Designing Auctions for Concessions : Guessing the Right Value to Bid and the Winner's Curse

Designing Auctions for Concessions : Guessing the Right Value to Bid and the Winner's Curse

Once a government has decided to award a concession by auction, it needs to decide what kind of auction to use. For concessions the standard is a first-price sealed bid auction in which bidders submit sealed envelopes containing their offer and the...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Klein, Michael
Format: Viewpoint
Language:English
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2012
Subjects:
CONCESSIONS
AUCTIONS
BIDDING
BIDS
PRICES
COLLUSION
SEALED BIDS
OPEN BIDS
SEQUENTIAL BIDDING
SIMULTANEOUS BIDDING
PREQUALIFICATION ASSETS
AUCTION
BID
BIDDERS
BIDDING FOR CONCESSIONS
BOOK VALUE
EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS
MONOPOLIES
OPEN AUCTIONS
TRANSACTION COSTS
TRANSPARENCY
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1998/11/441575/designing-auctions-concession-guessing-right-value-bid-sinners-curse
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11525

Internet

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1998/11/441575/designing-auctions-concession-guessing-right-value-bid-sinners-curse
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11525

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