREE OF AUTONOMY DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION DEVOLUTION DISTRICTS ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES ETHNIC GROUPS EXPENDITURE FEDERAL FINANCE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FEDERAL STATES FEDERALISM FEDERATIONS FINANCIAL CAPACITIES FINANCIAL CAPACITY FISCAL FISCAL BURDEN FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION FISCAL DISCIPLINE FISCAL EQUALIZATION FISCAL FEDERALISM FORMAL INSTITUTIONS GOVERNMENT AGENCIES GOVERNMENT EXECUTIVES GOVERNMENT LEVEL GOVERNMENT SECTOR GOVERNMENT SIZE INCOME INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL RELATIONS LARGE CITIES LAWS LEGAL FRAMEWORK LEGISLATION LEGISLATIVE POWER LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT LOCAL AUTHORITIES LOCAL AUTONOMY LOCAL FINANCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT LOCAL GOVERNMENT SIZE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS LOCAL LEVEL LOCAL PUBLIC FINANCE LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT LOCAL SPENDING LOCAL TAXES MACROECONOMIC STABILITY MEMBER STATES MINISTERS MINISTRY OF FINANCE MUNICIPAL COUNCILS MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS MUNICIPAL LEVEL MUNICIPALITIES NATIONAL BUDGET NATIONAL LEVEL NATIONALISM PER CAPITA INCOME POLITICIANS PROVISIONS PUBLIC EXPENDITURE PUBLIC EXPENDITURES PUBLIC FINANCE PUBLIC FUNDS PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC INVESTMENTS PUBLIC POLICIES PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC PROPERTY PUBLIC REVENUES PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SERVICE PUBLIC SERVICE PROVISION PUBLIC SERVICES RECURRENT EXPENDITURES REFERENDUM RENT-SEEKING BEHAVIOR REPRESENTATIVES REVENUE ASSIGNMENT REVENUE SHARING REVENUE SOURCES SCHOOL DISTRICTS SENATE SIZE OF GOVERNMENT SMALL MUNICIPALITIES SOCIAL CAPITAL SOVEREIGNTY STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENTS SUBSIDIARITY PRINCIPLE TAX TAX ADMINISTRATION TAX BURDEN TAX RATES TAX REVENUES TAX SYSTEM TAXATION TRANSITION ECONOMIES URBAN AREAS USER CHARGES VOTERS VOTING Its highly fragmented structure of local governments and serious horizontal fiscal imbalances make Switzerland a surprisingly powerful model for Eastern European countries that are currently facing the challenge of fiscal decentralization. In spite of the substantial differences in the tradition and current practice of intergovernmental fiscal relations, transition economies may learn valuable lessons from the Swiss case in the fields of direct democracy, horizontal cooperation, expenditure and revenue assignment, and fiscal discipline. Among other conclusions, the authors suggest that subnational authorities can effectively fend off recentralization attempts of the central government if they engage in spontaneous cooperation to enhance the efficiency of public service provision. Together with an adequate fiscal equalization scheme, interjurisdictional cooperation also permits the reconciliation of the objective of an increasing devolution of powers with the existing regional disparities. The authors also show that the principle of subsidiarity can best be safeguarded by anchoring the expenditure and revenue powers of subnational governments in the constitution or in a similarly strong law. With regard to fiscal discipline, the combination of a "golden rule" with direct democratic instruments of budget control is proven to be successful in enhancing the accountability of local politicians toward their constituencies. 2012-06-15T20:59:39Z 2012-06-15T20:59:39Z 2005-07 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/07/6027355/fiscal-federalism-switzerland-relevant-issues-transition-economies-central-eastern-europe http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8213 English Policy Research Working Paper; No. 3655 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research Europe and Central Asia Switzerland