Fiscal Federalism in Switzerland : Relevant Issues for Transition Economies in Central and Eastern Europe
Its highly fragmented structure of local governments and serious horizontal fiscal imbalances make Switzerland a surprisingly powerful model for Eastern European countries that are currently facing the challenge of fiscal decentralization. In spite of the substantial differences in the tradition and...
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Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
Language: | English |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2012
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Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/07/6027355/fiscal-federalism-switzerland-relevant-issues-transition-economies-central-eastern-europe http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8213 |
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oai_dc |
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Digital Repository |
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Foreign Institution |
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World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
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World Bank |
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English |
topic |
ACCOUNTABILITY ADMINISTRATIVE REGIONS BUDGETARY AUTONOMY BUREAUCRATIC CONTROL CAPITAL EXPENDITURES CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS CITIZENS CONFEDERATION CONSTITUENCY CONSTITUTION CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES CONSTITUTIONS COUNCILS CURRENT EXPENDITURES DEBT DECISION-MAKING DECISION-MAKING POWER DECISION-MAKING PROCESS DEFICITS DEGREE OF AUTONOMY DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION DEVOLUTION DISTRICTS ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES ETHNIC GROUPS EXPENDITURE FEDERAL FINANCE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FEDERAL STATES FEDERALISM FEDERATIONS FINANCIAL CAPACITIES FINANCIAL CAPACITY FISCAL FISCAL BURDEN FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION FISCAL DISCIPLINE FISCAL EQUALIZATION FISCAL FEDERALISM FORMAL INSTITUTIONS GOVERNMENT AGENCIES GOVERNMENT EXECUTIVES GOVERNMENT LEVEL GOVERNMENT SECTOR GOVERNMENT SIZE INCOME INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL RELATIONS LARGE CITIES LAWS LEGAL FRAMEWORK LEGISLATION LEGISLATIVE POWER LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT LOCAL AUTHORITIES LOCAL AUTONOMY LOCAL FINANCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT LOCAL GOVERNMENT SIZE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS LOCAL LEVEL LOCAL PUBLIC FINANCE LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT LOCAL SPENDING LOCAL TAXES MACROECONOMIC STABILITY MEMBER STATES MINISTERS MINISTRY OF FINANCE MUNICIPAL COUNCILS MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS MUNICIPAL LEVEL MUNICIPALITIES NATIONAL BUDGET NATIONAL LEVEL NATIONALISM PER CAPITA INCOME POLITICIANS PROVISIONS PUBLIC EXPENDITURE PUBLIC EXPENDITURES PUBLIC FINANCE PUBLIC FUNDS PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC INVESTMENTS PUBLIC POLICIES PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC PROPERTY PUBLIC REVENUES PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SERVICE PUBLIC SERVICE PROVISION PUBLIC SERVICES RECURRENT EXPENDITURES REFERENDUM RENT-SEEKING BEHAVIOR REPRESENTATIVES REVENUE ASSIGNMENT REVENUE SHARING REVENUE SOURCES SCHOOL DISTRICTS SENATE SIZE OF GOVERNMENT SMALL MUNICIPALITIES SOCIAL CAPITAL SOVEREIGNTY STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENTS SUBSIDIARITY PRINCIPLE TAX TAX ADMINISTRATION TAX BURDEN TAX RATES TAX REVENUES TAX SYSTEM TAXATION TRANSITION ECONOMIES URBAN AREAS USER CHARGES VOTERS VOTING |
spellingShingle |
ACCOUNTABILITY ADMINISTRATIVE REGIONS BUDGETARY AUTONOMY BUREAUCRATIC CONTROL CAPITAL EXPENDITURES CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS CITIZENS CONFEDERATION CONSTITUENCY CONSTITUTION CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES CONSTITUTIONS COUNCILS CURRENT EXPENDITURES DEBT DECISION-MAKING DECISION-MAKING POWER DECISION-MAKING PROCESS DEFICITS DEGREE OF AUTONOMY DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION DEVOLUTION DISTRICTS ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES ETHNIC GROUPS EXPENDITURE FEDERAL FINANCE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FEDERAL STATES FEDERALISM FEDERATIONS FINANCIAL CAPACITIES FINANCIAL CAPACITY FISCAL FISCAL BURDEN FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION FISCAL DISCIPLINE FISCAL EQUALIZATION FISCAL FEDERALISM FORMAL INSTITUTIONS GOVERNMENT AGENCIES GOVERNMENT EXECUTIVES GOVERNMENT LEVEL GOVERNMENT SECTOR GOVERNMENT SIZE INCOME INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL RELATIONS LARGE CITIES LAWS LEGAL FRAMEWORK LEGISLATION LEGISLATIVE POWER LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT LOCAL AUTHORITIES LOCAL AUTONOMY LOCAL FINANCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT LOCAL GOVERNMENT SIZE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS LOCAL LEVEL LOCAL PUBLIC FINANCE LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT LOCAL SPENDING LOCAL TAXES MACROECONOMIC STABILITY MEMBER STATES MINISTERS MINISTRY OF FINANCE MUNICIPAL COUNCILS MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS MUNICIPAL LEVEL MUNICIPALITIES NATIONAL BUDGET NATIONAL LEVEL NATIONALISM PER CAPITA INCOME POLITICIANS PROVISIONS PUBLIC EXPENDITURE PUBLIC EXPENDITURES PUBLIC FINANCE PUBLIC FUNDS PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC INVESTMENTS PUBLIC POLICIES PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC PROPERTY PUBLIC REVENUES PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SERVICE PUBLIC SERVICE PROVISION PUBLIC SERVICES RECURRENT EXPENDITURES REFERENDUM RENT-SEEKING BEHAVIOR REPRESENTATIVES REVENUE ASSIGNMENT REVENUE SHARING REVENUE SOURCES SCHOOL DISTRICTS SENATE SIZE OF GOVERNMENT SMALL MUNICIPALITIES SOCIAL CAPITAL SOVEREIGNTY STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENTS SUBSIDIARITY PRINCIPLE TAX TAX ADMINISTRATION TAX BURDEN TAX RATES TAX REVENUES TAX SYSTEM TAXATION TRANSITION ECONOMIES URBAN AREAS USER CHARGES VOTERS VOTING Dafflon, Bernard Tóth, Krisztina Fiscal Federalism in Switzerland : Relevant Issues for Transition Economies in Central and Eastern Europe |
geographic_facet |
Europe and Central Asia Switzerland |
relation |
Policy Research Working Paper; No. 3655 |
description |
Its highly fragmented structure of local governments and serious horizontal fiscal imbalances make Switzerland a surprisingly powerful model for Eastern European countries that are currently facing the challenge of fiscal decentralization. In spite of the substantial differences in the tradition and current practice of intergovernmental fiscal relations, transition economies may learn valuable lessons from the Swiss case in the fields of direct democracy, horizontal cooperation, expenditure and revenue assignment, and fiscal discipline. Among other conclusions, the authors suggest that subnational authorities can effectively fend off recentralization attempts of the central government if they engage in spontaneous cooperation to enhance the efficiency of public service provision. Together with an adequate fiscal equalization scheme, interjurisdictional cooperation also permits the reconciliation of the objective of an increasing devolution of powers with the existing regional disparities. The authors also show that the principle of subsidiarity can best be safeguarded by anchoring the expenditure and revenue powers of subnational governments in the constitution or in a similarly strong law. With regard to fiscal discipline, the combination of a "golden rule" with direct democratic instruments of budget control is proven to be successful in enhancing the accountability of local politicians toward their constituencies. |
format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
author |
Dafflon, Bernard Tóth, Krisztina |
author_facet |
Dafflon, Bernard Tóth, Krisztina |
author_sort |
Dafflon, Bernard |
title |
Fiscal Federalism in Switzerland : Relevant Issues for Transition Economies in Central and Eastern Europe |
title_short |
Fiscal Federalism in Switzerland : Relevant Issues for Transition Economies in Central and Eastern Europe |
title_full |
Fiscal Federalism in Switzerland : Relevant Issues for Transition Economies in Central and Eastern Europe |
title_fullStr |
Fiscal Federalism in Switzerland : Relevant Issues for Transition Economies in Central and Eastern Europe |
title_full_unstemmed |
Fiscal Federalism in Switzerland : Relevant Issues for Transition Economies in Central and Eastern Europe |
title_sort |
fiscal federalism in switzerland : relevant issues for transition economies in central and eastern europe |
publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
publishDate |
2012 |
url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/07/6027355/fiscal-federalism-switzerland-relevant-issues-transition-economies-central-eastern-europe http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8213 |
_version_ |
1764407517608148992 |
spelling |
okr-10986-82132021-04-23T14:02:43Z Fiscal Federalism in Switzerland : Relevant Issues for Transition Economies in Central and Eastern Europe Dafflon, Bernard Tóth, Krisztina ACCOUNTABILITY ADMINISTRATIVE REGIONS BUDGETARY AUTONOMY BUREAUCRATIC CONTROL CAPITAL EXPENDITURES CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS CITIZENS CONFEDERATION CONSTITUENCY CONSTITUTION CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES CONSTITUTIONS COUNCILS CURRENT EXPENDITURES DEBT DECISION-MAKING DECISION-MAKING POWER DECISION-MAKING PROCESS DEFICITS DEGREE OF AUTONOMY DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION DEVOLUTION DISTRICTS ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES ETHNIC GROUPS EXPENDITURE FEDERAL FINANCE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FEDERAL STATES FEDERALISM FEDERATIONS FINANCIAL CAPACITIES FINANCIAL CAPACITY FISCAL FISCAL BURDEN FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION FISCAL DISCIPLINE FISCAL EQUALIZATION FISCAL FEDERALISM FORMAL INSTITUTIONS GOVERNMENT AGENCIES GOVERNMENT EXECUTIVES GOVERNMENT LEVEL GOVERNMENT SECTOR GOVERNMENT SIZE INCOME INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL RELATIONS LARGE CITIES LAWS LEGAL FRAMEWORK LEGISLATION LEGISLATIVE POWER LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT LOCAL AUTHORITIES LOCAL AUTONOMY LOCAL FINANCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT LOCAL GOVERNMENT SIZE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS LOCAL LEVEL LOCAL PUBLIC FINANCE LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT LOCAL SPENDING LOCAL TAXES MACROECONOMIC STABILITY MEMBER STATES MINISTERS MINISTRY OF FINANCE MUNICIPAL COUNCILS MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS MUNICIPAL LEVEL MUNICIPALITIES NATIONAL BUDGET NATIONAL LEVEL NATIONALISM PER CAPITA INCOME POLITICIANS PROVISIONS PUBLIC EXPENDITURE PUBLIC EXPENDITURES PUBLIC FINANCE PUBLIC FUNDS PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC INVESTMENTS PUBLIC POLICIES PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC PROPERTY PUBLIC REVENUES PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SERVICE PUBLIC SERVICE PROVISION PUBLIC SERVICES RECURRENT EXPENDITURES REFERENDUM RENT-SEEKING BEHAVIOR REPRESENTATIVES REVENUE ASSIGNMENT REVENUE SHARING REVENUE SOURCES SCHOOL DISTRICTS SENATE SIZE OF GOVERNMENT SMALL MUNICIPALITIES SOCIAL CAPITAL SOVEREIGNTY STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENTS SUBSIDIARITY PRINCIPLE TAX TAX ADMINISTRATION TAX BURDEN TAX RATES TAX REVENUES TAX SYSTEM TAXATION TRANSITION ECONOMIES URBAN AREAS USER CHARGES VOTERS VOTING Its highly fragmented structure of local governments and serious horizontal fiscal imbalances make Switzerland a surprisingly powerful model for Eastern European countries that are currently facing the challenge of fiscal decentralization. In spite of the substantial differences in the tradition and current practice of intergovernmental fiscal relations, transition economies may learn valuable lessons from the Swiss case in the fields of direct democracy, horizontal cooperation, expenditure and revenue assignment, and fiscal discipline. Among other conclusions, the authors suggest that subnational authorities can effectively fend off recentralization attempts of the central government if they engage in spontaneous cooperation to enhance the efficiency of public service provision. Together with an adequate fiscal equalization scheme, interjurisdictional cooperation also permits the reconciliation of the objective of an increasing devolution of powers with the existing regional disparities. The authors also show that the principle of subsidiarity can best be safeguarded by anchoring the expenditure and revenue powers of subnational governments in the constitution or in a similarly strong law. With regard to fiscal discipline, the combination of a "golden rule" with direct democratic instruments of budget control is proven to be successful in enhancing the accountability of local politicians toward their constituencies. 2012-06-15T20:59:39Z 2012-06-15T20:59:39Z 2005-07 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/07/6027355/fiscal-federalism-switzerland-relevant-issues-transition-economies-central-eastern-europe http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8213 English Policy Research Working Paper; No. 3655 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research Europe and Central Asia Switzerland |