Buying Votes vs. Supplying Public Services : Political Incentives to Under-invest in Pro-poor Policies

Buying Votes vs. Supplying Public Services : Political Incentives to Under-invest in Pro-poor Policies

This paper uses unique survey data to provide, for the first time in the literature, direct evidence that vote buying in poor economies is associated with lower provision of public services that disproportionately benefit the poor. Various features...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Khemani, Stuti
Format: Policy Research Working Paper
Language:English
en_US
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2013
Subjects:
ACCESS TO HEALTH SERVICES
ACCOUNTABILITY
ACCOUNTING
ANTENATAL CARE
ASSETS
BASIC HEALTH SERVICES
BASIC SERVICES
BLOCK GRANTS
BRIBERY
CHILD HEALTH
CHILD HEALTH SERVICES
CIVIL SOCIETY
CLINICS
COMMUNITIES
COMMUNITY HEALTH
CONFIDENCE
CORRUPT
CORRUPTION
DECENTRALIZATION
DEMOCRACIES
DEMOCRACY
DESCRIPTION
DISTRICTS
DOCTORS
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
ECONOMIC POLICY
EMPLOYMENT
EQUILIBRIUM
EXPENDITURES
FAMILIES
FEMALE
FISCAL CAPACITY
FOLIC ACID
GOOD GOVERNANCE
HEALTH CENTERS
HEALTH FOR ALL
HEALTH INVESTMENTS
HEALTH OUTCOMES
HEALTH POLICIES
HEALTH POLICY
HEALTH PROFESSIONALS
HEALTH PROGRAMS
HEALTH PROJECTS
HEALTH PROVIDERS
HEALTH RECORDS
HEALTH SECTOR
HEALTH SERVICE
HEALTH SERVICE DELIVERY
HEALTH SERVICES
HOSPITALS
HOUSEHOLDS
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
HUNGER
IMMUNIZATION
INCOME
INFANT HEALTH
INFORMATION CAMPAIGNS
INTERVENTIONS
IRON
LAW ENFORCEMENT
LEASING
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
MEDIA
MEDICAL EQUIPMENT
MEDICINES
MONOPOLY
MUNICIPAL
MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS
MUNICIPALITIES
NEPOTISM
NURSES
NUTRITION
NUTRITIONAL STATUS
PATRONAGE
POLITICIAN
POLITICIANS
PREGNANCY
PRIMARY HEALTH CARE
PROBABILITY
PROCUREMENT
PUBLIC HEALTH
PUBLIC HEALTH PERSONNEL
PUBLIC HEALTH PROGRAMS
PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICES
PUBLIC HEALTH SPENDING
PUBLIC POLICIES
PUBLIC SERVICES
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT
REMEDY
RENTS
RESOURCE ALLOCATION
RULE OF LAW
SCANDALS
SERVICE DELIVERY
SETTLEMENTS
SOCIAL NETWORKS
SOCIAL SERVICES
STERILIZATION
TAXATION
THEFT
TRANSPARENCY
USER CHARGES
VILLAGE HEALTH WORKERS
VILLAGE LEVEL
VILLAGES
VIOLENCE
WORKERS
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/01/17200957/buying-votes-vs-supplying-public-services-political-incentives-under-invest-pro-poor-policies
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/13126

Internet

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/01/17200957/buying-votes-vs-supplying-public-services-political-incentives-under-invest-pro-poor-policies
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/13126

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