Determinants of Deposit-Insurance Adoption and Design
The authors seek to identify factors that influence decisions about a country's financial safety net, using a new dataset on 170 countries covering the 1960-2003 period. Specifically, they focus on how outside influences, economic development, crisis pressures, and political institutions affect...
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2012
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Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/02/6600507/determinants-deposit-insurance-adoption-design http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8744 |
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okr-10986-87442021-04-23T14:02:40Z Determinants of Deposit-Insurance Adoption and Design Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli Kane, Edward J. Laeven, Luc ACCOUNTABILITY BANK DEPOSITS BANK REGULATION BANK RISK BANKING CRISES BANKING CRISIS BANKING PANICS BANKING SECTOR BANKING SYSTEM BENCHMARK CAPITALIZATION COINSURANCE CONFIDENCE IN BANKS COVERAGE DEPOSIT GUARANTEES DEPOSIT INSURANCE DEPOSIT INSURANCE SCHEMES DEPOSIT INSURANCE SYSTEMS DEPOSITORS ECONOMICS ENDOGENOUS VARIABLES FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION FINANCIAL CRISES FINANCIAL CRISIS FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION FINANCIAL SECTOR FOREIGN CURRENCY DEPOSITS GDP GDP PER CAPITA GROWTH RATE INCOME GROUPS INFLATION INSOLVENCY INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT INSURANCE INSURANCE AGENCIES INSURANCE BENEFITS INSURANCE DESIGN INSURANCE SYSTEM INTEGRITY MACROECONOMIC CONDITIONS MACROECONOMIC SHOCKS MARKET DISCIPLINE MONETARY POLICY MORAL HAZARD NATIONAL ECONOMY OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE POLITICAL ECONOMY PREDICTIONS PRIVATE BANKS PRIVATIZATION RATES REAL GDP REAL INTEREST RATE REGULATORY SYSTEMS RESERVE BANK OF NEW ZEALAND STATISTICAL ANALYSIS VOTERS The authors seek to identify factors that influence decisions about a country's financial safety net, using a new dataset on 170 countries covering the 1960-2003 period. Specifically, they focus on how outside influences, economic development, crisis pressures, and political institutions affect deposit insurance adoption and design. Controlling for the influence of economic characteristics and events such as macroeconomic shocks, occurrence and severity of crises, and institutional development, they find that pressure to emulate developed-country regulatory frameworks and power-sharing political institutions dispose a country toward adopting design features that inadequately control risk-shifting. 2012-06-21T22:39:17Z 2012-06-21T22:39:17Z 2006-02 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/02/6600507/determinants-deposit-insurance-adoption-design http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8744 English Policy Research Working Paper; No. 3849 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research |
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Digital Repository |
institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
institution |
Digital Repositories |
building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
collection |
World Bank |
language |
English |
topic |
ACCOUNTABILITY BANK DEPOSITS BANK REGULATION BANK RISK BANKING CRISES BANKING CRISIS BANKING PANICS BANKING SECTOR BANKING SYSTEM BENCHMARK CAPITALIZATION COINSURANCE CONFIDENCE IN BANKS COVERAGE DEPOSIT GUARANTEES DEPOSIT INSURANCE DEPOSIT INSURANCE SCHEMES DEPOSIT INSURANCE SYSTEMS DEPOSITORS ECONOMICS ENDOGENOUS VARIABLES FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION FINANCIAL CRISES FINANCIAL CRISIS FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION FINANCIAL SECTOR FOREIGN CURRENCY DEPOSITS GDP GDP PER CAPITA GROWTH RATE INCOME GROUPS INFLATION INSOLVENCY INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT INSURANCE INSURANCE AGENCIES INSURANCE BENEFITS INSURANCE DESIGN INSURANCE SYSTEM INTEGRITY MACROECONOMIC CONDITIONS MACROECONOMIC SHOCKS MARKET DISCIPLINE MONETARY POLICY MORAL HAZARD NATIONAL ECONOMY OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE POLITICAL ECONOMY PREDICTIONS PRIVATE BANKS PRIVATIZATION RATES REAL GDP REAL INTEREST RATE REGULATORY SYSTEMS RESERVE BANK OF NEW ZEALAND STATISTICAL ANALYSIS VOTERS |
spellingShingle |
ACCOUNTABILITY BANK DEPOSITS BANK REGULATION BANK RISK BANKING CRISES BANKING CRISIS BANKING PANICS BANKING SECTOR BANKING SYSTEM BENCHMARK CAPITALIZATION COINSURANCE CONFIDENCE IN BANKS COVERAGE DEPOSIT GUARANTEES DEPOSIT INSURANCE DEPOSIT INSURANCE SCHEMES DEPOSIT INSURANCE SYSTEMS DEPOSITORS ECONOMICS ENDOGENOUS VARIABLES FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION FINANCIAL CRISES FINANCIAL CRISIS FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION FINANCIAL SECTOR FOREIGN CURRENCY DEPOSITS GDP GDP PER CAPITA GROWTH RATE INCOME GROUPS INFLATION INSOLVENCY INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT INSURANCE INSURANCE AGENCIES INSURANCE BENEFITS INSURANCE DESIGN INSURANCE SYSTEM INTEGRITY MACROECONOMIC CONDITIONS MACROECONOMIC SHOCKS MARKET DISCIPLINE MONETARY POLICY MORAL HAZARD NATIONAL ECONOMY OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE POLITICAL ECONOMY PREDICTIONS PRIVATE BANKS PRIVATIZATION RATES REAL GDP REAL INTEREST RATE REGULATORY SYSTEMS RESERVE BANK OF NEW ZEALAND STATISTICAL ANALYSIS VOTERS Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli Kane, Edward J. Laeven, Luc Determinants of Deposit-Insurance Adoption and Design |
relation |
Policy Research Working Paper; No. 3849 |
description |
The authors seek to identify factors that influence decisions about a country's financial safety net, using a new dataset on 170 countries covering the 1960-2003 period. Specifically, they focus on how outside influences, economic development, crisis pressures, and political institutions affect deposit insurance adoption and design. Controlling for the influence of economic characteristics and events such as macroeconomic shocks, occurrence and severity of crises, and institutional development, they find that pressure to emulate developed-country regulatory frameworks and power-sharing political institutions dispose a country toward adopting design features that inadequately control risk-shifting. |
format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
author |
Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli Kane, Edward J. Laeven, Luc |
author_facet |
Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli Kane, Edward J. Laeven, Luc |
author_sort |
Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli |
title |
Determinants of Deposit-Insurance Adoption and Design |
title_short |
Determinants of Deposit-Insurance Adoption and Design |
title_full |
Determinants of Deposit-Insurance Adoption and Design |
title_fullStr |
Determinants of Deposit-Insurance Adoption and Design |
title_full_unstemmed |
Determinants of Deposit-Insurance Adoption and Design |
title_sort |
determinants of deposit-insurance adoption and design |
publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
publishDate |
2012 |
url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/02/6600507/determinants-deposit-insurance-adoption-design http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8744 |
_version_ |
1764405937145118720 |