Corruption and Decentralized Public Governance
This paper examines the conceptual and empirical basis of corruption and governance and concludes that decentralized local governance is conducive to reduced corruption in the long run. This is because localization helps to break the monopoly of power at the national level by bringing decisionmaking...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2012
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/01/6534264/corruption-decentralized-public-governance http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8805 |
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okr-10986-8805 |
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oai_dc |
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Digital Repository |
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Foreign Institution |
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Digital Repositories |
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World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
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World Bank |
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English |
| topic |
ABUSES ABUSES OF POWER ACCOUNTABILITY IN GOVERNANCE ADMINISTRATIVE AUTONOMY ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ANTI-CORRUPTION ANTI-CORRUPTION STRATEGY ANTICORRUPTION ANTICORRUPTION AGENCIES ANTICORRUPTION EFFORTS AUTHORITY BANKING SYSTEM BRIBERY BRIBES BUREAUCRAT BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION CAMPAIGN FINANCING CITIZEN CITIZEN NEEDS CITIZENS CIVIL SERVANTS CIVIL SERVICE COLLUSION CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT CONTROLLING CORRUPTION CORRUPT ACTS CORRUPT COUNTRIES CORRUPT OFFICIALS CORRUPT PRACTICES CORRUPTION CRIME CRITICAL IMPORTANCE DECENTRALIZATION DECISION MAKING DECISION-MAKING DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION DEMOCRATIC PROCESS DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM DISCRETION DISTRICTS DYSFUNCTIONAL GOVERNANCE ECONOMIC ACTIVITY ECONOMIC POLICIES ELECTED OFFICIALS ELECTORAL COMPETITION ELECTORAL SYSTEMS ETHICS EXECUTIVE BRANCH FIGHTING CORRUPTION FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FINANCIAL RUIN FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION FOREIGN EXCHANGE FOREIGN INVESTMENT FORMAL ECONOMY FRAUD GOVERNANCE ENVIRONMENT GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY GOVERNMENT AGENCIES GOVERNMENT DECISION GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE GRAND CORRUPTION INCOME INEQUALITY INFANT MORTALITY INFORMATION ACCESS INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT INTEGRITY INTEREST GROUPS JUDICIAL SYSTEMS JUDICIARY JUSTICE LAWS LEGAL FRAMEWORK LEGISLATION LEGISLATORS LEGISLATURE LEGITIMACY LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT LOCAL GOVERNANCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT LOCAL GOVERNMENTS LOCAL LEVELS LOCAL POLITICIANS MACROECONOMIC STABILITY MALFEASANCE NATIONAL ELECTIONS NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS NATIONAL LEVEL NATIONALIZATION NEWS MEDIA PARLIAMENT PETTY CORRUPTION POLICE FORCES POLICY DESIGN POLITICAL CONTESTABILITY POLITICAL CORRUPTION POLITICAL INTERFERENCE POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL REFORMS POLITICIANS POOR GOVERNANCE PREFERENTIAL PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT PRIORITIES PROCUREMENT PROSECUTION PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION PUBLIC AWARENESS PUBLIC BUREAUCRACY PUBLIC EXPENDITURES PUBLIC FUNDS PUBLIC GOVERNANCE PUBLIC HEALTH PUBLIC HEALTH CARE PUBLIC MANAGEMENT PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC RESOURCES PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SECTOR CORRUPTION PUBLIC SECTOR MANAGEMENT PUBLIC SERVICE PUBLIC SERVICE PROVISION PUBLIC SERVICES PUNISHMENT REGULATORY CAPTURE REMEDIES REVOLUTION RULE OF LAW SERVICE DELIVERY SOCIAL INTERACTIONS STATE POWER STATE PROPERTY TAX BASE TAX RATES TAXATION TRANSPARENCY UPPER HOUSE VETO VETO POWER |
| spellingShingle |
ABUSES ABUSES OF POWER ACCOUNTABILITY IN GOVERNANCE ADMINISTRATIVE AUTONOMY ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ANTI-CORRUPTION ANTI-CORRUPTION STRATEGY ANTICORRUPTION ANTICORRUPTION AGENCIES ANTICORRUPTION EFFORTS AUTHORITY BANKING SYSTEM BRIBERY BRIBES BUREAUCRAT BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION CAMPAIGN FINANCING CITIZEN CITIZEN NEEDS CITIZENS CIVIL SERVANTS CIVIL SERVICE COLLUSION CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT CONTROLLING CORRUPTION CORRUPT ACTS CORRUPT COUNTRIES CORRUPT OFFICIALS CORRUPT PRACTICES CORRUPTION CRIME CRITICAL IMPORTANCE DECENTRALIZATION DECISION MAKING DECISION-MAKING DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION DEMOCRATIC PROCESS DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM DISCRETION DISTRICTS DYSFUNCTIONAL GOVERNANCE ECONOMIC ACTIVITY ECONOMIC POLICIES ELECTED OFFICIALS ELECTORAL COMPETITION ELECTORAL SYSTEMS ETHICS EXECUTIVE BRANCH FIGHTING CORRUPTION FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FINANCIAL RUIN FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION FOREIGN EXCHANGE FOREIGN INVESTMENT FORMAL ECONOMY FRAUD GOVERNANCE ENVIRONMENT GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY GOVERNMENT AGENCIES GOVERNMENT DECISION GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE GRAND CORRUPTION INCOME INEQUALITY INFANT MORTALITY INFORMATION ACCESS INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT INTEGRITY INTEREST GROUPS JUDICIAL SYSTEMS JUDICIARY JUSTICE LAWS LEGAL FRAMEWORK LEGISLATION LEGISLATORS LEGISLATURE LEGITIMACY LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT LOCAL GOVERNANCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT LOCAL GOVERNMENTS LOCAL LEVELS LOCAL POLITICIANS MACROECONOMIC STABILITY MALFEASANCE NATIONAL ELECTIONS NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS NATIONAL LEVEL NATIONALIZATION NEWS MEDIA PARLIAMENT PETTY CORRUPTION POLICE FORCES POLICY DESIGN POLITICAL CONTESTABILITY POLITICAL CORRUPTION POLITICAL INTERFERENCE POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL REFORMS POLITICIANS POOR GOVERNANCE PREFERENTIAL PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT PRIORITIES PROCUREMENT PROSECUTION PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION PUBLIC AWARENESS PUBLIC BUREAUCRACY PUBLIC EXPENDITURES PUBLIC FUNDS PUBLIC GOVERNANCE PUBLIC HEALTH PUBLIC HEALTH CARE PUBLIC MANAGEMENT PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC RESOURCES PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SECTOR CORRUPTION PUBLIC SECTOR MANAGEMENT PUBLIC SERVICE PUBLIC SERVICE PROVISION PUBLIC SERVICES PUNISHMENT REGULATORY CAPTURE REMEDIES REVOLUTION RULE OF LAW SERVICE DELIVERY SOCIAL INTERACTIONS STATE POWER STATE PROPERTY TAX BASE TAX RATES TAXATION TRANSPARENCY UPPER HOUSE VETO VETO POWER Shah, Anwar Corruption and Decentralized Public Governance |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper; No. 3824 |
| description |
This paper examines the conceptual and empirical basis of corruption and governance and concludes that decentralized local governance is conducive to reduced corruption in the long run. This is because localization helps to break the monopoly of power at the national level by bringing decisionmaking closer to people. Localization strengthens government accountability to citizens by involving citizens in monitoring government performance and demanding corrective actions. Localization as a means to making government responsive and accountable to people can help reduce corruption and improve service delivery. Efforts to improve service delivery usually force the authorities to address corruption and its causes. However, one must pay attention to the institutional environment and the risk of local capture by elites. In the institutional environments typical of some developing countries, when in a geographical area, feudal or industrial interests dominate and institutions of participation and accountability are weak or ineffective and political interference in local affairs is rampant, localization may increase opportunities for corruption. This suggests a pecking order of anticorruption policies and programs where the rule of law and citizen empowerment should be the first priority in any reform efforts. Localization in the absence of rule of law may not prove to be a potent remedy for combating corruption. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Shah, Anwar |
| author_facet |
Shah, Anwar |
| author_sort |
Shah, Anwar |
| title |
Corruption and Decentralized Public Governance |
| title_short |
Corruption and Decentralized Public Governance |
| title_full |
Corruption and Decentralized Public Governance |
| title_fullStr |
Corruption and Decentralized Public Governance |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Corruption and Decentralized Public Governance |
| title_sort |
corruption and decentralized public governance |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2012 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/01/6534264/corruption-decentralized-public-governance http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8805 |
| _version_ |
1764405768001421312 |
| spelling |
okr-10986-88052021-04-23T14:02:40Z Corruption and Decentralized Public Governance Shah, Anwar ABUSES ABUSES OF POWER ACCOUNTABILITY IN GOVERNANCE ADMINISTRATIVE AUTONOMY ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ANTI-CORRUPTION ANTI-CORRUPTION STRATEGY ANTICORRUPTION ANTICORRUPTION AGENCIES ANTICORRUPTION EFFORTS AUTHORITY BANKING SYSTEM BRIBERY BRIBES BUREAUCRAT BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION CAMPAIGN FINANCING CITIZEN CITIZEN NEEDS CITIZENS CIVIL SERVANTS CIVIL SERVICE COLLUSION CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT CONTROLLING CORRUPTION CORRUPT ACTS CORRUPT COUNTRIES CORRUPT OFFICIALS CORRUPT PRACTICES CORRUPTION CRIME CRITICAL IMPORTANCE DECENTRALIZATION DECISION MAKING DECISION-MAKING DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION DEMOCRATIC PROCESS DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM DISCRETION DISTRICTS DYSFUNCTIONAL GOVERNANCE ECONOMIC ACTIVITY ECONOMIC POLICIES ELECTED OFFICIALS ELECTORAL COMPETITION ELECTORAL SYSTEMS ETHICS EXECUTIVE BRANCH FIGHTING CORRUPTION FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FINANCIAL RUIN FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION FOREIGN EXCHANGE FOREIGN INVESTMENT FORMAL ECONOMY FRAUD GOVERNANCE ENVIRONMENT GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY GOVERNMENT AGENCIES GOVERNMENT DECISION GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE GRAND CORRUPTION INCOME INEQUALITY INFANT MORTALITY INFORMATION ACCESS INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT INTEGRITY INTEREST GROUPS JUDICIAL SYSTEMS JUDICIARY JUSTICE LAWS LEGAL FRAMEWORK LEGISLATION LEGISLATORS LEGISLATURE LEGITIMACY LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT LOCAL GOVERNANCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT LOCAL GOVERNMENTS LOCAL LEVELS LOCAL POLITICIANS MACROECONOMIC STABILITY MALFEASANCE NATIONAL ELECTIONS NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS NATIONAL LEVEL NATIONALIZATION NEWS MEDIA PARLIAMENT PETTY CORRUPTION POLICE FORCES POLICY DESIGN POLITICAL CONTESTABILITY POLITICAL CORRUPTION POLITICAL INTERFERENCE POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL REFORMS POLITICIANS POOR GOVERNANCE PREFERENTIAL PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT PRIORITIES PROCUREMENT PROSECUTION PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION PUBLIC AWARENESS PUBLIC BUREAUCRACY PUBLIC EXPENDITURES PUBLIC FUNDS PUBLIC GOVERNANCE PUBLIC HEALTH PUBLIC HEALTH CARE PUBLIC MANAGEMENT PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC RESOURCES PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SECTOR CORRUPTION PUBLIC SECTOR MANAGEMENT PUBLIC SERVICE PUBLIC SERVICE PROVISION PUBLIC SERVICES PUNISHMENT REGULATORY CAPTURE REMEDIES REVOLUTION RULE OF LAW SERVICE DELIVERY SOCIAL INTERACTIONS STATE POWER STATE PROPERTY TAX BASE TAX RATES TAXATION TRANSPARENCY UPPER HOUSE VETO VETO POWER This paper examines the conceptual and empirical basis of corruption and governance and concludes that decentralized local governance is conducive to reduced corruption in the long run. This is because localization helps to break the monopoly of power at the national level by bringing decisionmaking closer to people. Localization strengthens government accountability to citizens by involving citizens in monitoring government performance and demanding corrective actions. Localization as a means to making government responsive and accountable to people can help reduce corruption and improve service delivery. Efforts to improve service delivery usually force the authorities to address corruption and its causes. However, one must pay attention to the institutional environment and the risk of local capture by elites. In the institutional environments typical of some developing countries, when in a geographical area, feudal or industrial interests dominate and institutions of participation and accountability are weak or ineffective and political interference in local affairs is rampant, localization may increase opportunities for corruption. This suggests a pecking order of anticorruption policies and programs where the rule of law and citizen empowerment should be the first priority in any reform efforts. Localization in the absence of rule of law may not prove to be a potent remedy for combating corruption. 2012-06-22T17:00:03Z 2012-06-22T17:00:03Z 2006-01 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/01/6534264/corruption-decentralized-public-governance http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8805 English Policy Research Working Paper; No. 3824 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research |