Designing Auctions for Concessions : Guessing the Right Value to Bid and the Winner's Curse
Once a government has decided to award a concession by auction, it needs to decide what kind of auction to use. For concessions the standard is a first-price sealed bid auction in which bidders submit sealed envelopes containing their offer and the...
Main Author: | Klein, Michael |
---|---|
Format: | Viewpoint |
Language: | English |
Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2012
|
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1998/11/441575/designing-auctions-concession-guessing-right-value-bid-sinners-curse http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11525 |
Similar Items
-
Infrastructure Concessions : To Auction or Not to Auction?
by: Klein, Michael
Published: (2012) -
Rebidding for Concessions
by: Klein, Michael
Published: (2012) -
Joint Bidding in Infrastructure Procurement
by: Estache, Antonio, et al.
Published: (2012) -
Bidders’ Entry and Auctioneer’s Rejection : Applying a Double Selection Model to Road Procurement Auctions
by: Estache, Antonio, et al.
Published: (2012) -
‘Red Flags of Corruption’ in World Bank Projects : An Analysis of Infrastructure Contracts
by: Kenny, Charles, et al.
Published: (2012)