What Does Political Economy Tell Us About Economic Development and Vice Versa?

The author reviews how three pillars of political economy-collective action, institutions, and political market imperfections-help us answer the question: Why do some countries develop and others do not? Each makes tremendous advances in our under...

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Main Author:	Keefer, Philip
Format:	Policy Research Working Paper
Language:	English en_US
Published:	World Bank, Washington, D.C. 2013
Subjects:	POLITICAL ECONOMY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT COLLECTIVE ACTION INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL ASPECTS OF ECONOMIC POLICY VOTERS POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AGRICULTURE ANTI-CORRUPTION AUTHORITY BARRIERS TO ENTRY CABINET CABINET GOVERNMENTS CITIZEN CITIZENS COLONIES CONSTITUENCIES CONSTITUENCY CONSTITUENTS CONSTITUTION CORRUPTION CORRUPTION DATA COUNTRY DATA DECISION MAKERS DECISION MAKING DEMOCRACIES DEMOCRACY DEREGULATION DICTATORSHIP DISTRICTS ECONOMIC ACTIVITY ECONOMIC EFFECTS ECONOMIC POLICIES ECONOMIC POWER ECONOMIC RENTS ELECTION ELECTORAL RULES ELECTORAL SYSTEMS ELECTORATE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EXECUTIVE BRANCH FINANCIAL CRISES FORMAL INSTITUTIONS FRANCHISE GOVERNMENT ACTION GOVERNMENT CREDIBILITY GOVERNMENT DECISION GOVERNMENT DECISION MAKING GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE GOVERNMENT POLICY GOVERNMENT SPENDING GROWTH INCOME INEFFICIENCY INEQUALITY INSOLVENT INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS LAWS LEGAL OBSTACLES LEGISLATION LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEES LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS LEGISLATOR LEGISLATORS LEGISLATURE LEGISLATURES LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES LOWER HOUSE MINISTERS MONETARY POLICY MOTIVATIONS NATIONAL BUDGET NATIONAL INTEREST NATIONAL POLICY NATIONS NATURAL RESOURCES PARLIAMENT PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS PARTY DISCIPLINE PER CAPITA INCOME PER CAPITA INCOMES POLICY MAKERS POLICY MAKING POLICY OUTCOMES POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REFORM POLITICAL INSTABILITY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL LEADERS POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL RISK POLITICAL SYSTEM POLITICIANS PRESIDENTS PRICE CONTROLS PRIME MINISTER PRIVATE GOODS PRODUCER INCENTIVES PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC INTEREST PUBLIC INVESTMENT PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC SPENDING PURCHASING POWER PURCHASING POWER PARITY REPRESENTATIVES RULE OF LAW SAVINGS SENATE SEPARATION OF POWERS SKILLED WORKERS STANDING ORDERS STATE GOVERNORS TAX RATE TAXATION TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION TRADEOFFS VETO VETO POWER VOTER PREFERENCES VOTING WEALTH
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/03/3211802/political-economy-tell-economic-development-vice-versa http://hdl.handle.net/10986/14786

id	okr-10986-14786
recordtype	oai_dc
spelling	okr-10986-147862021-04-23T14:03:20Z What Does Political Economy Tell Us About Economic Development and Vice Versa? Keefer, Philip POLITICAL ECONOMY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT COLLECTIVE ACTION INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL ASPECTS OF ECONOMIC POLICY VOTERS POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AGRICULTURE ANTI-CORRUPTION AUTHORITY BARRIERS TO ENTRY CABINET CABINET GOVERNMENTS CITIZEN CITIZENS COLLECTIVE ACTION COLONIES CONSTITUENCIES CONSTITUENCY CONSTITUENTS CONSTITUTION CORRUPTION CORRUPTION DATA COUNTRY DATA DECISION MAKERS DECISION MAKING DEMOCRACIES DEMOCRACY DEREGULATION DICTATORSHIP DISTRICTS ECONOMIC ACTIVITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC EFFECTS ECONOMIC POLICIES ECONOMIC POWER ECONOMIC RENTS ELECTION ELECTORAL RULES ELECTORAL SYSTEMS ELECTORATE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EXECUTIVE BRANCH FINANCIAL CRISES FORMAL INSTITUTIONS FRANCHISE GOVERNMENT ACTION GOVERNMENT CREDIBILITY GOVERNMENT DECISION GOVERNMENT DECISION MAKING GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE GOVERNMENT POLICY GOVERNMENT SPENDING GROWTH INCOME INEFFICIENCY INEQUALITY INSOLVENT INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS LAWS LEGAL OBSTACLES LEGISLATION LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEES LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS LEGISLATOR LEGISLATORS LEGISLATURE LEGISLATURES LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES LOWER HOUSE MINISTERS MONETARY POLICY MOTIVATIONS NATIONAL BUDGET NATIONAL INTEREST NATIONAL POLICY NATIONS NATURAL RESOURCES PARLIAMENT PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS PARTY DISCIPLINE PER CAPITA INCOME PER CAPITA INCOMES POLICY MAKERS POLICY MAKING POLICY OUTCOMES POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REFORM POLITICAL INSTABILITY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL LEADERS POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL RISK POLITICAL SYSTEM POLITICIANS PRESIDENTS PRICE CONTROLS PRIME MINISTER PRIVATE GOODS PRODUCER INCENTIVES PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC INTEREST PUBLIC INVESTMENT PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC SPENDING PURCHASING POWER PURCHASING POWER PARITY REPRESENTATIVES RULE OF LAW SAVINGS SENATE SEPARATION OF POWERS SKILLED WORKERS STANDING ORDERS STATE GOVERNORS TAX RATE TAXATION TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION TRADEOFFS VETO VETO POWER VOTER PREFERENCES VOTERS VOTING WEALTH The author reviews how three pillars of political economy-collective action, institutions, and political market imperfections-help us answer the question: Why do some countries develop and others do not? Each makes tremendous advances in our understanding of who wins and who loses in government decision making, generally, but only a subset of this literature helps us answer the question. The study of political market imperfections strongly suggests that the lack of credibility of pre-electoral political promises and incomplete voter information are especially robust in explaining development outcomes. From the institutional literature, the most powerful explanation of contrasting development outcomes links political checks and balances to the credibility of government commitments. 2013-08-05T13:04:59Z 2013-08-05T13:04:59Z 2004-03 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/03/3211802/political-economy-tell-economic-development-vice-versa http://hdl.handle.net/10986/14786 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No.3250 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, D.C. Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research
repository_type	Digital Repository
institution_category	Foreign Institution
institution	Digital Repositories
building	World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection	World Bank
language	English en_US
topic	POLITICAL ECONOMY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT COLLECTIVE ACTION INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL ASPECTS OF ECONOMIC POLICY VOTERS POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AGRICULTURE ANTI-CORRUPTION AUTHORITY BARRIERS TO ENTRY CABINET CABINET GOVERNMENTS CITIZEN CITIZENS COLLECTIVE ACTION COLONIES CONSTITUENCIES CONSTITUENCY CONSTITUENTS CONSTITUTION CORRUPTION CORRUPTION DATA COUNTRY DATA DECISION MAKERS DECISION MAKING DEMOCRACIES DEMOCRACY DEREGULATION DICTATORSHIP DISTRICTS ECONOMIC ACTIVITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC EFFECTS ECONOMIC POLICIES ECONOMIC POWER ECONOMIC RENTS ELECTION ELECTORAL RULES ELECTORAL SYSTEMS ELECTORATE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EXECUTIVE BRANCH FINANCIAL CRISES FORMAL INSTITUTIONS FRANCHISE GOVERNMENT ACTION GOVERNMENT CREDIBILITY GOVERNMENT DECISION GOVERNMENT DECISION MAKING GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE GOVERNMENT POLICY GOVERNMENT SPENDING GROWTH INCOME INEFFICIENCY INEQUALITY INSOLVENT INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS LAWS LEGAL OBSTACLES LEGISLATION LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEES LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS LEGISLATOR LEGISLATORS LEGISLATURE LEGISLATURES LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES LOWER HOUSE MINISTERS MONETARY POLICY MOTIVATIONS NATIONAL BUDGET NATIONAL INTEREST NATIONAL POLICY NATIONS NATURAL RESOURCES PARLIAMENT PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS PARTY DISCIPLINE PER CAPITA INCOME PER CAPITA INCOMES POLICY MAKERS POLICY MAKING POLICY OUTCOMES POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REFORM POLITICAL INSTABILITY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL LEADERS POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL RISK POLITICAL SYSTEM POLITICIANS PRESIDENTS PRICE CONTROLS PRIME MINISTER PRIVATE GOODS PRODUCER INCENTIVES PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC INTEREST PUBLIC INVESTMENT PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC SPENDING PURCHASING POWER PURCHASING POWER PARITY REPRESENTATIVES RULE OF LAW SAVINGS SENATE SEPARATION OF POWERS SKILLED WORKERS STANDING ORDERS STATE GOVERNORS TAX RATE TAXATION TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION TRADEOFFS VETO VETO POWER VOTER PREFERENCES VOTERS VOTING WEALTH
spellingShingle	POLITICAL ECONOMY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT COLLECTIVE ACTION INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL ASPECTS OF ECONOMIC POLICY VOTERS POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AGRICULTURE ANTI-CORRUPTION AUTHORITY BARRIERS TO ENTRY CABINET CABINET GOVERNMENTS CITIZEN CITIZENS COLLECTIVE ACTION COLONIES CONSTITUENCIES CONSTITUENCY CONSTITUENTS CONSTITUTION CORRUPTION CORRUPTION DATA COUNTRY DATA DECISION MAKERS DECISION MAKING DEMOCRACIES DEMOCRACY DEREGULATION DICTATORSHIP DISTRICTS ECONOMIC ACTIVITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC EFFECTS ECONOMIC POLICIES ECONOMIC POWER ECONOMIC RENTS ELECTION ELECTORAL RULES ELECTORAL SYSTEMS ELECTORATE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EXECUTIVE BRANCH FINANCIAL CRISES FORMAL INSTITUTIONS FRANCHISE GOVERNMENT ACTION GOVERNMENT CREDIBILITY GOVERNMENT DECISION GOVERNMENT DECISION MAKING GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE GOVERNMENT POLICY GOVERNMENT SPENDING GROWTH INCOME INEFFICIENCY INEQUALITY INSOLVENT INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS LAWS LEGAL OBSTACLES LEGISLATION LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEES LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS LEGISLATOR LEGISLATORS LEGISLATURE LEGISLATURES LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES LOWER HOUSE MINISTERS MONETARY POLICY MOTIVATIONS NATIONAL BUDGET NATIONAL INTEREST NATIONAL POLICY NATIONS NATURAL RESOURCES PARLIAMENT PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS PARTY DISCIPLINE PER CAPITA INCOME PER CAPITA INCOMES POLICY MAKERS POLICY MAKING POLICY OUTCOMES POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REFORM POLITICAL INSTABILITY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL LEADERS POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL RISK POLITICAL SYSTEM POLITICIANS PRESIDENTS PRICE CONTROLS PRIME MINISTER PRIVATE GOODS PRODUCER INCENTIVES PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC INTEREST PUBLIC INVESTMENT PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC SPENDING PURCHASING POWER PURCHASING POWER PARITY REPRESENTATIVES RULE OF LAW SAVINGS SENATE SEPARATION OF POWERS SKILLED WORKERS STANDING ORDERS STATE GOVERNORS TAX RATE TAXATION TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION TRADEOFFS VETO VETO POWER VOTER PREFERENCES VOTERS VOTING WEALTH Keefer, Philip What Does Political Economy Tell Us About Economic Development and Vice Versa?
relation	Policy Research Working Paper;No.3250
description	The author reviews how three pillars of political economy-collective action, institutions, and political market imperfections-help us answer the question: Why do some countries develop and others do not? Each makes tremendous advances in our understanding of who wins and who loses in government decision making, generally, but only a subset of this literature helps us answer the question. The study of political market imperfections strongly suggests that the lack of credibility of pre-electoral political promises and incomplete voter information are especially robust in explaining development outcomes. From the institutional literature, the most powerful explanation of contrasting development outcomes links political checks and balances to the credibility of government commitments.
format	Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
author	Keefer, Philip
author_facet	Keefer, Philip
author_sort	Keefer, Philip
title	What Does Political Economy Tell Us About Economic Development and Vice Versa?
title_short	What Does Political Economy Tell Us About Economic Development and Vice Versa?
title_full	What Does Political Economy Tell Us About Economic Development and Vice Versa?
title_fullStr	What Does Political Economy Tell Us About Economic Development and Vice Versa?
title_full_unstemmed	What Does Political Economy Tell Us About Economic Development and Vice Versa?
title_sort	what does political economy tell us about economic development and vice versa?
publisher	World Bank, Washington, D.C.
publishDate	2013
url	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/03/3211802/political-economy-tell-economic-development-vice-versa http://hdl.handle.net/10986/14786
_version_	1764430076022095872

What Does Political Economy Tell Us About Economic Development and Vice Versa?

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