Why Performance Contracts for State-Owned Enterprises Haven't Worked

Why Performance Contracts for State-Owned Enterprises Haven't Worked

When privatization is not feasible or palatable, developing country governments seeking to improve the performance of state enterprises are often negotiating performance contracts with their managers. Many of these contracts have been put in place...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Shirley, Mary
Format: Viewpoint
Language:English
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2012
Subjects:
PUBLIC ENTERPRISES
PERFORMANCE CONTRACTS
POLITICS
CONTRACTS
EFFICIENCY
LABOR PRODUCTIVITY
STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES
STATE RESPONSIBILITY
PROFITABILITY
ECONOMIC INFORMATION
CONTRACT NEGOTIATION
INCENTIVES
PENALTIES
CONTRACTING
GOVERNANCE BANKS
BOARDS OF DIRECTORS
BUREAUCRATS
EMPLOYMENT
IMPORT TARIFFS
LEVEL PLAYING FIELD
MANAGERS
MONOPOLIES
OPERATING EFFICIENCY
PRIVATE ENTERPRISES
PRIVATIZATION
PRODUCTIVITY
REFORMS
RETURN ON ASSETS
STATE ENTERPRISES
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1998/08/441600/performance-contracts-state-owned-enterprises-havent-worked
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11537

Internet

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1998/08/441600/performance-contracts-state-owned-enterprises-havent-worked
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11537

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