Local Inequality and Project Choice: Theory and Evidence from Ecuador
This paper provides evidence consistent with elite capture of Social Fund investment projects in Ecuador. Exploiting a unique combination of data-sets on village-level income distributions, Social Fund project administration, and province level electoral results, the authors test a simple model of p...
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2012
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Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/08/7014478/local-inequality-project-choice-theory-evidence-ecuador http://hdl.handle.net/10986/9289 |
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okr-10986-92892021-04-23T14:02:41Z Local Inequality and Project Choice: Theory and Evidence from Ecuador Araujo, M. Caridad Ferreira, Francisco H.G. Lanjouw, Peter Özler, Berk ACCESS TO SERVICES AGRICULTURE ANTI-POVERTY BASIC INFRASTRUCTURE BENEFICIARIES BENEFICIARY ASSESSMENTS CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS COMMUNITY GROUPS COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION CORRUPTION DECENTRALIZATION DEMAND-DRIVEN APPROACH DEMOCRACY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS ECONOMIC STATUS EQUILIBRIUM ESTIMATES OF POVERTY FOOD FOR EDUCATION GEOGRAPHIC TARGETING GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT HIGHER INEQUALITY HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION HOUSEHOLD LEVEL HOUSEHOLD SURVEY HOUSEHOLD SURVEYS INCIDENCE OF POVERTY INCOME INCOME DISTRIBUTION INCOME INEQUALITY INCOME LEVELS INCOME TRANSFERS INDICATOR OF POVERTY INEQUALITY INFORMATION SYSTEM IRRIGATION LAND INEQUALITY LARGE POPULATIONS LOCAL COMMUNITIES LOCAL GOVERNMENTS LORENZ CURVE MACROECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT NATIONAL LEVEL NGO NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS NUTRITION PARTICIPATORY POLICY RESEARCH POLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL PROCESS POLITICAL SUPPORT POOR POOR AGENTS POOR COMMUNITIES POOR HOUSEHOLDS POOR INDIVIDUALS POOR PEOPLE POPULATION CENSUS POVERTY INCIDENCE POVERTY LINE POVERTY MAP POVERTY PROGRAMS POVERTY REDUCTION PRODUCTION FUNCTION PROGRESS PROJECT MONITORING PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC SPENDING RESOURCE ALLOCATION RESPECT RICHER PEOPLE RURAL RURAL ECONOMY RURAL POVERTY RURAL POVERTY RATES RURAL SECTOR SANITATION SCHOOL BUILDINGS SOCIAL FUND PROJECTS SOCIAL FUNDS SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE SOCIAL SERVICES SOCIAL WELFARE SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS TARGETING URBAN AREAS UTILITY FUNCTION VALUATION VOTERS WEALTH This paper provides evidence consistent with elite capture of Social Fund investment projects in Ecuador. Exploiting a unique combination of data-sets on village-level income distributions, Social Fund project administration, and province level electoral results, the authors test a simple model of project choice when local political power is unequally distributed. In accordance with the predictions of the model, poorer villages are more likely to receive projects that provide excludable (private) goods to the poor, such as latrines. Controlling for poverty, more unequal communities are less likely to receive such projects. Consistent with the hypothesis of elite capture, these results are sensitive to the specific measure of inequality used in the empirical analysis, and are strongest for expenditure shares at the top of the distribution. 2012-06-26T20:41:47Z 2012-06-26T20:41:47Z 2006-08 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/08/7014478/local-inequality-project-choice-theory-evidence-ecuador http://hdl.handle.net/10986/9289 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper; No. 3997 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research Latin America & Caribbean Ecuador |
repository_type |
Digital Repository |
institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
institution |
Digital Repositories |
building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
collection |
World Bank |
language |
English en_US |
topic |
ACCESS TO SERVICES AGRICULTURE ANTI-POVERTY BASIC INFRASTRUCTURE BENEFICIARIES BENEFICIARY ASSESSMENTS CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS COMMUNITY GROUPS COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION CORRUPTION DECENTRALIZATION DEMAND-DRIVEN APPROACH DEMOCRACY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS ECONOMIC STATUS EQUILIBRIUM ESTIMATES OF POVERTY FOOD FOR EDUCATION GEOGRAPHIC TARGETING GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT HIGHER INEQUALITY HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION HOUSEHOLD LEVEL HOUSEHOLD SURVEY HOUSEHOLD SURVEYS INCIDENCE OF POVERTY INCOME INCOME DISTRIBUTION INCOME INEQUALITY INCOME LEVELS INCOME TRANSFERS INDICATOR OF POVERTY INEQUALITY INFORMATION SYSTEM IRRIGATION LAND INEQUALITY LARGE POPULATIONS LOCAL COMMUNITIES LOCAL GOVERNMENTS LORENZ CURVE MACROECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT NATIONAL LEVEL NGO NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS NUTRITION PARTICIPATORY POLICY RESEARCH POLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL PROCESS POLITICAL SUPPORT POOR POOR AGENTS POOR COMMUNITIES POOR HOUSEHOLDS POOR INDIVIDUALS POOR PEOPLE POPULATION CENSUS POVERTY INCIDENCE POVERTY LINE POVERTY MAP POVERTY PROGRAMS POVERTY REDUCTION PRODUCTION FUNCTION PROGRESS PROJECT MONITORING PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC SPENDING RESOURCE ALLOCATION RESPECT RICHER PEOPLE RURAL RURAL ECONOMY RURAL POVERTY RURAL POVERTY RATES RURAL SECTOR SANITATION SCHOOL BUILDINGS SOCIAL FUND PROJECTS SOCIAL FUNDS SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE SOCIAL SERVICES SOCIAL WELFARE SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS TARGETING URBAN AREAS UTILITY FUNCTION VALUATION VOTERS WEALTH |
spellingShingle |
ACCESS TO SERVICES AGRICULTURE ANTI-POVERTY BASIC INFRASTRUCTURE BENEFICIARIES BENEFICIARY ASSESSMENTS CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS COMMUNITY GROUPS COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION CORRUPTION DECENTRALIZATION DEMAND-DRIVEN APPROACH DEMOCRACY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS ECONOMIC STATUS EQUILIBRIUM ESTIMATES OF POVERTY FOOD FOR EDUCATION GEOGRAPHIC TARGETING GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT HIGHER INEQUALITY HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION HOUSEHOLD LEVEL HOUSEHOLD SURVEY HOUSEHOLD SURVEYS INCIDENCE OF POVERTY INCOME INCOME DISTRIBUTION INCOME INEQUALITY INCOME LEVELS INCOME TRANSFERS INDICATOR OF POVERTY INEQUALITY INFORMATION SYSTEM IRRIGATION LAND INEQUALITY LARGE POPULATIONS LOCAL COMMUNITIES LOCAL GOVERNMENTS LORENZ CURVE MACROECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT NATIONAL LEVEL NGO NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS NUTRITION PARTICIPATORY POLICY RESEARCH POLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL PROCESS POLITICAL SUPPORT POOR POOR AGENTS POOR COMMUNITIES POOR HOUSEHOLDS POOR INDIVIDUALS POOR PEOPLE POPULATION CENSUS POVERTY INCIDENCE POVERTY LINE POVERTY MAP POVERTY PROGRAMS POVERTY REDUCTION PRODUCTION FUNCTION PROGRESS PROJECT MONITORING PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC SPENDING RESOURCE ALLOCATION RESPECT RICHER PEOPLE RURAL RURAL ECONOMY RURAL POVERTY RURAL POVERTY RATES RURAL SECTOR SANITATION SCHOOL BUILDINGS SOCIAL FUND PROJECTS SOCIAL FUNDS SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE SOCIAL SERVICES SOCIAL WELFARE SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS TARGETING URBAN AREAS UTILITY FUNCTION VALUATION VOTERS WEALTH Araujo, M. Caridad Ferreira, Francisco H.G. Lanjouw, Peter Özler, Berk Local Inequality and Project Choice: Theory and Evidence from Ecuador |
geographic_facet |
Latin America & Caribbean Ecuador |
relation |
Policy Research Working Paper; No. 3997 |
description |
This paper provides evidence consistent with elite capture of Social Fund investment projects in Ecuador. Exploiting a unique combination of data-sets on village-level income distributions, Social Fund project administration, and province level electoral results, the authors test a simple model of project choice when local political power is unequally distributed. In accordance with the predictions of the model, poorer villages are more likely to receive projects that provide excludable (private) goods to the poor, such as latrines. Controlling for poverty, more unequal communities are less likely to receive such projects. Consistent with the hypothesis of elite capture, these results are sensitive to the specific measure of inequality used in the empirical analysis, and are strongest for expenditure shares at the top of the distribution. |
format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
author |
Araujo, M. Caridad Ferreira, Francisco H.G. Lanjouw, Peter Özler, Berk |
author_facet |
Araujo, M. Caridad Ferreira, Francisco H.G. Lanjouw, Peter Özler, Berk |
author_sort |
Araujo, M. Caridad |
title |
Local Inequality and Project Choice: Theory and Evidence from Ecuador |
title_short |
Local Inequality and Project Choice: Theory and Evidence from Ecuador |
title_full |
Local Inequality and Project Choice: Theory and Evidence from Ecuador |
title_fullStr |
Local Inequality and Project Choice: Theory and Evidence from Ecuador |
title_full_unstemmed |
Local Inequality and Project Choice: Theory and Evidence from Ecuador |
title_sort |
local inequality and project choice: theory and evidence from ecuador |
publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
publishDate |
2012 |
url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/08/7014478/local-inequality-project-choice-theory-evidence-ecuador http://hdl.handle.net/10986/9289 |
_version_ |
1764406408753709056 |