What Does Political Economy Tell Us About Economic Development and Vice Versa?

The author reviews how three pillars of political economy-collective action, institutions, and political market imperfections-help us answer the question: Why do some countries develop and others do not? Each makes tremendous advances in our under...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author:	Keefer, Philip
Format:	Policy Research Working Paper
Language:	English en_US
Published:	World Bank, Washington, D.C. 2013
Subjects:	POLITICAL ECONOMY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT COLLECTIVE ACTION INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL ASPECTS OF ECONOMIC POLICY VOTERS POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AGRICULTURE ANTI-CORRUPTION AUTHORITY BARRIERS TO ENTRY CABINET CABINET GOVERNMENTS CITIZEN CITIZENS COLONIES CONSTITUENCIES CONSTITUENCY CONSTITUENTS CONSTITUTION CORRUPTION CORRUPTION DATA COUNTRY DATA DECISION MAKERS DECISION MAKING DEMOCRACIES DEMOCRACY DEREGULATION DICTATORSHIP DISTRICTS ECONOMIC ACTIVITY ECONOMIC EFFECTS ECONOMIC POLICIES ECONOMIC POWER ECONOMIC RENTS ELECTION ELECTORAL RULES ELECTORAL SYSTEMS ELECTORATE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EXECUTIVE BRANCH FINANCIAL CRISES FORMAL INSTITUTIONS FRANCHISE GOVERNMENT ACTION GOVERNMENT CREDIBILITY GOVERNMENT DECISION GOVERNMENT DECISION MAKING GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE GOVERNMENT POLICY GOVERNMENT SPENDING GROWTH INCOME INEFFICIENCY INEQUALITY INSOLVENT INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS LAWS LEGAL OBSTACLES LEGISLATION LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEES LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS LEGISLATOR LEGISLATORS LEGISLATURE LEGISLATURES LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES LOWER HOUSE MINISTERS MONETARY POLICY MOTIVATIONS NATIONAL BUDGET NATIONAL INTEREST NATIONAL POLICY NATIONS NATURAL RESOURCES PARLIAMENT PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS PARTY DISCIPLINE PER CAPITA INCOME PER CAPITA INCOMES POLICY MAKERS POLICY MAKING POLICY OUTCOMES POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REFORM POLITICAL INSTABILITY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL LEADERS POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL RISK POLITICAL SYSTEM POLITICIANS PRESIDENTS PRICE CONTROLS PRIME MINISTER PRIVATE GOODS PRODUCER INCENTIVES PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC INTEREST PUBLIC INVESTMENT PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC SPENDING PURCHASING POWER PURCHASING POWER PARITY REPRESENTATIVES RULE OF LAW SAVINGS SENATE SEPARATION OF POWERS SKILLED WORKERS STANDING ORDERS STATE GOVERNORS TAX RATE TAXATION TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION TRADEOFFS VETO VETO POWER VOTER PREFERENCES VOTING WEALTH
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/03/3211802/political-economy-tell-economic-development-vice-versa http://hdl.handle.net/10986/14786

Internet

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/03/3211802/political-economy-tell-economic-development-vice-versa
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/14786

What Does Political Economy Tell Us About Economic Development and Vice Versa?

Internet

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