Designing Auctions for Concessions : Guessing the Right Value to Bid and the Winner's Curse

Once a government has decided to award a concession by auction, it needs to decide what kind of auction to use. For concessions the standard is a first-price sealed bid auction in which bidders submit sealed envelopes containing their offer and the...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author:	Klein, Michael
Format:	Viewpoint
Language:	English
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2012
Subjects:	CONCESSIONS AUCTIONS BIDDING BIDS PRICES COLLUSION SEALED BIDS OPEN BIDS SEQUENTIAL BIDDING SIMULTANEOUS BIDDING PREQUALIFICATION ASSETS AUCTION BID BIDDERS BIDDING FOR CONCESSIONS BOOK VALUE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS MONOPOLIES OPEN AUCTIONS TRANSACTION COSTS TRANSPARENCY
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1998/11/441575/designing-auctions-concession-guessing-right-value-bid-sinners-curse http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11525

id	okr-10986-11525
recordtype	oai_dc
spelling	okr-10986-115252021-06-14T11:03:50Z Designing Auctions for Concessions : Guessing the Right Value to Bid and the Winner's Curse Klein, Michael CONCESSIONS AUCTIONS BIDDING BIDS PRICES COLLUSION SEALED BIDS OPEN BIDS SEQUENTIAL BIDDING SIMULTANEOUS BIDDING PREQUALIFICATION ASSETS AUCTION AUCTIONS BID BIDDERS BIDDING BIDDING FOR CONCESSIONS BIDS BOOK VALUE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS MONOPOLIES OPEN AUCTIONS TRANSACTION COSTS TRANSPARENCY Once a government has decided to award a concession by auction, it needs to decide what kind of auction to use. For concessions the standard is a first-price sealed bid auction in which bidders submit sealed envelopes containing their offer and the highest offer determines the price. The bidding may occur in one or two stages. In two-stage bidding the technical parameters of the bids are made comparable in the first stage, and only the main offer on the core bid parameter is submitted in the second. The main offer may relate to a price, a level of subsidy, a payment for net worth, or any other appropriate parameter; the discussion in this Note focuses on price. 2012-08-13T15:18:14Z 2012-08-13T15:18:14Z 1998-11 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1998/11/441575/designing-auctions-concession-guessing-right-value-bid-sinners-curse http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11525 English Viewpoint: Public Policy for the Private Sector; Note No. 160 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Viewpoint Publications & Research
repository_type	Digital Repository
institution_category	Foreign Institution
institution	Digital Repositories
building	World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection	World Bank
language	English
topic	CONCESSIONS AUCTIONS BIDDING BIDS PRICES COLLUSION SEALED BIDS OPEN BIDS SEQUENTIAL BIDDING SIMULTANEOUS BIDDING PREQUALIFICATION ASSETS AUCTION AUCTIONS BID BIDDERS BIDDING BIDDING FOR CONCESSIONS BIDS BOOK VALUE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS MONOPOLIES OPEN AUCTIONS TRANSACTION COSTS TRANSPARENCY
spellingShingle	CONCESSIONS AUCTIONS BIDDING BIDS PRICES COLLUSION SEALED BIDS OPEN BIDS SEQUENTIAL BIDDING SIMULTANEOUS BIDDING PREQUALIFICATION ASSETS AUCTION AUCTIONS BID BIDDERS BIDDING BIDDING FOR CONCESSIONS BIDS BOOK VALUE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS MONOPOLIES OPEN AUCTIONS TRANSACTION COSTS TRANSPARENCY Klein, Michael Designing Auctions for Concessions : Guessing the Right Value to Bid and the Winner's Curse
relation	Viewpoint: Public Policy for the Private Sector; Note No. 160
description	Once a government has decided to award a concession by auction, it needs to decide what kind of auction to use. For concessions the standard is a first-price sealed bid auction in which bidders submit sealed envelopes containing their offer and the highest offer determines the price. The bidding may occur in one or two stages. In two-stage bidding the technical parameters of the bids are made comparable in the first stage, and only the main offer on the core bid parameter is submitted in the second. The main offer may relate to a price, a level of subsidy, a payment for net worth, or any other appropriate parameter; the discussion in this Note focuses on price.
format	Publications & Research :: Viewpoint
author	Klein, Michael
author_facet	Klein, Michael
author_sort	Klein, Michael
title	Designing Auctions for Concessions : Guessing the Right Value to Bid and the Winner's Curse
title_short	Designing Auctions for Concessions : Guessing the Right Value to Bid and the Winner's Curse
title_full	Designing Auctions for Concessions : Guessing the Right Value to Bid and the Winner's Curse
title_fullStr	Designing Auctions for Concessions : Guessing the Right Value to Bid and the Winner's Curse
title_full_unstemmed	Designing Auctions for Concessions : Guessing the Right Value to Bid and the Winner's Curse
title_sort	designing auctions for concessions : guessing the right value to bid and the winner's curse
publisher	World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate	2012
url	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1998/11/441575/designing-auctions-concession-guessing-right-value-bid-sinners-curse http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11525
_version_	1764417049182863360

Designing Auctions for Concessions : Guessing the Right Value to Bid and the Winner's Curse

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