Democracy, Credibility and Clientelism
The authors demonstrate that sharply different policy choices across democracies can be explained as a consequence of differences in the ability of political competitors to make credible pre-electoral commitments to voters. Politicians can overcome their credibility deficit in two ways. First, they...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2012
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/01/5579805/democracy-credibility-clientelism http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8954 |
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okr-10986-89542021-04-23T14:02:42Z Democracy, Credibility and Clientelism Keefer, Philip Vlaicu, Razvan BENCHMARK BENCHMARKS BUREAUCRACY CANDIDATES COLLECTIVE ACTION CONSTITUENCIES CORRUPTION DECISION MAKING DEMOCRACIES DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT DIMINISHING RETURNS DISCOUNT RATES ECONOMIC BENEFITS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ELECTION ELECTIONS ELECTORAL COMPETITION ELECTORAL INSTITUTIONS ELECTORAL SYSTEMS EQUILIBRIUM EXOGENOUS SHOCKS EXPENDITURES GDP INNOVATIONS JURISDICTION LEGISLATORS ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE PER CAPITA INCOME POLICY INSTRUMENTS POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICIANS PRIVATE GOODS PRODUCTIVITY PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC INVESTMENT PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC SPENDING RENTS RESOURCE ALLOCATION TRANSPORTATION UTILITY FUNCTION VOTER PREFERENCES VOTER REGISTRATION VOTERS VOTING WEALTH The authors demonstrate that sharply different policy choices across democracies can be explained as a consequence of differences in the ability of political competitors to make credible pre-electoral commitments to voters. Politicians can overcome their credibility deficit in two ways. First, they can build reputations. This requires that they fulfill preconditions that in practice are costly: informing voters of their promises; tracking those promises; ensuring that voters turn out on election day. Alternatively, they can rely on intermediaries -- patrons - who are already able to make credible commitments to their clients. Endogenizing credibility in this way, the authors find that targeted transfers and corruption are higher and public good provision lower than in democracies in which political competitors can make credible pre-electoral promises. The authors also argue that in the absence of political credibility, political reliance on patrons enhances welfare in the short-run, in contrast to the traditional view that clientelism in politics is a source of significant policy distortion. However, in the long run reliance on patrons may undermine the emergence of credible political parties. The model helps to explain several puzzles. For example, public investment and corruption are higher in young democracies than old; and democratizing reforms succeeded remarkably in Victorian England, in contrast to the more difficult experiences of many democratizing countries, such as the Dominican Republic. 2012-06-25T17:57:15Z 2012-06-25T17:57:15Z 2005-01 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/01/5579805/democracy-credibility-clientelism http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8954 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper; No. 3472 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
BENCHMARK BENCHMARKS BUREAUCRACY CANDIDATES COLLECTIVE ACTION CONSTITUENCIES CORRUPTION DECISION MAKING DEMOCRACIES DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT DIMINISHING RETURNS DISCOUNT RATES ECONOMIC BENEFITS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ELECTION ELECTIONS ELECTORAL COMPETITION ELECTORAL INSTITUTIONS ELECTORAL SYSTEMS EQUILIBRIUM EXOGENOUS SHOCKS EXPENDITURES GDP INNOVATIONS JURISDICTION LEGISLATORS ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE PER CAPITA INCOME POLICY INSTRUMENTS POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICIANS PRIVATE GOODS PRODUCTIVITY PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC INVESTMENT PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC SPENDING RENTS RESOURCE ALLOCATION TRANSPORTATION UTILITY FUNCTION VOTER PREFERENCES VOTER REGISTRATION VOTERS VOTING WEALTH |
| spellingShingle |
BENCHMARK BENCHMARKS BUREAUCRACY CANDIDATES COLLECTIVE ACTION CONSTITUENCIES CORRUPTION DECISION MAKING DEMOCRACIES DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT DIMINISHING RETURNS DISCOUNT RATES ECONOMIC BENEFITS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ELECTION ELECTIONS ELECTORAL COMPETITION ELECTORAL INSTITUTIONS ELECTORAL SYSTEMS EQUILIBRIUM EXOGENOUS SHOCKS EXPENDITURES GDP INNOVATIONS JURISDICTION LEGISLATORS ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE PER CAPITA INCOME POLICY INSTRUMENTS POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICIANS PRIVATE GOODS PRODUCTIVITY PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC INVESTMENT PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC SPENDING RENTS RESOURCE ALLOCATION TRANSPORTATION UTILITY FUNCTION VOTER PREFERENCES VOTER REGISTRATION VOTERS VOTING WEALTH Keefer, Philip Vlaicu, Razvan Democracy, Credibility and Clientelism |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper; No. 3472 |
| description |
The authors demonstrate that sharply different policy choices across democracies can be explained as a consequence of differences in the ability of political competitors to make credible pre-electoral commitments to voters. Politicians can overcome their credibility deficit in two ways. First, they can build reputations. This requires that they fulfill preconditions that in practice are costly: informing voters of their promises; tracking those promises; ensuring that voters turn out on election day. Alternatively, they can rely on intermediaries -- patrons - who are already able to make credible commitments to their clients. Endogenizing credibility in this way, the authors find that targeted transfers and corruption are higher and public good provision lower than in democracies in which political competitors can make credible pre-electoral promises. The authors also argue that in the absence of political credibility, political reliance on patrons enhances welfare in the short-run, in contrast to the traditional view that clientelism in politics is a source of significant policy distortion. However, in the long run reliance on patrons may undermine the emergence of credible political parties. The model helps to explain several puzzles. For example, public investment and corruption are higher in young democracies than old; and democratizing reforms succeeded remarkably in Victorian England, in contrast to the more difficult experiences of many democratizing countries, such as the Dominican Republic. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Keefer, Philip Vlaicu, Razvan |
| author_facet |
Keefer, Philip Vlaicu, Razvan |
| author_sort |
Keefer, Philip |
| title |
Democracy, Credibility and Clientelism |
| title_short |
Democracy, Credibility and Clientelism |
| title_full |
Democracy, Credibility and Clientelism |
| title_fullStr |
Democracy, Credibility and Clientelism |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Democracy, Credibility and Clientelism |
| title_sort |
democracy, credibility and clientelism |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2012 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/01/5579805/democracy-credibility-clientelism http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8954 |
| _version_ |
1764406864039116800 |