Lobbying and Agricultural Trade Policy in the United States
The authors study whether political campaign contributions influence agricultural protection in the United States in the manner suggested by the political economy model of Grossman and Helpman (1994). This is the first attempt to test this model using agricultural data. The authors test the model us...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2012
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/01/6530318/lobbying-agricultural-trade-policy-united-states http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8802 |
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okr-10986-88022021-04-23T14:02:40Z Lobbying and Agricultural Trade Policy in the United States Gawande, Kishore Hoekman, Bernard AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES AGRICULTURAL PRICE AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS AGRICULTURAL SUPPORT AGRICULTURAL SUPPORT POLICIES AGRICULTURAL TRADE AGRICULTURE BORDER PROTECTION CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS COEFFICIENT ESTIMATE COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE COMPARATIVE DISADVANTAGE CONSUMER CONSUMER SUBSIDY CONSUMER SURPLUS CONSUMERS DEFICIENCY PAYMENTS DEMAND ELASTICITIES DEMAND ELASTICITY DOMESTIC PRODUCTION ECONOMETRIC MODELS ECONOMICS LITERATURE ELASTICITY ENDOGENOUS VARIABLES EQUILIBRIUM EQUILIBRIUM THEORY EXOGENOUS VARIABLES EXPENDITURES EXPORT RATIO EXPORT SUBSIDIES EXPORT SUPPLY EXPORTS FACTOR ENDOWMENTS FOOD CONSUMPTION FREE TRADE GDP IMPORT IMPORT PENETRATION IMPORT TARIFF IMPORTS INTERMEDIATE INPUTS INTERNATIONAL TRADE ITC MARKET CONDITIONS MARKET PRICE MARKET PRICES MARKET VALUE POLITICAL ECONOMY PRICE CONTROL PRICE DISTORTIONS PRICE SUPPORT PRICE SUPPORTS PRODUCTION COSTS PROTECTION DATA PROTECTION MEASURES QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS SUPPLY ELASTICITY TARIFF DATA TARIFF REDUCTIONS TARIFF REVENUE TERMS OF TRADE TRADE DATA TRADE POLICY TRADE PROTECTION URUGUAY ROUND VALUE ADDED VALUE OF EXPORTS WELFARE FUNCTION WELFARE LOSS WELFARE LOSSES WELFARE OF CONSUMERS WORLD MARKET WORLD PRICES WTO ZERO TARIFF The authors study whether political campaign contributions influence agricultural protection in the United States in the manner suggested by the political economy model of Grossman and Helpman (1994). This is the first attempt to test this model using agricultural data. The authors test the model using a detailed cross-sectional data set of agricultural protection, subsidies, and political action committee (PAC) contributions in the late 1990s. The model is qualitatively affirmed by the data. They make a novel attempt to solve a puzzle about the model's quantitative implications, also found in recent studies. This solution makes the simple model consistent with the complicated decisionmaking process in real world government. The results imply the underpinnings of a political economy equilibrium that will be hard to dislodge. 2012-06-22T16:46:24Z 2012-06-22T16:46:24Z 2006-01 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/01/6530318/lobbying-agricultural-trade-policy-united-states http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8802 English Policy Research Working Paper; No. 3819 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research United States |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English |
| topic |
AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES AGRICULTURAL PRICE AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS AGRICULTURAL SUPPORT AGRICULTURAL SUPPORT POLICIES AGRICULTURAL TRADE AGRICULTURE BORDER PROTECTION CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS COEFFICIENT ESTIMATE COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE COMPARATIVE DISADVANTAGE CONSUMER CONSUMER SUBSIDY CONSUMER SURPLUS CONSUMERS DEFICIENCY PAYMENTS DEMAND ELASTICITIES DEMAND ELASTICITY DOMESTIC PRODUCTION ECONOMETRIC MODELS ECONOMICS LITERATURE ELASTICITY ENDOGENOUS VARIABLES EQUILIBRIUM EQUILIBRIUM THEORY EXOGENOUS VARIABLES EXPENDITURES EXPORT RATIO EXPORT SUBSIDIES EXPORT SUPPLY EXPORTS FACTOR ENDOWMENTS FOOD CONSUMPTION FREE TRADE GDP IMPORT IMPORT PENETRATION IMPORT TARIFF IMPORTS INTERMEDIATE INPUTS INTERNATIONAL TRADE ITC MARKET CONDITIONS MARKET PRICE MARKET PRICES MARKET VALUE POLITICAL ECONOMY PRICE CONTROL PRICE DISTORTIONS PRICE SUPPORT PRICE SUPPORTS PRODUCTION COSTS PROTECTION DATA PROTECTION MEASURES QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS SUPPLY ELASTICITY TARIFF DATA TARIFF REDUCTIONS TARIFF REVENUE TERMS OF TRADE TRADE DATA TRADE POLICY TRADE PROTECTION URUGUAY ROUND VALUE ADDED VALUE OF EXPORTS WELFARE FUNCTION WELFARE LOSS WELFARE LOSSES WELFARE OF CONSUMERS WORLD MARKET WORLD PRICES WTO ZERO TARIFF |
| spellingShingle |
AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES AGRICULTURAL PRICE AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS AGRICULTURAL SUPPORT AGRICULTURAL SUPPORT POLICIES AGRICULTURAL TRADE AGRICULTURE BORDER PROTECTION CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS COEFFICIENT ESTIMATE COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE COMPARATIVE DISADVANTAGE CONSUMER CONSUMER SUBSIDY CONSUMER SURPLUS CONSUMERS DEFICIENCY PAYMENTS DEMAND ELASTICITIES DEMAND ELASTICITY DOMESTIC PRODUCTION ECONOMETRIC MODELS ECONOMICS LITERATURE ELASTICITY ENDOGENOUS VARIABLES EQUILIBRIUM EQUILIBRIUM THEORY EXOGENOUS VARIABLES EXPENDITURES EXPORT RATIO EXPORT SUBSIDIES EXPORT SUPPLY EXPORTS FACTOR ENDOWMENTS FOOD CONSUMPTION FREE TRADE GDP IMPORT IMPORT PENETRATION IMPORT TARIFF IMPORTS INTERMEDIATE INPUTS INTERNATIONAL TRADE ITC MARKET CONDITIONS MARKET PRICE MARKET PRICES MARKET VALUE POLITICAL ECONOMY PRICE CONTROL PRICE DISTORTIONS PRICE SUPPORT PRICE SUPPORTS PRODUCTION COSTS PROTECTION DATA PROTECTION MEASURES QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS SUPPLY ELASTICITY TARIFF DATA TARIFF REDUCTIONS TARIFF REVENUE TERMS OF TRADE TRADE DATA TRADE POLICY TRADE PROTECTION URUGUAY ROUND VALUE ADDED VALUE OF EXPORTS WELFARE FUNCTION WELFARE LOSS WELFARE LOSSES WELFARE OF CONSUMERS WORLD MARKET WORLD PRICES WTO ZERO TARIFF Gawande, Kishore Hoekman, Bernard Lobbying and Agricultural Trade Policy in the United States |
| geographic_facet |
United States |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper; No. 3819 |
| description |
The authors study whether political campaign contributions influence agricultural protection in the United States in the manner suggested by the political economy model of Grossman and Helpman (1994). This is the first attempt to test this model using agricultural data. The authors test the model using a detailed cross-sectional data set of agricultural protection, subsidies, and political action committee (PAC) contributions in the late 1990s. The model is qualitatively affirmed by the data. They make a novel attempt to solve a puzzle about the model's quantitative implications, also found in recent studies. This solution makes the simple model consistent with the complicated decisionmaking process in real world government. The results imply the underpinnings of a political economy equilibrium that will be hard to dislodge. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Gawande, Kishore Hoekman, Bernard |
| author_facet |
Gawande, Kishore Hoekman, Bernard |
| author_sort |
Gawande, Kishore |
| title |
Lobbying and Agricultural Trade Policy in the United States |
| title_short |
Lobbying and Agricultural Trade Policy in the United States |
| title_full |
Lobbying and Agricultural Trade Policy in the United States |
| title_fullStr |
Lobbying and Agricultural Trade Policy in the United States |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Lobbying and Agricultural Trade Policy in the United States |
| title_sort |
lobbying and agricultural trade policy in the united states |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2012 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/01/6530318/lobbying-agricultural-trade-policy-united-states http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8802 |
| _version_ |
1764405713617027072 |