Natural Resources, Weak States and Civil War : Can Rents Stabilize Coup Prone Regimes?

This paper argues that state weakness is broader than implied previously in the civil war literature, and that particular types of weakness in interaction with natural resources have aggravating or mitigating consequences for the risk of civil war. While in anocracies or unstable regimes natural res...

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Main Author:	Bodea, Cristina
Format:	Policy Research Working Paper
Language:	English
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2012
Subjects:	ACCOUNTING ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES ARMED CONFLICT ARMED CONFLICTS ARMS BANKS BARGAINING BATTLE CITIZENS CIVIL CONFLICT CIVIL SOCIETY CIVIL WAR CIVIL WARS COLD WAR COLLECTIVE ACTION CONFLICT RESOLUTION COUNTERINSURGENCY COUPS D'ETAT DEATHS DEBT DEMOCRACY DEPENDENCE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPMENT POLICY DISCRIMINATION ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMICS ENERGY CONSUMPTION ENTREPRENEURS ETHNIC DISCRIMINATION ETHNIC GROUP ETHNIC GROUPS EXPLOITATION FIGHTING FOUNDATIONS INCOME INFORMATION EXCHANGE INTERNATIONAL BANK INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION INTERNATIONAL SECURITY MILITARY EXPENDITURES MILITARY FORCES MILITARY REGIMES MILITARY SPENDING NATIONS NATURAL RESOURCE NATURAL RESOURCES PEACE PEACE RESEARCH POLARIZATION POLICE POLICY DISCUSSIONS POLICY RESEARCH POLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER POLITICAL INSTABILITY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL SYSTEMS POLITICAL VIOLENCE POPULATION SIZE PROGRESS PROPERTY RIGHTS QUANTITATIVE MEASURES REBEL REBEL ARMY REBELS RECONSTRUCTION RENTS REVOLUTION REVOLUTIONS RIOT RIOTS SOCIAL STRUCTURE SOLDIERS STATE UNIVERSITY VIOLENT CONFLICT VULNERABILITY WAGES WAR LITERATURE WARS WORLD DEVELOPMENT
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2012/05/16271733/natural-resources-weak-states-civil-war-can-rents-stabilize-coup-prone-regimes http://hdl.handle.net/10986/9350

id	okr-10986-9350
recordtype	oai_dc
spelling	okr-10986-93502021-04-23T14:02:45Z Natural Resources, Weak States and Civil War : Can Rents Stabilize Coup Prone Regimes? Bodea, Cristina ACCOUNTING ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES ARMED CONFLICT ARMED CONFLICTS ARMS BANKS BARGAINING BATTLE CITIZENS CIVIL CONFLICT CIVIL SOCIETY CIVIL WAR CIVIL WARS COLD WAR COLLECTIVE ACTION CONFLICT RESOLUTION COUNTERINSURGENCY COUPS D'ETAT DEATHS DEBT DEMOCRACY DEPENDENCE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPMENT POLICY DISCRIMINATION ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMICS ENERGY CONSUMPTION ENTREPRENEURS ETHNIC DISCRIMINATION ETHNIC GROUP ETHNIC GROUPS EXPLOITATION FIGHTING FOUNDATIONS INCOME INFORMATION EXCHANGE INTERNATIONAL BANK INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION INTERNATIONAL SECURITY MILITARY EXPENDITURES MILITARY FORCES MILITARY REGIMES MILITARY SPENDING NATIONS NATURAL RESOURCE NATURAL RESOURCES PEACE PEACE RESEARCH POLARIZATION POLICE POLICY DISCUSSIONS POLICY RESEARCH POLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER POLITICAL INSTABILITY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL SYSTEMS POLITICAL VIOLENCE POPULATION SIZE PROGRESS PROPERTY RIGHTS QUANTITATIVE MEASURES REBEL REBEL ARMY REBELS RECONSTRUCTION RENTS REVOLUTION REVOLUTIONS RIOT RIOTS SOCIAL STRUCTURE SOLDIERS STATE UNIVERSITY VIOLENT CONFLICT VULNERABILITY WAGES WAR LITERATURE WARS WORLD DEVELOPMENT This paper argues that state weakness is broader than implied previously in the civil war literature, and that particular types of weakness in interaction with natural resources have aggravating or mitigating consequences for the risk of civil war. While in anocracies or unstable regimes natural resources can be expected to increase the risk of civil war, we suggest that resource wealth allows weak leaders to stabilize their relationship with their inner elite circle. In particular, for regimes at risk of coup d'etat, the availability of substantial resources is more likely to be channeled in ways that deter rebellion, plausibly countering the grievances generated by natural resources and rebels' viewing of such resources as a prize for taking over the state. Data from 1946-2003 and multiple empirical operationalizations broadly support our argument. These findings are consistent with work showing that resource rents can induce stability in state - society relationships. 2012-06-29T21:56:29Z 2012-06-29T21:56:29Z 2012-05 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2012/05/16271733/natural-resources-weak-states-civil-war-can-rents-stabilize-coup-prone-regimes http://hdl.handle.net/10986/9350 English Policy Research Working Paper; No. 6071 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research
repository_type	Digital Repository
institution_category	Foreign Institution
institution	Digital Repositories
building	World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection	World Bank
language	English
topic	ACCOUNTING ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES ARMED CONFLICT ARMED CONFLICTS ARMS BANKS BARGAINING BATTLE CITIZENS CIVIL CONFLICT CIVIL SOCIETY CIVIL WAR CIVIL WARS COLD WAR COLLECTIVE ACTION CONFLICT RESOLUTION COUNTERINSURGENCY COUPS D'ETAT DEATHS DEBT DEMOCRACY DEPENDENCE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPMENT POLICY DISCRIMINATION ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMICS ENERGY CONSUMPTION ENTREPRENEURS ETHNIC DISCRIMINATION ETHNIC GROUP ETHNIC GROUPS EXPLOITATION FIGHTING FOUNDATIONS INCOME INFORMATION EXCHANGE INTERNATIONAL BANK INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION INTERNATIONAL SECURITY MILITARY EXPENDITURES MILITARY FORCES MILITARY REGIMES MILITARY SPENDING NATIONS NATURAL RESOURCE NATURAL RESOURCES PEACE PEACE RESEARCH POLARIZATION POLICE POLICY DISCUSSIONS POLICY RESEARCH POLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER POLITICAL INSTABILITY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL SYSTEMS POLITICAL VIOLENCE POPULATION SIZE PROGRESS PROPERTY RIGHTS QUANTITATIVE MEASURES REBEL REBEL ARMY REBELS RECONSTRUCTION RENTS REVOLUTION REVOLUTIONS RIOT RIOTS SOCIAL STRUCTURE SOLDIERS STATE UNIVERSITY VIOLENT CONFLICT VULNERABILITY WAGES WAR LITERATURE WARS WORLD DEVELOPMENT
spellingShingle	ACCOUNTING ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES ARMED CONFLICT ARMED CONFLICTS ARMS BANKS BARGAINING BATTLE CITIZENS CIVIL CONFLICT CIVIL SOCIETY CIVIL WAR CIVIL WARS COLD WAR COLLECTIVE ACTION CONFLICT RESOLUTION COUNTERINSURGENCY COUPS D'ETAT DEATHS DEBT DEMOCRACY DEPENDENCE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPMENT POLICY DISCRIMINATION ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMICS ENERGY CONSUMPTION ENTREPRENEURS ETHNIC DISCRIMINATION ETHNIC GROUP ETHNIC GROUPS EXPLOITATION FIGHTING FOUNDATIONS INCOME INFORMATION EXCHANGE INTERNATIONAL BANK INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION INTERNATIONAL SECURITY MILITARY EXPENDITURES MILITARY FORCES MILITARY REGIMES MILITARY SPENDING NATIONS NATURAL RESOURCE NATURAL RESOURCES PEACE PEACE RESEARCH POLARIZATION POLICE POLICY DISCUSSIONS POLICY RESEARCH POLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER POLITICAL INSTABILITY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL SYSTEMS POLITICAL VIOLENCE POPULATION SIZE PROGRESS PROPERTY RIGHTS QUANTITATIVE MEASURES REBEL REBEL ARMY REBELS RECONSTRUCTION RENTS REVOLUTION REVOLUTIONS RIOT RIOTS SOCIAL STRUCTURE SOLDIERS STATE UNIVERSITY VIOLENT CONFLICT VULNERABILITY WAGES WAR LITERATURE WARS WORLD DEVELOPMENT Bodea, Cristina Natural Resources, Weak States and Civil War : Can Rents Stabilize Coup Prone Regimes?
relation	Policy Research Working Paper; No. 6071
description	This paper argues that state weakness is broader than implied previously in the civil war literature, and that particular types of weakness in interaction with natural resources have aggravating or mitigating consequences for the risk of civil war. While in anocracies or unstable regimes natural resources can be expected to increase the risk of civil war, we suggest that resource wealth allows weak leaders to stabilize their relationship with their inner elite circle. In particular, for regimes at risk of coup d'etat, the availability of substantial resources is more likely to be channeled in ways that deter rebellion, plausibly countering the grievances generated by natural resources and rebels' viewing of such resources as a prize for taking over the state. Data from 1946-2003 and multiple empirical operationalizations broadly support our argument. These findings are consistent with work showing that resource rents can induce stability in state - society relationships.
format	Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
author	Bodea, Cristina
author_facet	Bodea, Cristina
author_sort	Bodea, Cristina
title	Natural Resources, Weak States and Civil War : Can Rents Stabilize Coup Prone Regimes?
title_short	Natural Resources, Weak States and Civil War : Can Rents Stabilize Coup Prone Regimes?
title_full	Natural Resources, Weak States and Civil War : Can Rents Stabilize Coup Prone Regimes?
title_fullStr	Natural Resources, Weak States and Civil War : Can Rents Stabilize Coup Prone Regimes?
title_full_unstemmed	Natural Resources, Weak States and Civil War : Can Rents Stabilize Coup Prone Regimes?
title_sort	natural resources, weak states and civil war : can rents stabilize coup prone regimes?
publisher	World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate	2012
url	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2012/05/16271733/natural-resources-weak-states-civil-war-can-rents-stabilize-coup-prone-regimes http://hdl.handle.net/10986/9350
_version_	1764409231445852160

Natural Resources, Weak States and Civil War : Can Rents Stabilize Coup Prone Regimes?

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