Writing an Effective Anticorruption Law
The note looks at effective anticorruption legal instruments, ensuring that laws are in place to deter corruption. However, law enforcement measures are not the first, or necessarily the preferred method of defense. An informed citizenry, a governm...
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2012
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Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2002/03/1998937/writing-effective-anticorruption-law http://hdl.handle.net/10986/9777 |
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okr-10986-97772021-04-23T14:02:47Z Writing an Effective Anticorruption Law Messick, Richard E. Kleinfeld, Rachel CORRUPTION LEGAL FRAMEWORK LAW ENFORCEMENT LEGAL INSTRUMENTS CORRUPT PRACTICES BRIBERY CIVIL SOCIETY ETHICS ENFORCEMENT POWERS CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS CONFLICT OF INTERESTS CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT PUBLIC DISCLOSURE ACTIONS ANTI-CORRUPTION ANTICORRUPTION AUTHORITY BRIBERY BRIBES CITIZENS CIVIL SERVANTS CONFLICTS OF INTEREST CORRUPT ACTS CORRUPT OFFICIALS CRIME DEMOCRACY DISCRETION ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ETHICS GOVERNMENT ACTION GOVERNMENT AGENCIES GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS JUSTICE LAW ENFORCEMENT LAW REFORM LAWS LAWYER LEGAL ASPECTS LEGAL FRAMEWORK LEGAL REFORM LEGAL REFORMS LEGALITY LEGISLATION LIBEL MEDIA NATIONAL INTEGRITY NATIONAL LEGISLATION NATIONS NEPOTISM PROSECUTION PROSECUTORS PUBLIC LAWS PUBLIC OPINION PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SERVANTS PUBLIC SERVICES PUNISHMENT REPRESENTATIVES RULINGS SECRECY SOCIAL POLICY TRANSPARENCY The note looks at effective anticorruption legal instruments, ensuring that laws are in place to deter corruption. However, law enforcement measures are not the first, or necessarily the preferred method of defense. An informed citizenry, a government imbued with a service ethic, and other measures can be more effective in combating corruption. But tailoring the law to enforcement capacity, generally encompass a variety of statutes that prohibit bribery, nepotism, conflicts of interest, and favoritism in the award of contracts, or the provision of government benefits. And, writing such laws contain "bright-line rules" that are contrasted with those containing standards that are open to interpretation by enforcement agencies. As an example of these "bright-line rules" the note provides the recent example from Argentina, where nepotism, and favoritism in government hiring are perceived as serious problems. Considerations to the inclusion of bright-line rules include, the preclusion of receiving gifts or payments by government employees; of interest in a corporation or entity affected by that employee's decision; of hiring relatives; and, that employees must publicly disclose assets hold. 2012-08-13T09:30:45Z 2012-08-13T09:30:45Z 2002-03 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2002/03/1998937/writing-effective-anticorruption-law http://hdl.handle.net/10986/9777 English Africa Region Findings & Good Practice Infobriefs; No. 203 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Brief Publications & Research Africa |
repository_type |
Digital Repository |
institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
institution |
Digital Repositories |
building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
collection |
World Bank |
language |
English |
topic |
CORRUPTION LEGAL FRAMEWORK LAW ENFORCEMENT LEGAL INSTRUMENTS CORRUPT PRACTICES BRIBERY CIVIL SOCIETY ETHICS ENFORCEMENT POWERS CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS CONFLICT OF INTERESTS CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT PUBLIC DISCLOSURE ACTIONS ANTI-CORRUPTION ANTICORRUPTION AUTHORITY BRIBERY BRIBES CITIZENS CIVIL SERVANTS CONFLICTS OF INTEREST CORRUPT ACTS CORRUPT OFFICIALS CRIME DEMOCRACY DISCRETION ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ETHICS GOVERNMENT ACTION GOVERNMENT AGENCIES GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS JUSTICE LAW ENFORCEMENT LAW REFORM LAWS LAWYER LEGAL ASPECTS LEGAL FRAMEWORK LEGAL REFORM LEGAL REFORMS LEGALITY LEGISLATION LIBEL MEDIA NATIONAL INTEGRITY NATIONAL LEGISLATION NATIONS NEPOTISM PROSECUTION PROSECUTORS PUBLIC LAWS PUBLIC OPINION PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SERVANTS PUBLIC SERVICES PUNISHMENT REPRESENTATIVES RULINGS SECRECY SOCIAL POLICY TRANSPARENCY |
spellingShingle |
CORRUPTION LEGAL FRAMEWORK LAW ENFORCEMENT LEGAL INSTRUMENTS CORRUPT PRACTICES BRIBERY CIVIL SOCIETY ETHICS ENFORCEMENT POWERS CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS CONFLICT OF INTERESTS CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT PUBLIC DISCLOSURE ACTIONS ANTI-CORRUPTION ANTICORRUPTION AUTHORITY BRIBERY BRIBES CITIZENS CIVIL SERVANTS CONFLICTS OF INTEREST CORRUPT ACTS CORRUPT OFFICIALS CRIME DEMOCRACY DISCRETION ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ETHICS GOVERNMENT ACTION GOVERNMENT AGENCIES GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS JUSTICE LAW ENFORCEMENT LAW REFORM LAWS LAWYER LEGAL ASPECTS LEGAL FRAMEWORK LEGAL REFORM LEGAL REFORMS LEGALITY LEGISLATION LIBEL MEDIA NATIONAL INTEGRITY NATIONAL LEGISLATION NATIONS NEPOTISM PROSECUTION PROSECUTORS PUBLIC LAWS PUBLIC OPINION PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SERVANTS PUBLIC SERVICES PUNISHMENT REPRESENTATIVES RULINGS SECRECY SOCIAL POLICY TRANSPARENCY Messick, Richard E. Kleinfeld, Rachel Writing an Effective Anticorruption Law |
geographic_facet |
Africa |
relation |
Africa Region Findings & Good Practice Infobriefs; No. 203 |
description |
The note looks at effective
anticorruption legal instruments, ensuring that laws are in
place to deter corruption. However, law enforcement measures
are not the first, or necessarily the preferred method of
defense. An informed citizenry, a government imbued with a
service ethic, and other measures can be more effective in
combating corruption. But tailoring the law to enforcement
capacity, generally encompass a variety of statutes that
prohibit bribery, nepotism, conflicts of interest, and
favoritism in the award of contracts, or the provision of
government benefits. And, writing such laws contain
"bright-line rules" that are contrasted with those
containing standards that are open to interpretation by
enforcement agencies. As an example of these
"bright-line rules" the note provides the recent
example from Argentina, where nepotism, and favoritism in
government hiring are perceived as serious problems.
Considerations to the inclusion of bright-line rules
include, the preclusion of receiving gifts or payments by
government employees; of interest in a corporation or entity
affected by that employee's decision; of hiring
relatives; and, that employees must publicly disclose assets hold. |
format |
Publications & Research :: Brief |
author |
Messick, Richard E. Kleinfeld, Rachel |
author_facet |
Messick, Richard E. Kleinfeld, Rachel |
author_sort |
Messick, Richard E. |
title |
Writing an Effective Anticorruption Law |
title_short |
Writing an Effective Anticorruption Law |
title_full |
Writing an Effective Anticorruption Law |
title_fullStr |
Writing an Effective Anticorruption Law |
title_full_unstemmed |
Writing an Effective Anticorruption Law |
title_sort |
writing an effective anticorruption law |
publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
publishDate |
2012 |
url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2002/03/1998937/writing-effective-anticorruption-law http://hdl.handle.net/10986/9777 |
_version_ |
1764410624479068160 |