Environmental Federalism : A Panacea or Pandora’s Box for Developing Countries?

This paper provides new empirical evidence to the debate on the optimal locus of power over environmental policymaking in developing countries. The authors develop a simple lobby group model with mobile capital. The model predicts that a decentralized institutional structure leads to weaker environm...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Fredriksson, Per G., Mani, Muthukumara, Wollscheid, Jim R.
Format:	Policy Research Working Paper
Language:	English
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2012
Subjects:	ABATEMENT ABATEMENT COSTS ACCOUNTABILITY AIR POLLUTION ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AUTONOMY BENCHMARK CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS CAPITAL FLIGHT CAPITAL FLOWS CLEAN WATER CONSERVATION CONSTANT RETURNS TO SCALE DECENTRALIZATION DETRIMENTAL EFFECTS DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DEVOLUTION DIRECT INVESTMENT DUMPING ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS ECONOMETRICS ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ECONOMIC COMPETITION ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC POLICIES EFFECTIVE USE EMISSION EMISSION REDUCTION EMISSIONS EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ENFORCEMENT RESPONSIBILITIES ENVIRONMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS ENVIRONMENTAL KUZNETS ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT ENVIRONMENTAL MATTERS ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY FRAMEWORK ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARD ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY ENVIRONMENTALISM ENVIRONMENTALISTS EQUILIBRIUM EXOGENOUS VARIABLES EXPORTS EXPOSURE TO POLLUTION FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION FISHERIES FOREIGN COMPETITION FORESTRY FREE TRADE GDP GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY IMPORTS INCOME INDUSTRIAL PLANTS INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION INFLATION INFORMAL REGULATION INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAWS LOCAL GOVERNMENT LOCAL GOVERNMENTS MARGINAL PRODUCT MARGINAL PRODUCTIVITY MARGINAL PRODUCTS MARGINAL SOCIAL DAMAGE MUNICIPALITIES NASH EQUILIBRIUM NATURAL RESOURCE NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT NATURAL RESOURCES NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT NITROGEN OXIDES POLICY DECISIONS POLICY FRAMEWORK POLICY INSTRUMENTS POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL PRESSURE POLLUTION CONTROL POLLUTION DAMAGE POLLUTION LEVELS POLLUTION MANAGEMENT POLLUTION REGULATION PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC SERVICES PURCHASING POWER REGULATORY COMPLIANCE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT SAVINGS SCARCE CAPITAL SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT SUSTAINABLE GROWTH SUSTAINABLE USE TAXATION THEORETICAL MODELS TOTAL OUTPUT TRADE LIBERALIZATION UTILITY FUNCTIONS WASTE WASTE MANAGEMENT WATER POLLUTION WATER QUALITY
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/02/6596734/environmental-federalism-panacea-or-pandoras-box-developing-countries http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8738

id	okr-10986-8738
recordtype	oai_dc
spelling	okr-10986-87382021-04-23T14:02:40Z Environmental Federalism : A Panacea or Pandora’s Box for Developing Countries? Fredriksson, Per G. Mani, Muthukumara Wollscheid, Jim R. ABATEMENT ABATEMENT COSTS ACCOUNTABILITY AIR POLLUTION ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AUTONOMY BENCHMARK CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS CAPITAL FLIGHT CAPITAL FLOWS CLEAN WATER CONSERVATION CONSTANT RETURNS TO SCALE DECENTRALIZATION DETRIMENTAL EFFECTS DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DEVOLUTION DIRECT INVESTMENT DUMPING ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS ECONOMETRICS ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ECONOMIC COMPETITION ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC POLICIES EFFECTIVE USE EMISSION EMISSION REDUCTION EMISSIONS EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ENFORCEMENT RESPONSIBILITIES ENVIRONMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS ENVIRONMENTAL KUZNETS ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT ENVIRONMENTAL MATTERS ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY FRAMEWORK ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARD ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY ENVIRONMENTALISM ENVIRONMENTALISTS EQUILIBRIUM EXOGENOUS VARIABLES EXPORTS EXPOSURE TO POLLUTION FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION FISHERIES FOREIGN COMPETITION FORESTRY FREE TRADE GDP GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY IMPORTS INCOME INDUSTRIAL PLANTS INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION INFLATION INFORMAL REGULATION INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAWS LOCAL GOVERNMENT LOCAL GOVERNMENTS MARGINAL PRODUCT MARGINAL PRODUCTIVITY MARGINAL PRODUCTS MARGINAL SOCIAL DAMAGE MUNICIPALITIES NASH EQUILIBRIUM NATURAL RESOURCE NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT NATURAL RESOURCES NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT NITROGEN OXIDES POLICY DECISIONS POLICY FRAMEWORK POLICY INSTRUMENTS POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL PRESSURE POLLUTION CONTROL POLLUTION DAMAGE POLLUTION LEVELS POLLUTION MANAGEMENT POLLUTION REGULATION PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC SERVICES PURCHASING POWER REGULATORY COMPLIANCE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT SAVINGS SCARCE CAPITAL SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT SUSTAINABLE GROWTH SUSTAINABLE USE TAXATION THEORETICAL MODELS TOTAL OUTPUT TRADE LIBERALIZATION UTILITY FUNCTIONS WASTE WASTE MANAGEMENT WATER POLLUTION WATER QUALITY This paper provides new empirical evidence to the debate on the optimal locus of power over environmental policymaking in developing countries. The authors develop a simple lobby group model with mobile capital. The model predicts that a decentralized institutional structure leads to weaker environmental policy due to more intensive lobbying by capital owners and workers. They test this prediction using novel cross-sectional developing country data. The results are consistent with the prediction of the model, in particular for air pollution policies. The authors also find that the effect of decentralization declines with a greater degree of trade openness. They believe this is the first developing country evidence on the environmental policy effects of federalism. 2012-06-21T21:58:15Z 2012-06-21T21:58:15Z 2006-02 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/02/6596734/environmental-federalism-panacea-or-pandoras-box-developing-countries http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8738 English Policy Research Working Paper; No. 3847 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research
repository_type	Digital Repository
institution_category	Foreign Institution
institution	Digital Repositories
building	World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection	World Bank
language	English
topic	ABATEMENT ABATEMENT COSTS ACCOUNTABILITY AIR POLLUTION ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AUTONOMY BENCHMARK CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS CAPITAL FLIGHT CAPITAL FLOWS CLEAN WATER CONSERVATION CONSTANT RETURNS TO SCALE DECENTRALIZATION DETRIMENTAL EFFECTS DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DEVOLUTION DIRECT INVESTMENT DUMPING ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS ECONOMETRICS ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ECONOMIC COMPETITION ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC POLICIES EFFECTIVE USE EMISSION EMISSION REDUCTION EMISSIONS EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ENFORCEMENT RESPONSIBILITIES ENVIRONMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS ENVIRONMENTAL KUZNETS ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT ENVIRONMENTAL MATTERS ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY FRAMEWORK ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARD ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY ENVIRONMENTALISM ENVIRONMENTALISTS EQUILIBRIUM EXOGENOUS VARIABLES EXPORTS EXPOSURE TO POLLUTION FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION FISHERIES FOREIGN COMPETITION FORESTRY FREE TRADE GDP GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY IMPORTS INCOME INDUSTRIAL PLANTS INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION INFLATION INFORMAL REGULATION INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAWS LOCAL GOVERNMENT LOCAL GOVERNMENTS MARGINAL PRODUCT MARGINAL PRODUCTIVITY MARGINAL PRODUCTS MARGINAL SOCIAL DAMAGE MUNICIPALITIES NASH EQUILIBRIUM NATURAL RESOURCE NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT NATURAL RESOURCES NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT NITROGEN OXIDES POLICY DECISIONS POLICY FRAMEWORK POLICY INSTRUMENTS POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL PRESSURE POLLUTION CONTROL POLLUTION DAMAGE POLLUTION LEVELS POLLUTION MANAGEMENT POLLUTION REGULATION PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC SERVICES PURCHASING POWER REGULATORY COMPLIANCE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT SAVINGS SCARCE CAPITAL SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT SUSTAINABLE GROWTH SUSTAINABLE USE TAXATION THEORETICAL MODELS TOTAL OUTPUT TRADE LIBERALIZATION UTILITY FUNCTIONS WASTE WASTE MANAGEMENT WATER POLLUTION WATER QUALITY
spellingShingle	ABATEMENT ABATEMENT COSTS ACCOUNTABILITY AIR POLLUTION ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AUTONOMY BENCHMARK CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS CAPITAL FLIGHT CAPITAL FLOWS CLEAN WATER CONSERVATION CONSTANT RETURNS TO SCALE DECENTRALIZATION DETRIMENTAL EFFECTS DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DEVOLUTION DIRECT INVESTMENT DUMPING ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS ECONOMETRICS ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ECONOMIC COMPETITION ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC POLICIES EFFECTIVE USE EMISSION EMISSION REDUCTION EMISSIONS EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ENFORCEMENT RESPONSIBILITIES ENVIRONMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS ENVIRONMENTAL KUZNETS ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT ENVIRONMENTAL MATTERS ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY FRAMEWORK ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARD ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY ENVIRONMENTALISM ENVIRONMENTALISTS EQUILIBRIUM EXOGENOUS VARIABLES EXPORTS EXPOSURE TO POLLUTION FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION FISHERIES FOREIGN COMPETITION FORESTRY FREE TRADE GDP GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY IMPORTS INCOME INDUSTRIAL PLANTS INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION INFLATION INFORMAL REGULATION INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAWS LOCAL GOVERNMENT LOCAL GOVERNMENTS MARGINAL PRODUCT MARGINAL PRODUCTIVITY MARGINAL PRODUCTS MARGINAL SOCIAL DAMAGE MUNICIPALITIES NASH EQUILIBRIUM NATURAL RESOURCE NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT NATURAL RESOURCES NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT NITROGEN OXIDES POLICY DECISIONS POLICY FRAMEWORK POLICY INSTRUMENTS POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL PRESSURE POLLUTION CONTROL POLLUTION DAMAGE POLLUTION LEVELS POLLUTION MANAGEMENT POLLUTION REGULATION PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC SERVICES PURCHASING POWER REGULATORY COMPLIANCE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT SAVINGS SCARCE CAPITAL SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT SUSTAINABLE GROWTH SUSTAINABLE USE TAXATION THEORETICAL MODELS TOTAL OUTPUT TRADE LIBERALIZATION UTILITY FUNCTIONS WASTE WASTE MANAGEMENT WATER POLLUTION WATER QUALITY Fredriksson, Per G. Mani, Muthukumara Wollscheid, Jim R. Environmental Federalism : A Panacea or Pandora’s Box for Developing Countries?
relation	Policy Research Working Paper; No. 3847
description	This paper provides new empirical evidence to the debate on the optimal locus of power over environmental policymaking in developing countries. The authors develop a simple lobby group model with mobile capital. The model predicts that a decentralized institutional structure leads to weaker environmental policy due to more intensive lobbying by capital owners and workers. They test this prediction using novel cross-sectional developing country data. The results are consistent with the prediction of the model, in particular for air pollution policies. The authors also find that the effect of decentralization declines with a greater degree of trade openness. They believe this is the first developing country evidence on the environmental policy effects of federalism.
format	Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
author	Fredriksson, Per G. Mani, Muthukumara Wollscheid, Jim R.
author_facet	Fredriksson, Per G. Mani, Muthukumara Wollscheid, Jim R.
author_sort	Fredriksson, Per G.
title	Environmental Federalism : A Panacea or Pandora’s Box for Developing Countries?
title_short	Environmental Federalism : A Panacea or Pandora’s Box for Developing Countries?
title_full	Environmental Federalism : A Panacea or Pandora’s Box for Developing Countries?
title_fullStr	Environmental Federalism : A Panacea or Pandora’s Box for Developing Countries?
title_full_unstemmed	Environmental Federalism : A Panacea or Pandora’s Box for Developing Countries?
title_sort	environmental federalism : a panacea or pandora’s box for developing countries?
publisher	World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate	2012
url	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/02/6596734/environmental-federalism-panacea-or-pandoras-box-developing-countries http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8738
_version_	1764405914157187072

Environmental Federalism : A Panacea or Pandora’s Box for Developing Countries?

Similar Items