Local Inequality and Project Choice: Theory and Evidence from Ecuador

This paper provides evidence consistent with elite capture of Social Fund investment projects in Ecuador. Exploiting a unique combination of data-sets on village-level income distributions, Social Fund project administration, and province level electoral results, the authors test a simple model of p...

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Main Authors: Araujo, M. Caridad, Ferreira, Francisco H.G., Lanjouw, Peter, Özler, Berk
Format: Policy Research Working Paper
Language:English
en_US
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2012
Subjects:
NGO
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/08/7014478/local-inequality-project-choice-theory-evidence-ecuador
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/9289
id okr-10986-9289
recordtype oai_dc
spelling okr-10986-92892021-04-23T14:02:41Z Local Inequality and Project Choice: Theory and Evidence from Ecuador Araujo, M. Caridad Ferreira, Francisco H.G. Lanjouw, Peter Özler, Berk ACCESS TO SERVICES AGRICULTURE ANTI-POVERTY BASIC INFRASTRUCTURE BENEFICIARIES BENEFICIARY ASSESSMENTS CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS COMMUNITY GROUPS COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION CORRUPTION DECENTRALIZATION DEMAND-DRIVEN APPROACH DEMOCRACY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS ECONOMIC STATUS EQUILIBRIUM ESTIMATES OF POVERTY FOOD FOR EDUCATION GEOGRAPHIC TARGETING GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT HIGHER INEQUALITY HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION HOUSEHOLD LEVEL HOUSEHOLD SURVEY HOUSEHOLD SURVEYS INCIDENCE OF POVERTY INCOME INCOME DISTRIBUTION INCOME INEQUALITY INCOME LEVELS INCOME TRANSFERS INDICATOR OF POVERTY INEQUALITY INFORMATION SYSTEM IRRIGATION LAND INEQUALITY LARGE POPULATIONS LOCAL COMMUNITIES LOCAL GOVERNMENTS LORENZ CURVE MACROECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT NATIONAL LEVEL NGO NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS NUTRITION PARTICIPATORY POLICY RESEARCH POLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL PROCESS POLITICAL SUPPORT POOR POOR AGENTS POOR COMMUNITIES POOR HOUSEHOLDS POOR INDIVIDUALS POOR PEOPLE POPULATION CENSUS POVERTY INCIDENCE POVERTY LINE POVERTY MAP POVERTY PROGRAMS POVERTY REDUCTION PRODUCTION FUNCTION PROGRESS PROJECT MONITORING PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC SPENDING RESOURCE ALLOCATION RESPECT RICHER PEOPLE RURAL RURAL ECONOMY RURAL POVERTY RURAL POVERTY RATES RURAL SECTOR SANITATION SCHOOL BUILDINGS SOCIAL FUND PROJECTS SOCIAL FUNDS SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE SOCIAL SERVICES SOCIAL WELFARE SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS TARGETING URBAN AREAS UTILITY FUNCTION VALUATION VOTERS WEALTH This paper provides evidence consistent with elite capture of Social Fund investment projects in Ecuador. Exploiting a unique combination of data-sets on village-level income distributions, Social Fund project administration, and province level electoral results, the authors test a simple model of project choice when local political power is unequally distributed. In accordance with the predictions of the model, poorer villages are more likely to receive projects that provide excludable (private) goods to the poor, such as latrines. Controlling for poverty, more unequal communities are less likely to receive such projects. Consistent with the hypothesis of elite capture, these results are sensitive to the specific measure of inequality used in the empirical analysis, and are strongest for expenditure shares at the top of the distribution. 2012-06-26T20:41:47Z 2012-06-26T20:41:47Z 2006-08 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/08/7014478/local-inequality-project-choice-theory-evidence-ecuador http://hdl.handle.net/10986/9289 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper; No. 3997 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research Latin America & Caribbean Ecuador
repository_type Digital Repository
institution_category Foreign Institution
institution Digital Repositories
building World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection World Bank
language English
en_US
topic ACCESS TO SERVICES
AGRICULTURE
ANTI-POVERTY
BASIC INFRASTRUCTURE
BENEFICIARIES
BENEFICIARY ASSESSMENTS
CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS
COMMUNITY GROUPS
COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS
COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION
CORRUPTION
DECENTRALIZATION
DEMAND-DRIVEN APPROACH
DEMOCRACY
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS
ECONOMIC STATUS
EQUILIBRIUM
ESTIMATES OF POVERTY
FOOD FOR EDUCATION
GEOGRAPHIC TARGETING
GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT
HIGHER INEQUALITY
HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION
HOUSEHOLD LEVEL
HOUSEHOLD SURVEY
HOUSEHOLD SURVEYS
INCIDENCE OF POVERTY
INCOME
INCOME DISTRIBUTION
INCOME INEQUALITY
INCOME LEVELS
INCOME TRANSFERS
INDICATOR OF POVERTY
INEQUALITY
INFORMATION SYSTEM
IRRIGATION
LAND INEQUALITY
LARGE POPULATIONS
LOCAL COMMUNITIES
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
LORENZ CURVE
MACROECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT
NATIONAL LEVEL
NGO
NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS
NUTRITION
PARTICIPATORY
POLICY RESEARCH
POLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER
POLITICAL POWER
POLITICAL PROCESS
POLITICAL SUPPORT
POOR
POOR AGENTS
POOR COMMUNITIES
POOR HOUSEHOLDS
POOR INDIVIDUALS
POOR PEOPLE
POPULATION CENSUS
POVERTY INCIDENCE
POVERTY LINE
POVERTY MAP
POVERTY PROGRAMS
POVERTY REDUCTION
PRODUCTION FUNCTION
PROGRESS
PROJECT MONITORING
PUBLIC GOOD
PUBLIC SPENDING
RESOURCE ALLOCATION
RESPECT
RICHER PEOPLE
RURAL
RURAL ECONOMY
RURAL POVERTY
RURAL POVERTY RATES
RURAL SECTOR
SANITATION
SCHOOL BUILDINGS
SOCIAL FUND PROJECTS
SOCIAL FUNDS
SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE
SOCIAL SERVICES
SOCIAL WELFARE
SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION
STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT
STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS
TARGETING
URBAN AREAS
UTILITY FUNCTION
VALUATION
VOTERS
WEALTH
spellingShingle ACCESS TO SERVICES
AGRICULTURE
ANTI-POVERTY
BASIC INFRASTRUCTURE
BENEFICIARIES
BENEFICIARY ASSESSMENTS
CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS
COMMUNITY GROUPS
COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS
COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION
CORRUPTION
DECENTRALIZATION
DEMAND-DRIVEN APPROACH
DEMOCRACY
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS
ECONOMIC STATUS
EQUILIBRIUM
ESTIMATES OF POVERTY
FOOD FOR EDUCATION
GEOGRAPHIC TARGETING
GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT
HIGHER INEQUALITY
HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION
HOUSEHOLD LEVEL
HOUSEHOLD SURVEY
HOUSEHOLD SURVEYS
INCIDENCE OF POVERTY
INCOME
INCOME DISTRIBUTION
INCOME INEQUALITY
INCOME LEVELS
INCOME TRANSFERS
INDICATOR OF POVERTY
INEQUALITY
INFORMATION SYSTEM
IRRIGATION
LAND INEQUALITY
LARGE POPULATIONS
LOCAL COMMUNITIES
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
LORENZ CURVE
MACROECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT
NATIONAL LEVEL
NGO
NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS
NUTRITION
PARTICIPATORY
POLICY RESEARCH
POLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER
POLITICAL POWER
POLITICAL PROCESS
POLITICAL SUPPORT
POOR
POOR AGENTS
POOR COMMUNITIES
POOR HOUSEHOLDS
POOR INDIVIDUALS
POOR PEOPLE
POPULATION CENSUS
POVERTY INCIDENCE
POVERTY LINE
POVERTY MAP
POVERTY PROGRAMS
POVERTY REDUCTION
PRODUCTION FUNCTION
PROGRESS
PROJECT MONITORING
PUBLIC GOOD
PUBLIC SPENDING
RESOURCE ALLOCATION
RESPECT
RICHER PEOPLE
RURAL
RURAL ECONOMY
RURAL POVERTY
RURAL POVERTY RATES
RURAL SECTOR
SANITATION
SCHOOL BUILDINGS
SOCIAL FUND PROJECTS
SOCIAL FUNDS
SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE
SOCIAL SERVICES
SOCIAL WELFARE
SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION
STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT
STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS
TARGETING
URBAN AREAS
UTILITY FUNCTION
VALUATION
VOTERS
WEALTH
Araujo, M. Caridad
Ferreira, Francisco H.G.
Lanjouw, Peter
Özler, Berk
Local Inequality and Project Choice: Theory and Evidence from Ecuador
geographic_facet Latin America & Caribbean
Ecuador
relation Policy Research Working Paper; No. 3997
description This paper provides evidence consistent with elite capture of Social Fund investment projects in Ecuador. Exploiting a unique combination of data-sets on village-level income distributions, Social Fund project administration, and province level electoral results, the authors test a simple model of project choice when local political power is unequally distributed. In accordance with the predictions of the model, poorer villages are more likely to receive projects that provide excludable (private) goods to the poor, such as latrines. Controlling for poverty, more unequal communities are less likely to receive such projects. Consistent with the hypothesis of elite capture, these results are sensitive to the specific measure of inequality used in the empirical analysis, and are strongest for expenditure shares at the top of the distribution.
format Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
author Araujo, M. Caridad
Ferreira, Francisco H.G.
Lanjouw, Peter
Özler, Berk
author_facet Araujo, M. Caridad
Ferreira, Francisco H.G.
Lanjouw, Peter
Özler, Berk
author_sort Araujo, M. Caridad
title Local Inequality and Project Choice: Theory and Evidence from Ecuador
title_short Local Inequality and Project Choice: Theory and Evidence from Ecuador
title_full Local Inequality and Project Choice: Theory and Evidence from Ecuador
title_fullStr Local Inequality and Project Choice: Theory and Evidence from Ecuador
title_full_unstemmed Local Inequality and Project Choice: Theory and Evidence from Ecuador
title_sort local inequality and project choice: theory and evidence from ecuador
publisher World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate 2012
url http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/08/7014478/local-inequality-project-choice-theory-evidence-ecuador
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/9289
_version_ 1764406408753709056